defense watch

April 2008

Changes to Military Strategy, In Time for the Next War

By Sandra I. Erwin

It is a Pentagon cliché that the military is always preparing for the last war.

Iraq is far from over, but the Defense Department — and notably the Army — already are rewriting military doctrine so that forces are adequately trained and ready for another Iraq-like conflict years or decades from now.

Just during the past year, a new Pentagon policy and a revamped Army operations manual have officially made nation-building and post-war reconstruction primary duties for the military.

These so-called “stability operations” are now on equal footing with traditional combat, which means the Pentagon expects the military services to train and equip forces for such missions.

The Army’s recently published field operations manual, the FM3-0, constitutes a major endorsement of this new policy. It is the guidebook that the Army probably wished it had written a decade ago, so it would have been better prepared to cope with the chaos and violent insurgency that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Although it could take years to turn this new policy into actual changes to the military’s force structure and budgets, observers are rather impressed that that the Army is choosing to go in this direction, rather than stick to its traditional focus on preparing for big all-out wars.

“We are seeing the Defense Department and the Army doing something that’s never been done before — elevating stability operations,” says Roger D. Carstens, a senior military analyst at the Center for a New American Security.

It is still unclear how the Army plans to move forward as it tries to carry out this new doctrine. Some factions within the Army are advocating the creation of a permanent “advisory corps” that would specialize in training foreign troops. But the service’s senior leadership so far have resisted the idea, arguing that the Army is now too stressed and overcommitted. In the near term, the Army will study and test several “prototype” advisory team arrangements, says Maj. Gen. David A. Fastabend, director of strategy, plans and policy.

The Defense Department’s policy — known as directive 3000.05 — does not specifically tell the services how to go about training and equipping forces for stability operations. “Directive 3000.05 is a policy-setting instrument, not a roadmap with a checklist,” says Celeste Ward, deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability operations capabilities.

The Army general who oversaw the writing of the field manual says that he expects some pushback from those who view stability operations as a distraction from war fighting.

“Throughout my entire military career, I was taught that if, in fact, you can conduct operations at the high-end level, major wars, then you can do any lesser, including this type of activity,” says Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

“What these past years have shown us is that’s not the case,” Caldwell tells reporters.

Among the most immediate changes that can be expected within the Army is a boost in civil affairs organizations, he says. “For the brand-new recruit coming in, the change you’re going to see is an emphasis on cultural awareness.”

Carstens gives the Army credit for introducing such seismic doctrinal changes at a time when the force is strained from the war and faces a tough environment for recruiting and retention.

The commanders in the field no doubt are happy to see the Army go in this direction, Carstens says. “It takes time for the rest of the building to catch up.”

Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, who commanded U.S. forces in Iraq and is now the vice chief of staff, says there is no going back to the old ways. The Army must not forget what it learned during the past five years, Odierno says. “We can’t ever completely go back to conventional.”

The new field manual should be viewed as a “strong and powerful vote” for the Army shifting more resources to irregular warfare, Carstens says. But the change will not be sudden. “The Army is like an aircraft carrier, you just can’t turn it on a dime.”

A bigger problem for the Army as it tries to carry out stability operations is that it probably will have little civilian support. “We are never going to win the peace alone. So until we can get the interagency, the whole of government engaged, we’re going to continue to be challenged,” Caldwell said.

An abundance of rhetoric about the importance of having State Department officials involved in nation-building so far has not been backed up by actions or funding. “It’s common knowledge in Washington that we have a major problem with the interagency,” Carstens says. In 2004, State created a new organization to support post-war reconstruction, but thus far only a handful of people from that agency are qualified to deploy to combat zones.

Although the Army’s field manual doesn’t say so, the biggest lesson to be learned is that you should never start a war until you know how the war ends.

Please email your comments to SErwin@ndia.org

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