Defense Watch

April 2007

Military Readiness: Candid Assessments Long Overdue

By Sandra I. Erwin

Alarm bells have gotten progressively louder and more jarring in recent weeks on the issue of military readiness.

The warnings voiced by military officials, lawmakers and a chorus of beltway pundits are hardly surprising: The nation’s army is so overcommitted in Iraq that it could not respond to another major unforeseen contingency.

Four years of rotational deployments to Iraq have been debilitating. And while there is no shortage of evidence to prove that point, it is notable that these cautionary outcries only came to light after the departure of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

On several occasions since December 2006, both Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. James T. Conway, have repeatedly said they worry that the Iraq rotations are relentlessly stressing the force. They warned that while units are being trained and equipped to fight in Iraq, the troops back home remain unprepared to engage in another conflict, if one erupted unexpectedly. There simply isn’t enough personnel and equipment to fight the war and simultaneously keep up the training for skills other than counterinsurgency.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace echoed the unease in a February report to Congress. But fearing that these revelations would embolden would-be enemies, Pace also tried to soften the blow by assuring potential foes that the United States would be “able to respond elsewhere in the world to another threat … We would freeze the units that are in Iraq and Afghanistan in place, and mobilize our Reserve.”

The chairman obviously wants to play down the challenges we face because he’s worried about adversaries exploiting the situation, said Michele Flournoy, a former Pentagon official and military expert at the Center for a New American Security.

If other conflicts required heavy use of air and naval forces, there would be no problem. But another major ground war would be a tall order, unless the president risked his popularity dipping even lower by mobilizing the entire National Guard and Reserves, Flournoy said. “If you are looking for a full ground force, short of mobilizing the entire National Guard and Reserves, it would be hard to respond to a sizeable conflict.” Under the current partial mobilization, the president “almost has exhausted what he can do.”

Four years of Iraq deployments have created in the Army a readiness caste system of “haves” and “have-nots.” Those units that are not heading to Iraq suffer from personnel, equipment and training shortfalls.

“The Army is cannibalizing units at home to man and equip deploying units which are left behind in shambles, less able to respond to any unforeseen contingency,” Flournoy said. “There’s no strategic reserve.”

Back in the early 1990s, the Defense Department used to brag about its readiness to engage in two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. That scenario was never put to the test, but it nevertheless helped affirm the United States’ status as a global superpower.

But Iraq turned all pre-existing notions of readiness upside down.

The invasion of Iraq was planned as a major conflict that would be over in weeks. If that had been the case, the Army most likely would have been able to redeploy to another war relatively painlessly. Unfortunately for the Army, Iraq has been all about “post-conflict” or what the Pentagon calls “stability operations.” And a civil war to boot.

“It’s the rotation base that kills you,” Flournoy said. “It’s not just going in and out. Sustaining that rotation over time is a killer. For every unit forward they need two to three back home training.” Of the Army’s 44 combat brigades, 31 have been to Iraq at least twice, according to a recent report by the Center for American Progress.

The administration’s attempt at fixing the problem was to approve an increase of 65,000 troops for the Army and 27,000 for the Marine Corps. But by all accounts, it will take at least five years to get that many new recruits and prep them to fight. By the time the Army and the Marine Corps complete their expansion plans, a safe prediction is that the nation will be so war-averse from the Iraq experience that it may no longer want or need such a large force.

While Iraq rotations continue unabated, the mounting strain on the all-volunteer force may prove incapacitating, if not fatal, Flournoy predicts. “The first time they’re patriots, they are glad to serve. Even two or three times. By the time someone is going for the third or fourth time with less than a year at home between tours, it’s starting to put real pressures on soldiers and families.”

Short of a draft or full mobilization of the Guard and Reserves, the administration is gambling that the volunteer force can hang on, at least until the end of Bush’s term. As to whether the ground forces can be counted on to respond to another conflict, it probably would be best to not send them, several officials have suggested. At least two top generals who were asked that question acknowledged that the Army and the Marine Corps could realistically engage in another major war, but that the cost in lives would be huge.

Former Pentagon official Lawrence Korb, a critic of the administration, said the Army’s predicament would be hard to reverse in the near term. Even if the Army left Iraq today, he said, it would need at least a decade to recover.

Please email your comments to SErwin@ndia.org

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