DefenseWatch

By Sandra I. Erwin

Defensewatchjuly The Defense Department, it appears, has a serious case of the “innovator’s dilemma.” Like many successful mega-corporations, the Pentagon has been a leading developer of cutting-edge technology. It also has fielded the world’s most advanced military force. But at the same time, it has created self-defeating mechanisms that quash innovation and fail to capitalize on available opportunities.

Being victim of your own success is what causes the innovator’s dilemma — a catchphrase coined by Harvard Business School Professor Clayton Christenson.

A company he founded, Innosight, currently is advising an unidentified cadre of military and defense officials who worry that, no matter how much money the Pentagon spends, it is failing to provide relevant training and equipment for combat troops.

Since the early days of the occupation of Iraq and the ensuing counterinsurgency campaign, the Defense Department has accelerated the delivery of new technologies to meet urgent commanders’ requests. Nevertheless, the right tools are not getting to the troops fast enough, argues Mark Johnson, co-founder and president of Innosight.

“The circumstance of the current military is exactly the same as companies and industries we’ve studied, in the sense of having to deal with dramatic change,” says Johnson.

The traditional forms of research, development, and acquisition have served the nation well, Johnson says. “However, we are in different circumstances today. We need a parallel, nontraditional system that helps us win the nontraditional war we are in.”

Prime examples of what afflicts the Pentagon can be seen on the frontlines, says Charles McLaughlin, an executive at Innosight and Army Special Forces reservist.

Much attention is paid to developing ultra-high-end technology, often at the expense of mundane but necessary items that can make a huge difference in war. He cites the predicament faced by soldiers responsible for guarding checkpoints. These troops are unable to stop approaching vehicles by firing warning shots, because their weapons are not loud enough. As a result, they are left with no recourse but to shoot at automobiles that, more often than not, are occupied by innocent civilians.

“People are unnecessarily dying, which hurts our counterinsurgency efforts, just because we don’t have a loud enough noise maker,” McLaughlin says. A soldier who was a former police officer suggested that a stoplight similar to those found on cop cars in the United States would fix the problem. A number of soldiers ended up buying stoplights out of their own pockets.

Most recently, the Pentagon began purchasing a green-laser device specifically for checkpoint use. “I’m hoping that we’ll have many, many more that we can use here before too long,” Lt. Gen. Pete Chiarelli, a senior commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, told reporters.

The Pentagon finally delivered a solution, but it should not have taken this long, McLaughlin says.

Early in the conflict, the Army realized that its standard procurement system would not fit the bill, so it created the “rapid equipping force” to meet urgent needs. But even that has not been enough to overcome endemic dysfunctions in the way the Pentagon and the defense industry supply technology to the force.

While the Defense Department has poured billions of dollars into armor protection and counter-explosive technologies, it has been unable to stop the mounting U.S. casualty toll caused by roadside bombs. Again, the institution is getting in the way of innovation, McLaughlin contends.

“The Defense Department needs to set up a parallel structure to deal with these unconventional threats.” To be successful, the Pentagon has to break away from the culture that aims for “perfect” technology and learn how to incorporate “good enough” technology into weapon systems and training.

The industry is also to blame, Johnson says. “I am not aware of any major defense contractor that has set up a separate entity to do the kinds of things the Army needs in terms of new equipment.” Major contractors traditionally focus on “high-end, gold-plated sophisticated pieces of equipment” and are not financially motivated to address urgent but less glamorous needs the Army has today.

A former industry executive who is now the secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter, echoed this notion in a speech to the Navy League. According to Winter, the industry has not put its “best minds” into tackling technical challenges such as the IED threat. These are not considered lucrative projects, compared to multibillion-dollar ships and combat aircraft.

Another glaring example of misguided priorities is the costly and technically complex “joint tactical radio system” currently in development, Johnson says. Most soldiers just need a simple device to communicate, and many of them buy their own commercial radios.

Military policies also have been slow to adapt to the current environment. “Our current doctrine still says that what’s going in Iraq is not war. It is an ‘operation other than war,’” McLaughlin says. Counterinsurgency and stability operations are not viewed as war.

Both Johnson and McLaughlin acknowledge that their criticisms could be dismissed as ivory-tower academic analysis. But their own military experience and interaction with frontline troops convince them that the innovator’s dilemma that they see in many industries and organizations also ails the Defense Department.

“Our central idea, after all, is the seemingly obvious insight that the military, like any organization, must understand and organize for the actual situation it faces if it hopes to succeed.”

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