FEATURE ARTICLE

April 2001

The U.S. Needs a Sound Military Strategy

by Daniel Gouré

In the next six months or so, the Bush administration will make decisions on the future of the U.S. military that have the potential for revolutionizing military strategy and the supporting force structure. There are no cheap solutions. But there is the potential for bold solutions to the problem of the mismatch between strategy and capabilities.

The central tenet of U.S. defense policy for almost a decade has been the need to be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous large regional conflicts, termed major theater wars (MTWs). The case for a two-MTW strategy arose naturally with the end of the Cold War.

Each MTW would require five to six Army/Marine Corps divisions, 10 fighter wings, four to six aircraft carriers, half the strategic bomber force and hundreds of support aircraft, dozens of surface ships and most of the nation’s space-based intelligence assets.

The two-war requirement was confirmed by the two major assessments of U.S. military capabilities conducted by the Clinton administration, the Bottom-Up Review and the last Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Despite the apparent consensus, it is likely that the two-MTW standard will be a casualty of the strategic review now underway in the Pentagon. It has been evident for several years now that U.S. military forces are being over-stretched and over-used. Deployments in support of contingencies in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and the Persian Gulf are depleting units that would have to take part in a two-MTW situation. The divisions supporting Balkan deployment were rated as C-4, or unready for wartime duty, precisely because they are engaged in peacekeeping duties instead of training for their wartime missions.

Under the current strategy, certain weapon systems such as the E-6 electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence assets will “swing” from one theater to the other. It is clear from recent events, when operations over northern Iraq were curtailed in order to reinforce forces conducting the air war over Kosovo, that such a strategy will not work. There are not enough of these units for more than one conflict.

In testimony last year before the House Armed Services Committee, witnesses identified a number of shortfalls in the current force posture. For example, while a two-MTW strategy is estimated to require some 4,000 Tomahawk land-attack missiles, the Navy has just 50 percent of that number. Lt. Gen. Larry Ellis, the Army’s deputy chief of staff for operations and plans reported that the Army currently lacks the capability to enter a conflict quickly and sustain operations. The Army also has insufficient ammunition stocks.

Similarly, Vice Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, deputy chief of naval operations for resources, warfare requirements and assessment reported that a build rate of eight to 10 ships per year is required to sustain a two-MTW fleet. Currently, the Navy is producing six ships a year.

The two-MTW standard is likely to be modified, if not cast aside, in the face of the reality that defense spending is simply too low to maintain the current force, itself barely capable of meeting current demands. Estimates vary, but the shortfall in defense spending is probably no less than $50 billion annually and could be as much as $100 billion.

The Congressional Budget Office said that $90 billion in procurement was required to sustain forces under the current strategy. This is $30 billion more than currently is budgeted for procurement. Of the $90 billion total, $15 billion would need to go to the Army, $35 billion to the Navy and Marine Corps, $35 billion to the Air Force and $5 billion to defense agency systems. This shortfall translates into a need to reduce forces and personnel by between 25 percent and 50 percent of the current levels. Even if force structure reductions were in the range of 25 percent, this would constitute a fatal blow to the two-MTW strategy.

The Pentagon cannot avoid this shortfall by buying less-expensive equipment. The need to maintain a global presence with a force 40 percent smaller than that which existed at the end of the Cold War means that each new system must do more than those they replace and, hence, must be more capable than their predecessors. The Air Force needs to buy the F-22 fighter to maintain air dominance, more C-17 transports to provide mobility, electronic warfare and intelligence aircraft and more strategic bombers. The Army has an ambitious modernization program that includes new ground-combat systems and the Comanche helicopter. The Navy must ensure its global presence and command of the seas by augmenting its fleet of submarines, acquire more surface ships, and deploy sufficient F/A-18 and Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) to equip aircraft carriers. The Marine Corps is acquiring a new amphibious vehicle, a vertical take-off and landing version of the JSF, and the V-22 Osprey transport. The growing ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland, forward-deployed forces, friends and allies means that theater and national missile defenses also must be built.

What can be done to resolve the mismatch between U.S. military strategy and the realities of limited resources? The simple answer would be to abandon the two-MTW standard for a lesser one, say one-and-a-half MTWs. The simple answer is the wrong one. A lesser requirement is likely to result in a reduction in forces.

The better answer is to look to new ways to meet U.S. military requirements through a capabilities-based strategy. In particular, the United States should consider pursuing an aerospace-centered strategy. Aerospace power, deployed on land, at sea and in space, provides a unique set of operational advantages. A revolution in aerospace power is in the offing. This involves the development of stealthy aircraft such as the F-22, JSF and B-2 bomber. It includes the exploitation of long-range “smart” munitions such as cruise missiles, and satellite-guided bombs. It means deployment of a new generation of electronic warfare and intelligence platforms. A potentially revolutionary new capability, the airborne laser, promises to change the way U.S. forces defeat ballistic missiles and possibly the full range of air-breathing threats. Space exploitation will center on new generations of satellites, low cost lift to orbit, and a capability to maneuver in space.

Daniel Goure is a senior defense analyst at the Lexington Institute, based in Arlington, Va.

Editor’s Note: This is the first of a series of articles to be published by National Defense on defense policy and industrial base issues.

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