FEATURE ARTICLE

June 2005

Space Programs Aren’t ‘Broken,’ But Need Fixes

By Edward Swallow

As space programs come under increasing scrutiny—under the Nunn-McCurdy legislation—for cost overruns and schedule delays, it is important to understand the complexity and uniqueness associated with these systems.

Space acquisition programs are different from other military procurements. Unlike aircraft programs that procure hundreds of units, space systems are purchased in small numbers, typically the minimum to fill the constellation. This can be as few as one or two spacecraft. As a result, when a system runs over budget, it often is not possible to cut quantities, which means that program officials end up delaying capability or sacrificing performance.

Space programs also are different because of their long cycles. It can take 10 years to build a satellite. Small production numbers and highly specialized components result in custom-built satellites. The majority of the system “life cycle” cost is incurred during the engineering of spacecraft, which is the inverse of aircraft and munitions programs.

There are very few cookie-cutter satellites. The Global Positioning System is the lone exception. Upfront engineering is critical, because there are no “600-mile long screwdrivers.” Because of the limited ability to repair or upgrade satellites on orbit, changes are limited to operational uses—no parts’ fixes—and ground and software modifications. Any changes to space-based hardware are executed in the next block of production.

These circumstances call into question whether categorizing satellites as procurement units is appropriate. Congressional appropriations language considers procurement units those that are made after one or two research and development units are produced. Cost increases in non-recurring design of R&D satellites are spread over a limited number of procurement units. This is leading to increasingly frequent Nunn-McCurdy breaches in space programs as they work their way through final engineering stages, and gives the appearance that “space is broken, ” even when those breaches occur before any long-lead items have even been ordered.

Allowing a “management reserve” fund in space program budgets is critical. With a 10-year development cycle, it is commonplace to have just-maturing technologies targeted for inclusion on a spacecraft. This level of risk is necessary, because the technology life cycle is such that any mature technology selected at the beginning of a program is potentially obsolete before launch. A management reserve would help bring stability to a program.

The next step is to make sure the programs are well run, well engineered, affordable and sustainable.

Recent discussions among space industry leaders point to several key factors in the current state of space acquisition.

• Acquisition reform initiatives in the early ‘90s created programs that tested out problems late in the cycle, rather than engineering when it is least expensive.
• The wholesale rejection of specs and standards created a market situation that resulted in inconsistency in ordering parts and material that pervades the problems we are having in those areas.
• The concept of total system performance responsibility created program offices with the “technology” versus “cost” pendulum too far in the cost column.

A directive called NSS 03-01 takes the best practices of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Defense Department and builds an underpinning of systems engineering and technology maturation in space programs. Standards and specifications are coming back, not as a prescription for “how to,” which is left to the market to decide, but rather a definition of “what is,” as in “what is the standard interface” and “what is the desired functionality.”

According to the outgoing commander of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, Lt. Gen. Brian Arnold, this newfound rigor “ensures the next generation of space programs will be built with mission focus and systems engineering rigor, balanced against schedule and cost.”

Edward Swallow chairs the Space Division of the National Defense Industrial Association

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