FEATURE ARTICLE

February 2005

Advanced Communications Net Debuts With 3rd Infantry Division

by Sandra I. Erwin

An obsolete analog communications network—plagued by spotty coverage, limited bandwidth and poor connectivity—is being replaced by a more capable commercial system in reorganized Army divisions.

At the same time, Army planners are seeking less expensive alternatives to commercial satellites and are drastically revamping signal corps support to these newly restructured tactical formations.

Although the Army in recent years has spent billions of dollars on programs to upgrade tactical communications, command and control networks, the Iraqi conflict brought to light serious shortfalls. Most notable is a “digital divide” between the division level—where massive volumes of data pour in—and the front-line troops, which often lack connectivity and access to critical intelligence.

Based on lessons from the initial phase of the war, the Army decided to put together a vastly improved communications network, which is being showcased by the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, and later will be expanded to other units.

Headquartered at Fort Stewart, Ga., the division led the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and returned to the United States in October.

Now on its way back to the war zone, the 3rd ID has become a touchstone for the Army’s so-called “transformation” into a more flexible force, with a flatter command structure and an assortment of new communications technologies intended to address the connectivity problems the division experienced during its first Iraq deployment.

It took about nine months to get the division equipped with a $300 million Internet-based high-speed communications backbone.

“For military acquisition, it’s speed of light,” says Lt. Col. Frank Huber, chief information officer for the 3rd ID. The technology replaces the Army’s analog-based communications system, called mobile subscriber equipment. “Having lived through the fielding of MSE, we talked about it for a decade before we actually got it,” Huber tells National Defense. By contrast, the new network was completed at a pace that is unprecedented in major procurement programs, he says. “This all happened in about nine months by the time they brought the system to Fort Stewart.”

Huber attributes the rapid procurement to a “combination of finding the money and using commercial off-the-shelf technology.” All the components in the system are the same as those commonly found on AT&T, MCI, Sprint or any other commercial network, Huber says. The communications services are linked via commercial satellite. The router and switching technologies also are commercial, as is the telephone technology.

“They saved an incredible amount of time on design because all they had to do was take these commercial systems and put them together inside an Army vehicle,” he notes.

The new capability, called the joint network transport capability, has three major components: a main network hub, network nodes that connect brigade and division headquarters, and battalion command post nodes that link the battalions into the network. The contractors responsible for integrating the systems are General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin.

The brigade and division systems, called joint network nodes, are assembled in hard shelters mounted on Humvees. The battalion nodes consist of satellite communications terminals aboard trailers.

The upshot is that brigade and battalion commanders have a direct connection into the strategic network, Huber notes. “That’s a big change for us. Instead of going through the big layers of command above us to get our connectivity, we will actually link directly into the joint defense information systems agency network.”

From the viewpoint of a battalion commander, this level of connectivity is exceptional, Huber says. “It’s a wonderful capability to have … It gives us access to both unclassified and classified networks.”

The system also offers phone service, via the Pentagon’s “defense switch network.” It’s wired for a third network, which typically would be from a non-U.S. coalition partner, Huber offers. “Each theater is different, but it’s pre-wired to take coalition operations into account.”

The division’s logistics units also will be part of the network. “We put a joint network node at the division support brigade headquarters, which is the logistics command for the division,” Huber says. “Each of the logistics battalions gets a battalion command post node.”

The logisticians will rely on the unclassified network to connect with depots or other organizations to request parts and supplies.

The backbone of the system is satellite-based communications. This is the answer to the original problem the division experienced in Iraq: the terrestrial communications were too slow to react to the pace of maneuver. During the division’s march toward Baghdad, commanders relied on a commercial Ku-band satellite link in order to un-tether the maneuver commander from earthbound links.

“Commercial satellites offered much greater bandwidth than we had with the old military satellite,” Huber points out.

For this coming deployment, U.S. Central Command has leased space on a commercial Ku-band satellite exclusively for use by the 3rd ID.

In the long run, however, the Army plans to eventually lower its dependence on commercial satellites, because of the high cost. A major step in that direction could happen as early as next year, when the Defense Department launches its next-generation wideband gapfiller satellite, notes Lt. Gen. Steven Boutelle, the Army’s chief information officer.

“The government owns that, so we won’t have to pay leasing costs,” he tells reporters. “The intent is to move everything to Ka-band. We’ll get access to the first satellite in spring 2006, assuming a successful launch … We pay a terrible cost for commercial Ku-band satellite lease in the Gulf.”

To expedite the 3rd ID’s training on the new equipment, the Army gave $9 million in extra funds to its information technology school at Fort Gordon, Ga.

“Our priority is to get the schools up to date on this,” says Boutelle.

Boutelle, who spearheaded the development and fielding of the JNTC system, said he was concerned that the rotation of troops in and out of Iraq would interfere with the training program, which typically takes five months at the schoolhouse. So the Army hired General Dynamics C4 Systems to provide training on-site at Fort Stewart, make CD-ROMs for self-learning and work out equipment kinks with field engineers.

“That does not replace the resident school program, but it was the only way to accommodate their schedules,” says a General Dynamics spokesperson.

Huber agrees that rotations cause disruptions to training, particularly because of the fast pace at which the Army fielded this system, he says. “We compressed the training timeline a lot … It was very fast and very intense. Soldiers learned a lot in a short amount of time.”

Fort Gordon officials have visited the 3rd ID to learn how to best tailor the training programs, Huber says. “They’ve watched what we’ve done, they’ve talked to soldiers.”

Division commanders, additionally, are having to learn to operate under a new division structure, called “modular,” which will be implemented across the Army during the next several years. The idea is to take a division that previously had three brigades and reconfigure it into four brigades that can operate more autonomously from division headquarters. The 3rd ID is the first division to go through this changeover.

Under the old design, for example, the 3rd ID had a signal battalion for the division. All the signal assets were concentrated into that battalion. That signal battalion no longer exists; the components are embedded in each unit. Every maneuver battalion has a battalion command post node that is part of that battalion. Every brigade has a signal company that supports the brigade headquarters with the JNN technology. The division has a signal company that supports the division headquarters with those same systems.

Most importantly, Huber says, the maneuver commander now owns those signal assets. Previously, all the command-and-control capability resided within that signal battalion. “For a brigade to operate independently, you had to cut part of that signal battalion to that brigade. Now, he owns the management and the assets. He can manage his own network independent of the division.”

Soldiers at the lower echelons also appreciate the ease of use of this new equipment, especially in austere battlefield conditions, Huber says. “You can set up an antenna in a few minutes. The antenna is mounted on a trailer that the vehicle moves. It’s kind of amazing to watch. It lifts itself off the trailer, rotates automatically, finds the satellite on its own and within a few seconds it’s tracking the satellite,” he explains. “In a relative short time, soldiers can set up the telephones and land connections for the brigade or battalion tactical operations center … It doesn’t matter if they are five miles or 500 miles from the division headquarters.”

So far, the 3rd ID is the only division that has this equipment. But the Army already has allocated $247 million to deploy the system to the 101st Airborne Division, in Fort Campbell, Ky.; the 4th Infantry Division, in Fort Hood, Texas; and the 10th Mountain Division, in Fort Drum, N.Y.

The 101st Air Assault Division was to begin receiving the technology in January.

The implications of the JNTC technology could be much broader as the Army continues to reorganize into modular brigades. Under current plans, the service intends to field a new “war fighter information network” called WIN-T, which is in the early stages of development.

The JNTC provides an immediate solution to the problems that WIN-T was designed to solve, said Boutelle. “But the Army could not wait until 2009 to get WIN-T.”

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