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November 2005

Will Capitol Hill Keep Funding Missile Defense for Airliners?

By Joe Pappalardo

An effort to protect commercial aircraft against shoulder-fired missiles will face a critical moment in January, when Congress is scheduled to vote on whether to continue funding development of the system. President George W. Bush’s 2006 budget proposed a $49 million increase in funding for the project, raising the total to $110 million.

The controversial program has traveled a long road, according to its director, James Tuttle, in the Department of Homeland Security Office of Systems Engineering and Development.

The initial response to a 2003 request for proposals generated 110 white papers, ranging from the possible to the absurd. One advocated shooting Roman Candle fireworks from planes; another called for a net to snare onrushing missiles.

“Don’t laugh,” he told attendees at a recent conference hosted by DHS, referring to the net scheme. “The Defense Department actually tested that.”

Three teams were selected to move on: Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems and United Airlines were awarded $2 million each to develop a countermeasure system to defend commercial aircraft against shoulder-fired missiles. The UA idea—using flares, infrared and oxidizing countermeasures—was cut in favor of other methods that spoof oncoming threats with lasers.

The BAE system takes an internal-mounting approach, building the tracking and laser targeting components into the aircraft. Grumman’s proposal advocates installing pods onto aircraft that can be removed and reinstalled as the need dictates. Both companies currently are installing prototypes—BAE in a Boeing 707 and Grumman in a Boeing MD-11.

If Congress approves, the second phase of the contract will feature construction and testing of systems. Tests will involve firing real missiles and judging the two finalists’ abilities to deter them from striking their targets, Tuttle said.

Another major hurdle involves maintenance. Military anti-missile systems get checked after 300 to 1,000 flight hours, while commercial systems would get an inspection after 3,000 to 5,000 flight hours, he noted.

The false-positive rate for a system on a commercial airliner also would have to be much less than on a military aircraft. The analysis would be done by ground controllers, who would be alerted instantly to any missile incident and fed relevant data.

DHS shares responsibility for testing the systems with the Federal Aviation Administration, with DHS evaluating performance and the FAA checking airworthiness, Tuttle said.

Resistance to the program has been strong since its inception. Naysayers come from every direction, including Capitol Hill, aerospace pundits and segments of the airline industry itself. “Airlines are struggling, to say the least. The last thing they want to do is take on one extra cent,” he said. “They’ve been reluctant. We’ve received pushback, especially from the unions.”

Additional problems are presented by federal technology-export laws. Under U.S. law, exports of unique, sensitive systems are controlled tightly.

“As soon as the wheels leave the ground on an international flight, we are exporting technology to other countries,” Tuttle said. “Anti-tamper technology is one area we need help with.”

DHS also is focusing on new ways to reduce aircraft signatures and to land damaged airplanes safely. One promising project is the Propulsion Control for Aircraft Recovery, a joint effort with NASA to design software to compensate for damages to hydraulics. Tuttle said that an aircraft could fly without flaps solely by using thrust for control, if the correct programming could take the new conditions into account.

DHS has aviation concerns well beyond surface-to-air missiles, Tuttle said, even though the missile program gets most of the press and congressional attention. Other threats include high-caliber rifle shots at low-flying planes, increasingly powerful commercial lasers that can blind pilots and a slew of sabotage methods that will necessitate integrating next-generation explosive and biological- agent-detection systems into airplanes, Tuttle said.

Additional worries that will generate future government contracts from the research community involve information security, chiefly the protection of navigation and communication infrastructure from dangerous sabotage.

“Commercial airplanes were not designed with security in mind,” he noted. “The only thing they were worried about was bird strikes to the engines.”

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