FEATURE ARTICLE

May 2001

U.S. Space Command Chief Warns About Technological Complacency

by Sandra I. Erwin

It may take another “Sputnik” to reverse a declining spending trend in space-related research and development, said the U.S. top military officer in charge of space operations.

Air Force Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, commander in chief, U.S. Space Command, said that more research dollars are needed for “both offensive and defensive weapons” in space. Just as the Soviets shocked U.S. leaders half a century ago with the launch of the satellite Sputnik, only a similar “surprise” may prompt the United States to “recommit ... to invest more money and invest it smarter, both in military and commercial space,” Eberhart said in a recent interview.

“There is a misunderstanding out there, right now, in terms of weapons in space,” he said. There is no legal “delineation” between offensive and defensive weapons, for example.

Under international space laws and treaties, nations cannot build military fortifications on a celestial body. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans space-based weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical and biological. But it doesn’t prohibit conventional weapons, nor does it say that they have to be defensive, Eberhart noted. That means the deployment of kinetic-energy or directed-energy weapons would not violate any laws.

The anti-satellite, kinetic-energy system called KE-ASAT is a case in point. That program, which the Pentagon did not support for several years and only was kept alive by congressional plus-ups, will continue to move forward, said Eberhart. The agreement with the Defense Department is to develop three kill vehicles and put them “on the shelf.” Still to be determined is how much flight-testing will be involved.

The KE-ASAT would be used to destroy an enemy satellite. But that should be a “last ditch” option, after negotiations and other means of resolving a conflict have failed, Eberhart stressed. The only time that he would recommend “blowing things up in space” is “when your backs are against the wall,” he said. If diplomacy fails, the next step would be to “interfere with the [enemy satellites’] uplinks and downlinks.”

Even dropping conventional bombs over ground stations would be preferable to destroying a satellite, said Eberhart. The risks of harming humans on the ground would have to be assessed, depending on the severity of the conflict.

Destroying enemy satellites is the least-preferred option, because it could result in “collateral damage,” such as enemy retaliation resulting in the destruction of U.S. commercial satellite constellations, he added. “If we have to go into space and do something to a satellite, I would like it to be temporary and reversible.”

Electronic attacks should not be discounted, Eberhart said. “Another option I would be very interested in is an electronic computer-network attack.” The Space Command took over the responsibility for that mission in 1999. “We are looking at all applications of computer-network attack.”

Eberhart also is responsible for managing the Pentagon’s computer-network defense program. He recently told reporters in Washington, D.C.: “Right now, we’re pretty good at what I call a ‘burglar alarm,’ like a burglar alarm that you would have in your house” to alert someone that a burglar broke in, he said. “What we need is a ‘neighborhood watch.’ We need to know when they are getting close.” He plans to focus on technologies that monitor “unusual activity” on U.S. military networks.

Computer break-ins are an area of concern, for obvious reasons, said Eberhart, even though it’s not clear who the assailant may be. “The sad part of this is that, although we worry about state-sponsored [acts by] other nations, this is an area where terrorists can certainly play, this is an area where [drug smuggling] cartels can play,” he said.

Another top priority is the protection of U.S.-owned or international commercial satellites, given the Defense Department’s growing reliance on commercial systems. Most military commanders would rather have government-owned constellations for exclusive use by the Defense Department, but that is not an affordable option, said Eberhart. Commanders must use commercial systems, because the military networks don’t have enough capacity to meet all their needs, he said.

During the air war over Kosovo in 1999, the U.S. military services ran out of bandwidth, so they had to contract with commercial providers. One day, said Eberhart, “we’ll have all that ‘pre-contracted,’ like we have the CRAF (civil reserve air fleet).” The idea would be to sign agreements with commercial satellite communication providers, so that they can make their assets available to the Pentagon as soon as a conflict erupts, he explained. “We would pay a little bit, all the time, to have that in reserve. Meanwhile, they can serve their normal customers.”

There are instances when military-owned capabilities are the only option, he said. For example, military forces travel to remote corners of the world, where there is no infrastructure. Other times, commercial systems are not encrypted enough to satisfy military requirements.

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