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FEATURE ARTICLE
November 2005
Nuclear Detectors Tested in Nevada Desert
By Joe Pappalardo
The Department of Homeland Security’s newest office—dedicated
to stopping a nuclear attack on U.S. soil—has begun testing
detection devices at ranges in Nevada.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, established in April of
this year, inherited the project, known as the Advanced Spectroscopic
Portal program, from the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency.
HSARPA in 2004 awarded contracts to 10 companies, calling for the
development of detectors that can discriminate between naturally
occurring radioactive materials and ingredients that could be used
to create a nuclear device. Those contracts have been transferred
to the DNDO.
The companies have provided prototypes of the detectors that they
would like to sell to DHS. DNDO began testing them in August at
the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation
Complex at the Nevada Test Site, near Las Vegas, according to Vayl
Oxford, acting director of the program. Testing is expected to continue
through the end of this month.
Successful vendors will be asked to begin low-rate production of
detection systems to be deployed at the U.S. borders with Mexico
and Canada.
The portal program is among the first concrete steps taken by the
new office. The DNDO is part of DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff’s
effort to reorganize his department to focus upon the most serious
threats to U.S. security.
The office will be staffed with DHS technicians and nuclear-detection
experts from various state and federal agencies, Oxford said. Cooperation
between the office and the various other agencies involved in the
counter-nuclear proliferation is voluntary.
Detecting a nuclear device within U.S. borders is not the way that
DHS wants to deal with such a threat, Oxford said. The preferred
method would be to seize the nuclear material abroad, before it
enters the United States, he said.
The DNDO “will not undermine” those efforts, but he
cautioned that the United States “cannot rely on that alone.”
The portals are just one segment of a massive, worldwide effort
to track illicit nuclear materials and keep them away from American
soil. Oxford outlined a future counter-nuclear plan with the ability
to fuse detection data and intelligence assessments in near real-time.
That effort requires coordination with allied countries, as well
as other U.S. agencies, such as the Departments of Defense and State
Department, and the FBI, he said.
Coordinating with so many players is a serious challenge, Oxford
said. The problem of systems integration alone “is of biblical
proportions,” he said.
As DHS envisions the process, for example, every detection at a
land crossing would be reported to a central collection point for
analysis. Not only does this place increased demands on computer
networks, but it also complicates design requirements for engineers
working on the frontline equipment.
One key requirement is to minimize false alarms, which could cause
a flood of useless data, reducing confidence in the systems and
damaging international trade. Many harmless items, such as cat litter
and granite tiles, can trigger radiation detectors. With the massive
amount of cargo and vehicles being scanned, even very low false-positive
rates could translate to large numbers of pointless searches and
data crunching.
Another problem is the ability of some dangerous materials to slip
through a technology net.
Highly enriched uranium is a serious nuclear-terrorism threat,
because its stocks are more plentiful, less secure and easier to
use than plutonium, Oxford said. Unfortunately, he added, it also
emits a weak radiation trace, posing a large challenge to detectors.
The testing in Nevada is intended to discover equipment that can
detect the real threats, even with a weak signal, Oxford said.
“All the technology solutions will be validated through what
we can claim are high fidelity testing and evaluation … before
any acquisitions are made,” he said.
The next generation of detectors has to be easy for people with
little technological training to use. “I believe the burden
[of nuclear safety] will fall on federal, state and local law-enforcement
personnel,” Oxford said. “We have to bring radiation
detectors to their daily lives and daily operations.”
Strategic decisions need to be made concerning where detection
devices would be used. While land bridges and seaports are obvious
sites, other places—such as major cities and infrastructure—also
would need protection, he said.
“The establishment of these sites obviously will be risk
responsive and risk prioritized,” he said. For example, he
explained, Washington, D.C., and New York City are tempting terrorist
targets and would be high on a priority list for detectors.
Even if commercial technology was up to the tasks required by DNDO,
Oxford said, adapting it for homeland security poses an engineering
challenge. “With commercial-off-the-shelf products, you end
up deploying 100 systems,” he said. “We need one system
with 100 protection elements.”
In addition to the portal program, the DNDO is working to develop
other technologies to establish a synthesized, real-time monitoring
system.
More requests for proposals are expected by the year’s end,
including one for Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems,
designed to automatically check cargo with new signatures so that
terrorists cannot shield illicit materials. Another request will
focus on high-tech, handheld devices for use by Border Patrol agents
in the field and other law enforcement officers on land and at sea.
Longer-term goals include a quest for better standoff-detection
gear, Oxford noted. Next-generation equipment needs “to better
enable a broad range of detection, especially in search and surveillance,”
he said.
The DNDO also sees great promise in new materials, such nano-enhanced
or superconductive fibers, which can be molded into lightweight
containers with improved detection properties.
Oxford said that the potential impact of even a small nuclear attack
on U.S. soil has forced the government to pour resources into thwarting
such an event. “If we’re in clean-up mode, we have failed
miserably.”
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