Washington pulse

July 2007

By Sandra I. Erwin

Armored Vehicles: Why So Slow?

Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., has for several months been asking Pentagon officials to explain why they can’t deploy mine-resistant vehicles to Iraq fast enough. “How is it possible that with more than 130,000 Americans in danger, with roadside bombs destroying … lives and limbs, we were so slow to act to protect our troops?” Biden asked in a letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Defense officials have cited industrial capacity issues and steel availability as impediments to increasing production. But according to industry insiders, the reason why MRAP production cannot be rapidly accelerated is that vehicles have to comply with a standard design, or “technical data package” that would ensure some degree of commonality across the fleet. Not many companies are able to do that. Biden is said to be trying to convince the Marine Corps and the Army that they should acquire other mine-resistant vehicles that were not selected by the MRAP program but have proven that they can do the job.

Lack of Security Clearance Hinders Armor Suppliers

A full-court press by the Pentagon to accelerate the production of MRAP has raised fundamental questions about the Defense Department’s ability to acquire critical hardware on short notice. One major bottleneck in the MRAP program — as well as in other projects that involve sensitive armor technology — has been the scarcity of contractors who have the secret clearances that are required to get access to the technical specs of military armor.

“What I’ve seen is a problem getting ballistic specs to industry,” said Donald Akers, manager of tactical vehicle programs at Whitney Bradley and Brown Consulting. “We’ve got a real bureaucracy that tied down the clearances,” Akers noted. He recalled that when the Army hosted an industry conference in 2005 to discuss its “armor strategy,” of the 50 people who showed up, only two had clearances. “Most people don’t have the specs to know what ballistic protection to make.”

Military Acquisitions Divorced From Real Needs

When it comes to its acquisition programs, the Air Force could benefit from some serious soul-searching, said two retired four-star generals. Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard Myers urged current leaders to reevaluate spending priorities, even if it requires a shakeup of the acquisition culture.

“We need changes in acquisition,” Jumper told an aerospace industry audience. “We’ve been through record budgets in the Air Force in the past five years, but we really haven’t bought much of anything.” One flaw in the current system is that buying decisions often are disconnected from real-world needs, Jumper said. “We need to produce results that are usable to commanders on the ground.”

The Pentagon acquisition system in general “has grown away from the operational side,” Myers said. During his time in the building, Myers oversaw the drafting of guidelines for the procurement of “joint” weapon systems. These documents, however, never were helpful to anyone, Myers admitted. “I’m ashamed that this came about on my watch,” he said. “As I try to read it, I find that I don’t understand the words. They are explained in a torturous way.”

‘Joint’ Acquisitions Not Always the Best Choice

Pentagon acquisition officials for years have been looking for ways to develop joint weapon systems that can be used by all services. The focus currently is “too much on everything being joint,” said Eileen Giglio, assistant deputy undersecretary of defense for business transformation. Sometimes, that thinking goes too far, she told defense contractors. “It costs more money and takes more time. In the end, is the war fighter getting the best products? Or are we spending too much time worrying if everyone is happy, and then nobody is happy?”

Please email your comments to SErwin@ndia.org

Back To Top