viewpoint

December 2006

Simulation-Based Acquisition: Too Many Studies

By James F. O’Bryon

Modeling and simulation have long been touted by the Defense Department as offering savings in time and money in developing military systems. But efforts to move toward “simulation based acquisition” in the military remain only a bumper sticker.

Estimates for how much is spent annually on modeling and simulation in the Defense Department range from $5 billion to $30 billion, depending on how one defines modeling and simulation. While some of the spending is in support of training, the bulk of the funds are allocated to research, development, testing and evaluation of new defense acquisition programs.

A recent report published by the National Research Council committee on modeling and simulation enhancements for 21st century manufacturing and acquisition provides some thought-provoking observations regarding the history and progress, or lack thereof. It was commissioned by the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.

The committee reviewed no less than 10 other studies which had earlier addressed many of the same concerns regarding the lack of organization and structure in the Defense Department’s modeling and simulation activities.

Einstein defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over, expecting different results.” This is essentially what has been happening during the past two decades in modeling and simulation. Numerous studies conducted over this time period are unanimous in their conclusions.

However, findings don’t remedy problems. Recommendations must be acted upon. In fact, Johnny Foster, the former Defense Science Board chairman, noted that the “best way to make recommendations become of no effect is to simply agree with them.”

Regardless of whether the annual Defense Department investment in modeling and simulation is $5 billion or $30 billion, it’s a huge investment that must not be squandered.

According to the National Research Council report, “Many barriers remain to more widespread use of modeling and simulation in defense systems acquisition. These barriers include inadequate allocation of resources, lack of information for acquisition program managers, lack of an integrated software systems engineering process, issues related to the protection of intellectual property rights, poor information dissemination on simulation-based acquisition to the broader modeling and simulation community, and insufficient education and training for the work force.”

One would think that after this much attention to the topic, at least some measurable progress would be evident. The answer may lie in the reality that those who drew the conclusions were not the ones who were also responsible for implementing the recommendations. The answer may also lie in the fact that little to no incentives to implement them were given, nor any penalties prescribed if they were not adopted.

At the core of the problem is that the bulk of the funds available to support modeling and simulation in defense acquisition are controlled by program managers. Since their longevity in these positions is typically one acquisition milestone, investment in meaningful modeling and simulation is not high on the priority list and hence, the Defense Department continues to muddle through its investment process, with few incentives and virtually no penalties for those involved to be more efficient through the use of modeling and simulation.

Until the Defense Department either has a major change in the way its major acquisition programs are managed and funded, or takes an alternative approach to unify the funding and development of these models, it will continue to waste literally billions of dollars a year on modeling and simulation in support of acquisition, not to mention the millions spent on studies.

James F. O’Bryon served as deputy director of operational test and evaluation in the office of the secretary of defense from 1998 until 2001.

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