ARTICLE

December 2002

Navy Keeps Mine-Warfare Options Open

Budget cuts and ongoing changes in concept of operations slow down programs

by Sandra I. Erwin

Among the most mind-numbing jobs in the U.S. Navy is the uncovering and defusing of deadly mines located throughout the world’s oceans. The work is tedious, but essential to the conduct of U.S. military operations, given that most of the combat supplies and troops travel by ship to the world’s major theaters of war.

Mines can be floating or rising devices that typi-cally are placed in deep water. Moored and buried mines, by and large, are scattered in shallow water areas and surf zones. Sea mines often are called the poor man’s arsenal, because they are cheap and low tech but can cause pervasive destruction.

More than 50 countries currently possess mine inventories and are able to deploy more than 300 varieties of mines.

Finding and eliminating these underwater killers are jobs assigned to the Navy’s dedicated mine countermeasure (MCM) force, which consists of 14 Avenger class and 12 Osprey class mine hunter-killers, two MH-53 helicopter squadrons, and a specialized explosive ordnance disposal unit. The USS Inchon command-and-control ship for countermine operations was decommissioned earlier this year, and the Navy now is seeking a replacement.

In the future, the Navy wants to have an array of advanced mine detectors and anti-mine capabilities aboard each carrier battle group. Officials decided several years ago that the dedicated MCM force, although competent, is not able to respond and reach the combat zone quickly enough. In the mid 1990s, the Navy started a program to develop a set of organic mine countermeasure systems that would travel with each battle group. The service has spent between $200 million and $300 million during the past five years on the development of these technologies. The cost of deploying organic MCM systems aboard ships and helicopters is not known, given that the Navy has not yet defined what the organic MCM force will look like.

As recently as two years ago, the Navy’s official plan was to have the organic MCM systems in place on 10 carrier battle groups by 2005. Over time, the dedicated force would be downscaled. The MCM systems for each carrier group would include five airborne devices, based on helicopters, as well as two unmanned submersibles—one launched from a destroyer and the other from a submarine.

But Navy officials now concede that the original organic MCM concept was flawed, because it did not thoroughly consider the logistics and operational implications for the battle group. “The problem with organic MCM was that the conops [concept of operations] was not thought through,” said one former U.S. Navy mine warfare officer who did not want to be quoted by name.

The desirability of organic MCM systems has not changed, but the plan had to be revised, because surface-warfare officials complained that the MCM equipment and associated manpower could end up diverting resources away from combat operations.

These concerns, in addition to budget cutbacks to the organic MCM program, prompted the Navy’s mine-warfare requirements office to downscale the program and seek a new approach for deploying organic MCM.

Under the current plan, the Navy will go ahead and begin fielding organic MCM systems in 2005, but at a “limited rate,” said Capt. James Rennie, head of mine warfare programs at the office of the chief of naval operations.

Adding a new twist to the MCM program is the possible introduction in the U.S. Navy of a small surface combatant, called the Littoral Combat Ship. The LCS could end up becoming a core platform for many of the MCM systems that originally had been assigned to destroyers or submarines, Rennie told National Defense.

Some time next spring, the Navy will unveil an updated version of its mine warfare “master plan.” The release of a revised master plan, however, does not imply that the basic strategy for fielding mine countermeasures has changed, Rennie said.

Even though there will be cutbacks in the program, he said, “There is no change in strategy.”

The notional makeup of the organic MCM force in each battle group would include three airborne platforms (sensor-towing helicopters), a submersible attached to a submarine (called LMRS, for long-range mine reconnaissance system) and three larger submersibles (called RMS, for remote mine hunting system) that would be launched from destroyers or from the LCS.

In the Navy’s five-year budget, the MCM program has taken some hits, Rennie said. The upshot is that not every battle group will have as many MCM systems as planned.

“We are backing off a couple of systems, not because of technology ... but rather as a result of affordability problems and some administrative issues,” he said.

The deployment schedule and quantities of MCM systems ultimately may change, said Rennie, because the Navy wants the fleet to test and experiment with the MCM technology, before any final decisions are made. That does not mean necessarily that the “fleet doesn’t like mine warfare,” he said. “Once we determine effectiveness, we may adjust the ultimate final quantities in the fleet.”

Logistics Burden
The perception that the fleet does not welcome organic MCM was fueled by statements from some Navy officials, who questioned whether the anti-mine equipment and associated duties would place undue logistical burdens on the war-fighting units.

Earlier this year, Vice Adm. Timothy LaFleur, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s naval surface force, said that it would be too costly and inefficient to add organic MCM systems to existing warships. But he said he supports using the LCS as an anti-mine platform.

“I absolutely think the surface Navy has accepted mine warfare,” said LaFleur during a roundtable with reporters. “Whether we do it organically or whether we do it as part of the littoral combat ship, is the real debate.

“I don’t think it is efficient to do it organically, the way it was originally envisioned,” he said.

LaFleur speculated that the LCS would be a more suitable platform for MCM systems than destroyers or cruisers. “You can fly in the mission package, load it aboard the littoral combat ship and move it to where you need ... within a number of hours.”

Adding MCM functions to destroyers may not make economic sense, he noted. “The organic capability would be very expensive to build into every ship ... because you don’t know which ship is going to be where, when you run into a mine threat. ... Putting an unmanned submersible organic on every ship is really expensive.”

The Navy had planned to install the RMS submersible on up to 17 new Arleigh-Burke class destroyers. The order now has been scaled back to six systems, and it’s not clear how many of the six, if any, will be installed on destroyers or on LCS.

The reason why the Navy wanted organic MCM, said LaFleur, was to be able to clear a passageway for the battle group to sail through. If that is the case, he said, “Why don’t I just put it on one ship that leads the others through the minefield. I don’t need to put it on each and every ship.”

The former mine-warfare naval officer said that the concerns voiced by LaFleur and other senior officials drove the Navy to reconsider the organic MCM concept of operations. “We don’t want MCM to impede our other missions,” he said. “They should not get in the way, but be available when needed.”

The Navy’s mine-warfare “master plan” is expected to reflect the new approach to organic MCM and will advocate experimentation with smaller LCS-type vessels.

As part of the experimentation effort, the Navy Warfare Development Command is leasing a high-speed catamaran from an Australian firm to explore the use of RMS and other MCM systems aboard small vessels. The NWDC experiments will begin in the spring. The Navy, Army and Marine Corps already have been testing another leased catamaran, called the Joint Venture, during the past two years.

This summer, scientists from the Office of Naval Research tested an unmanned reconnaissance mine-hunter vehicle, launched from the Joint Venture, during the so-called Fleet Battle Experiment Juliet, off the coast of California.

At the experiment, Joint Venture served as a platform for the Remote Environmental Monitoring Unit Systems (REMUS), a small unmanned submersible developed by the Office of Naval Research and the Wood Hole Oceanographic Institution.

Two REMUS prototypes have been deployed for use by a special-warfare unit, known as the Very Shallow Water Mine Countermeasure Detachment, in San Diego. The unit includes Navy SEALs and Marines.

The 80-pound REMUS can perform reconnaissance missions in coastal waters up to 100 meters deep. The operators connect REMUS to a computer and program specific coordinates into the hard drive located inside the unit. The coordinates specify what area REMUS will survey.

Members of the MCM unit then transport it by boat to a specific location, drop it off and retrieve it, after the mission is completed. REMUS employs side-scan sonar and high frequency imaging sonar to gather information, which can be downloaded after it’s brought back to the ship.

During the Fleet Battle Experiment, the REMUS also was launched from the Sea Slice vessel, a novel design that has four separate underwater hulls. The manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Corp., is marketing the ship as a possible candidate for the Navy’s LCS.

The Sea Slice also served as a platform for a side-scan sonar device—called Klein 5000—that was used to identify potential mine-like objects. Once the sonar found an object, REMUS would be sent over to identify it as a possible mine. Side-scan sonar picks up sound to produce images of the seafloor.

Systems such as the Klein 5000 and the REMUS could be applied in an organic MCM mission, said Robby Harris, program manager at Lockheed Martin. If the Navy chose to deploy the much larger Remote Mine Hunting System aboard the Sea Slice, a crane would be needed to lift the submersible aboard and to place it in the water.

The Navy SEALs, meanwhile, have fielded a modified version of the REMUS, known as the semi-autonomous hydrographic reconnaissance vehicle.

The SAHRV can be launched from a rubber craft or from a submarine. It is used by SEALs to scan sections of the ocean from the 21-foot to the 10-foot mark, and relies on side-scan sonar to identify obstacles.

The vehicle navigates via transponders that are installed 60-100 nautical miles from the shore. SEALs in the craft can monitor the operation in real time and can reprogram the vehicle. The SAHRV can search an 800 by 1,000-yard area in about 3.5 hours. The Special Operations Command is spending $25 million on the program and plans to field 14 vehicles.

The REMUS technology officially is not in the Navy’s MCM acquisition program yet, but likely will be, once the testing and development work are completed, said Thomas Swean, program manager for ocean engineering and marine systems at the Office of Naval Research. He noted that the vehicle has been in development for more than 10 years.

The organic MCM technology, generally speaking, could be in the fleet much sooner than the 2005 planned deployment timeframe. The technology is ready, he said, but the expected budget cuts will slow down the program.

Swean said most of the REMUS demonstrations in the future will be aboard the HSV catamaran, rather than the Sea Slice.

“REMUS is not a system locked into any particular boat,” he said. It’s small—about 85-90 pounds and 5-feet long. It could be deployed from helicopters or rubber boats.

He noted that REMUS is one of two autonomous unmanned reconnaissance vehicles that ONR sponsored under the MCM program. The other system is called Cetus II, currently in development by Lockheed Martin Corp.

Cetus was designed for explosive-ordnance disposal applications, Swean explained. It is smaller and more maneuverable than REMUS. The Cetus sensors operate at short ranges but have much higher resolution, which help produce detailed images that are used to identify mines.

Very Shallow Waters
Under a separate program, ONR scientists are testing technologies that potentially could help crack one of the most vexing challenges in MCM—develop mechanical sensors that can identify mines accurately in shallow waters—less than 10-feet deep—as effectively as live dolphins and human divers do today.

Tim Schnoor, program manager for mine countermeasures at ONR, explained that shallow-water and surf areas offer ideal grounds for enemy mines, because the environment is cluttered with other metal debris, making it harder to detect the real mines.

Close to the beach, Schnoor said, “Typically, you have more mine-like objects, such as 55-gallon barrels, old refrigerators, cars, junk in general.” Those are detectable by sonar, but are difficult to identify as mines or non-mines without putting other types of sensors in the water.

“We are developing sensors and means of processing the data from the sensors that do as good or better than the marine mammals or divers with handheld devices,” said Schnoor.

Sonar is the primary means of detection, because it’s the only sensor that works in turbid waters. Video cameras only are useful in clear waters.

Swean said he believes that REMUS will be able to replace the mammal. He noted that the Very Shallow Water Mine Countermeasure Detachment is divided into three platoons: a diver platoon, a mammal platoon and an underwater robots platoon, which is now being staffed with REMUS vehicles. Two REMUS systems were deployed shortly after 9/11 for harbor search.

“Mammals are very good, but they take a lot of care and feeding,” said Swean. Small robotic vehicles are ideal for this mission, he said.

ONR also is involved in a program to develop mine breaching systems for use in amphibious operations. In recent years, Marine Corps officials have voiced disappointment about the Navy’s failure to deploy anti-mine weapons for use in the surf zone, and up through the beach area. Marines have complained that the lack of mine breaching systems severely limits their flexibility in planning amphibious landings.

Breaching means either physically removing or detonating mines located in the assault lane that Marines would traverse to gain safe passage ashore, along with their armored vehicles and heavy-duty landing craft.

The Navy spent at least $70 million to develop the Shallow Water Assault Breaching (SABRE) and Distributed Explosive Technology (DET), for this particular mission. But the Marines did not like these systems, because they were too cumbersome and labor intensive.

About two years ago, ONR awarded $5 million in study contracts for companies to design short-term alternatives to the SABRE and DET.

Proposals are being evaluated, said Schnoor. Development contracts might be awarded during the next several months, he said.

The Navy did not allocate any funds in fiscal year 2003 for the mine-breaching program, because it’s not yet clear what the specific requirements and missions for these systems are, said Rennie, head of the Navy’s mine warfare branch. “It’s still really early in the process,” he said. The Navy wants to allow more time for ONR to complete the science and research work.

As part of another program that seeks a future, long-term replacement for the SABRE and DET, the Office of Naval Research awarded three contracts to Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Science Applications International Corp. for the development of surf-zone mine breaching systems.

“That effort looks at the far term, somewhere in 2010,” said Schnoor. The three companies are working on mine breaching technologies that are based on precision-guided weapons. That program, he said, had begun long before the SABRE and DET were cancelled.

The long-term program is based on the concept that precision-guided weapons could be used to destroy mines. These weapons—likely to be cluster-type bombs—would be dropped from aircraft or fired by naval guns. Penetrating darts would be dispersed in a predictable pattern and would impact the mine casing, Schnoor explained. A chemical reaction from a material in the dart would cause the propellant inside the mine to burn rapidly rather than explode, and would essentially neutralize the mine.

In order to break up obstacles, he added, the precision munitions could deliver a continuous rod warhead, which is an expanding metal band that would impact obstacles on the beach and surf zone, and cause them to break apart, so that amphibious assault craft can make safe passage.

Having adequate technologies for MCM operations is among the concerns of Col. Frank A. Panter Jr., commander of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. He also serves as the vice chief of ONR.

During a recent interview, he said that he is confident that the new mine-warfare master plan currently in the works at the Pentagon will help move MCM programs in the right direction. But he said he is not optimistic about anti-mine projects getting more funding. “In the MCM arena, it often comes down to resources.”

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