ARTICLE

September 2004

Security Beat

by Joe Pappalardo

Vaccine Stockpiles Now Required by Law
President George W. Bush in late July signed a bill to develop and stockpile vaccines, and other antidotes to biological and chemical weapons.

The bi-partisan legislation, dubbed BioShield, provides the drug industry with incentives to research and develop bioterrorism countermeasures, speeds up the approval process of antidotes and allows the government, in an emergency, to distribute certain treatments before the Food and Drug Administration has approved them.

“We know that the terrorists seek an even deadlier technology,” Bush said at the signing. “If they acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, we have no doubt they will use them to cause even greater harm.”

The law authorizes $5.6 billion over 10 years. Among the initiatives being funded are the purchases of a second-generation smallpox vaccine and an antidote to botulinum toxin, as well as the research of new treatments for chemical and radiological injuries. The National Institutes of Health will administer programs to speed up the processing of grants to develop treatments for weapons of mass destruction attacks.

There is some doubt among industry experts, however, on whether the vaccine approach is effective. Ken Alibek, executive director of education at the National Center for Biodefense at George Mason University and former Soviet bioweaponeer, noted that it is far easier to develop a weapons-grade disease than produce a vaccine against it.

In a statement released through Aethlon Medical Inc., where Alibek serves on the board of directors, he said vaccines wouldn’t be practical since they must be administered before an attack to be truly effective, and there was no way of knowing which agents to guard against. He suggested that more money be dedicated to post-exposure treatment rather than preventative defense.

Commission: Military Had No Warning During 9/11
Three of the four hijacked planes used during the attacks of September 11, 2001 had already crashed by the time fighter pilots scrambled to intercept them, according to the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States.

Officials with North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS), based in Rome, N.Y., had nine minutes’ notice on the first hijacked plane and no advance notice on the other three, the report states.

The only military aircraft that was in position to witness the attack on the capital was an unarmed National Guard C-130H, heading for Minnesota and re-vectored by Reagan National Airport controllers to identify a “suspicious aircraft.” That aircraft was American Flight 77, heading towards a fiery crash at the Pentagon.

The C-130 pilot found the plane, followed in its path and witnessed the Boeing 757’s descent into the Pentagon. That pilot later reported a column of black smoke from United 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers rushed the cockpit, the first report of that aircraft being downed.

“More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response, ” the report noted, before outlining several incorrect reports from NORAD on exactly when the defense command received information.

Among the confusing reports are intercept orders given to thwart hijackings that didn’t take place, while two actual planes were careening towards Washington, D.C. Testimony from NORAD to the commission indicated the military had 47 minutes to respond to United 93, when in truth, the report states, “by the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.”

At Langley Air Force Base, fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09 a.m. This was done in case they needed to be sent to New York; NORAD had no indication that any other planes had been hijacked. At 9:34 a.m., the Federal Aviation Administration advised that Flight 77 was missing, location unknown; three minutes later it crashed into the Pentagon.

The commission report scuttles the idea, put forth by senior administration officials, that United Flight 93 could have been shot down prior to reaching targets in Washington, D.C. The commission timeline shows that the FAA notified the military of the hijacking at 10:07; four minutes after the pane had crashed. Additionally, fighters from Langley were not given clearance from NEADS commanders to shoot down aircraft. That clearance was later given by President Bush.

“The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with pre-existing training and protocols,” the report said. “It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear (by removing transponders) and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction…We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities.”

Since the attacks of 2001, the Pentagon established Northern Command to better defend U.S. airspace.

Simulated Agent Mimics Bio-Terror Weapons
Scientists in Kansas City have created a biological simulant that impersonates dangerous pathogens, a development that eases the testing of detection systems.

Sceptor Industries Inc. engineered the product, called BioSim, in a partnership with the Midwest Research Institute. The company is marketing genetically tailored simulants for a variety of pathogens. For example, scientists make an anthrax mimic by taking DNA from a common, harmless anthrax substitute called Bacillus globigii and chemically attaching it to the generic BioSim beads. That way, the resulting particle behaves like anthrax as far as detection systems can tell, with no risk.

The test particles are designed to be collected and analyzed using polymerase chain reaction methods, a common but expensive process that is used in virtually all currently deployed detection systems. Company officials said future efforts would concentrate on simulant compatibility with other forms of detection.

“It’s imperative to routinely perform quality control checks on our detection systems,” said Richard Jarman, Sceptor’s chief executive officer. “Biosim is the first quality assurance test that will safely check every aspect of the system.”

Unlike previous simulants, the engineered mimics can be used in large-scale open-air tests, enhanced detection equipment training for specific agents and the evaluation of biodefense gear against specific threats. Most importantly for the product’s usefulness, the phony agents do not contaminate systems and require no special cleaning. They also naturally degrade, making later false positive hits unlikely, Jarman noted.

Cyber-security Hampered by Lack of Attention
The state of cyber-security in the United States is suffering from a lack of attention from industry and academia, according to a leading national information technology expert.

“Research funding from the federal government is mainly going into the biological area,” said Harris Miller, president of the Information Technology Association of America. “Why? We’re more scared of dying than getting a computer virus.”

Since the threat is considered second-tier, gaps in computer defenses will remain open, Miller told the President’s Information and Technology Advisory Committee in late July. Since many of the homeland security missions rely on information technology, such as the U.S. Visit program at border crossings and cargo tracking at ports, the chink in the armor needs to be addressed, Miller said.

One large problem is the divide between academia and industry. A lack of students entering the profession may leave the United States at a disadvantage, and those who bring cyber security programs into the field often face differences in the professional culture. “Most of the physical security people are from law enforcement or military backgrounds, while most of the cyber security people come from the geek community,” Miller said. “They’ve never even talked.”

Adding to the problem, there is a general lack of corporate will to tighten internet security, he added. Excepting financial services industry, Miller noted, “Cyber security is number 11 on a ten item list of what a company needs to do.”

Miller suggested that the academic community and industrial base reach out to each other to create solutions. He said that despite the seeming corporate apathy there is a market for the technology. “There are dozens and dozens of very small firms that are thought leaders and have excellent products, and would be happy to collaborate,” he said. “People are hungry for new technological approaches. Any research that is practicable will be avidly consumed.”

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