FEATURE ARTICLE

February 2005

Sharper Focus On Special Operators Seen Worldwide

by Roxana Tiron and Joe Pappalardo

Special operations forces around the world are being molded in the image of the elite military units of the United States, a development that is likely to shape future coalitions. Critics warn, however, that U.S. commando units may not make an ideal model, because their organization is fragmented and their tactics are not as unconventional as they could be.

“The trend is that most countries in the world are trying to design around the U.S. model,” said Tim Eades, a former U.S. Army Ranger currently employed by Blackbird Technologies Inc., a firm that does consulting work with the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla. “Since the Iron Curtain came down they seem to be saying, ‘Let’s go the way the U.S. guys do it.’”

For example, Romania, one of the newest NATO members, is patterning its special operations units after the U.S. commandos, government defense officials told National Defense. Similarly, the Polish GROM, which is earning its reputation as a first-class counter-terrorism unit, was modeled after U.S and U.K. special operations units in 1991.

But some critics argue that countries seeking to enhance their SOF units according to the U.S. model should proceed with caution. The organization of special operations in the United States, for example, is tied to a large bureaucracy that potentially can stifle innovation, noted Michael Cheswick, a retired SEAL who now studies at the University of San Diego.

“U.S. units are part of Special Operations Command, and are part of their respective services,” he told National Defense. “Since the Pentagon’s conventional commanders have tried to push special operations under the rug over the years (because of rivalry), special ops leadership has finally worked its way in the door as conventional support.”

Cheswick called it the “most defeatist plan of action” on the part of special operations. “That move pushed the doctrine of unconventional warfare capability out the door because they had to convince the conventional commanders that they could play according to their rules.”

According to Cheswick, special operations in the United States became decidedly conventional instead of unconventional. “Nobody in the program understands what it is to be truly unconventional anymore, and the tragedy is that these units were set up under this very premise,” he said.

The United States and other countries trying to establish their own special forces have some learning to do from their British and European counterparts, Cheswick said. “Whereas U.K. and others are organized along clear lines, U.S. units are fragmented,” he said.

Despite organizational issues, training for the U.S. special operators is top-notch, he said. Nations from every continent have hosted U.S. special operations troops in joint training and advisory roles, which has established the framework for future cooperation on joint missions. Popular zones for these exercises include South America, the states of the former Soviet Union and Southeast Asia.

Special forces exchanges are often the first military-to-military contact between the United States and other nations. The reason for this, Eades explained, is that the higher level of training and equipping makes collaboration more effective.

“The special operations guys have the same kind of mission sets,” he added. “Linking up an infantry battalion from Taiwan with an infantry battalion from Fort Campbell, Ky., is tough. But the special operations forces have a lot more in common.”

Every nation retains its own flavor of training, Eades noted. Special operations officers in Indonesia, he said, take live gunshots to the chest to demonstrate the effectiveness of their flak jackets to their troops, and advocate using trances to achieve higher states of learning. Called Kopassus, the Indonesian special forces regiment is regarded as one of the toughest in the world. Its record, however, is tarnished by human rights abuses in East Timor. In 1998, the U.S. military, which has trained and collaborated with Kopassus, stopped its relationships because of the unit’s involvement in torturing political dissidents.

But the United States has been considering renewing its aid to Detachment 81, the counterterrorism arm of Kopassus as part of the war against terrorism. The unit was responsible for liberating passengers from a Garuda Airlines aircraft that was hijacked by Islamic extremists in 1981. The Defense Intelligence Agency and Agency for International Development representatives said Detachment 81 has not violated human rights and is adept at tracking down and nabbing hard-to-find terrorists.

Australia, for its part, also is trying to renew its relationship with the Indonesian military after a string of bombings in Indonesia that killed hundreds of Australians.

At a time when U.S. forces are stretched thin, the ability to rely on allied special forces units is critical. Australia in 2002 established a special operations command to better coordinate its counter-terrorism capabilities in the region and around the world. A special forces task group was part of Australia’s contribution to the military campaign in Iraq, and was used for sensitive, high-risk missions.

“Special force operations in the western desert of Iraq were aimed at preventing the use of ballistic missiles,” said Matt Francis, spokesman for the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

U.S. special operations troops are often at the forefront of military operations, and gathering intelligence with the foreign troops with which they will be fighting is vital to their mission success.

The Special Operations Command carefully documents the capabilities of potential coalition allies after each training-collaboration, Eades said. “You don’t want to go into an operation in a city with special forces equipped with 9 mm ammunition you know has such a high velocity that it can penetrate walls,” he said, referring to the risk of fratricide and civilian casualties.

Other equipment needs are evaluated after SOF training, and while the United States can’t give or sell military equipment without going through channels, the special forces liaisons make recommendations on equipment purchases, upgrades and doctrine, Eades said.

The list of those who don’t pursue the U.S. model is rather short. The two most prominent are the North Korean and Chinese armies, which have their own methodologies. How much is known about those elite troops is seldom discussed in unclassified environments.

During the Cold War, the Soviet model for special operations offered a competing approach, Eades noted. The Spetnatz were small units trained in special operations in support of a larger combat operation. They did not work autonomously, he said, and placed a greater emphasis on spy-craft and deception than U.S. military forces.

“They could go into plainclothes at any time and be all they could be,” Eades said. That covert capability was often made suspect by the physical builds of the Spetnatz troops, who were typically over six feet tall and heavily muscled. “It’s very hard to infiltrate a guy who looks like Charlie Atlas,” Eades said.

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