FEATURE ARTICLE

March 2005

Defense Review: Beltway Dogfighting at Its Best

by Sandra I. Erwin

Military officials have, in recent weeks, been diligently articulating their thinking on how each service contributes to the overall national security strategy.

This is the rhetorical drill that is expected during the preparation of the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review. But this year’s QDR debate is somewhat different, in that it is being shaped largely by the notion that, somehow, the Navy and the Air Force will need to help offset the growing costs of keeping the Army and the Marine Corps heavily engaged in the Middle East.

Also framing the discussion are the administration’s marching orders to the Pentagon to cut spending from weapons programs to help pay for Iraq war costs and tax cuts. It all adds up to a surefire recipe for a nasty inside-the-beltway dogfight.

Veterans of past quadrennial reviews agree that it can get ugly, although they regard the process as a necessary evil that does not interfere with the close inter-service cooperation seen on the front lines.

“The QDR tends to bring out the worst in all of us,” noted Gen. John Jumper, chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force. Similarly, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James F. Amos, commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force, recalled the unpleasantness he experienced in the 2001 QDR. “It’s a very painful process. It doesn’t necessarily make friends among the services.”

In anticipation of inter-service tension over budget issues, the civilian leaders at the Pentagon directed that the QDR be more about “major ideas” on the priorities of national security, rather than a “laundry list” of pet projects, according to outgoing Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith.

In the world of Pentagon politics, however, the grand concepts that end up in the QDR only can become relevant if they are associated with concrete weapon systems and technologies.

Among the assumptions of the 2005 QDR is that the services should work together as a seamless fighting entity, and that they must have a force that can combat “irregular” enemies, such as shadowy terrorist networks, and respond quickly to “catastrophic” events such as 9/11. At the same time, they will have to sharpen their conventional military capabilities to fight traditional wars.

For the Army and Marine Corps, the implication is that they will keep doing what they are doing today in Iraq, where they fight irregular enemies every day. In the context of the QDR, the burden is on the Navy and the Air Force to show how they contribute to the success of the ground force.

A war of words already is raging over what capabilities are more valuable. A case in point is a proposed Navy-Marine concept for deploying high-tech floating bases that can serve as launch platforms for Army and Marine forces in the early phase of a conflict.

Although the price tag associated with this proposal—estimated between $14 billion and $30 billion—could doom the project, it is also perceived as an attempt to take over traditional Air Force missions. The Air Force views the sea-base concept as potentially undercutting its role as provider of strategic and tactical airlift, which is dependent on access to ground-based runways.

Observers already have alerted the Navy and Marines to prepare to rewrite their marketing pitch. “You can’t build a multibillion-dollar project and the only thing you sell is the Navy-Marine Corps team,” said retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, who participated in a Defense Science Board study on sea bases.

“From what I’ve seen to date, your message isn’t very good,” Scales told a meeting of the Surface Navy Association.

The next day, Scales’ observations prompted an angry Navy rebuttal. “I would challenge Scales’ assumptions,” said Rear Adm. William D. Sullivan, vice director of the Joint Staff.

But many supporters of sea bases attending the SNA meeting actually welcomed Scales’ critique as helpful advice. They fear that the narrow thinking still seen in some quarters at the Pentagon could crush a program, which, outside its inner circle, is viewed as pie-in-the-sky.

Although the Air Force does not openly criticize the Navy’s plan, it is subtly suggesting that sea bases have a long way to go before they graduate from a Powerpoint briefing.

“The concept needs to gain more maturity for us to understand how we can use it,” said Brig. Gen. Allison A. Hickey, Air Force assistant deputy director of strategic planning. “We are not negative. We are watching … It is premature to say what our position is.”

Beyond all the back-and-forth oratory, the bottom line remains that the services are being asked to do more, and most likely with less money. “We are expanding the set of problems that the Defense Department recognizes we are going to play a role in,” conceded Feith.

As the four-year defense review gets enmeshed in the battle for dollars, QDR planners may not want to be reminded that previous exercises have been severely discredited for ending up as a wish list of unattainable and unaffordable goals.

To be sure, the way the discussion is being framed obscures basic truths about modern U.S. military operations, such as the fact that every service plays a significant role. Even though soldiers and Marines are doing the heavy lifting and taking the brunt of the casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, ground forces are highly dependent on naval and air power for a myriad of battlefield functions, ranging from close-air support to transportation, aerial refueling, command-and-control, air defense and intelligence gathering.

Defense planners can be notoriously bad at predicting the future, cautions retired Air Force Gen. Richard Hawley. Ironically, it was the Army that was being targeted for major cuts only a few months before 9/11. Hawley’s advice to QDR officials: “show a little humility” when planning for the future.

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