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National Defense > Blog > Posts > U.S. Military Reigns Supreme in the Sea and Air: But Why Not on the Ground?
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9/27/2010 Army and Marine Corps platoons and squads have borne the wars’ burdens in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And yet, after a decade of predominantly ground-based warfare that has taken a huge toll on U.S. troops, the Defense Department has failed to pay adequate attention to improving the equipment and training for small infantry units, says a former commandant of the Army War College retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, a military historian and analyst.
Army units still go to war with M2 .50 caliber machine guns, which were originally issued in 1921, and fly Vietnam-era Chinook helicopters. “Don’t get me wrong, we’re still the best ground force in the world. We’re better than we were in my era. But we’re not dominant,” Scales told a gathering of defense experts and journalists at The Brookings Institution, in Washington, D.C.
To be sure, the Defense Department is spending far more money on infantry equipment ($17,000 per troop) than it ever has, but for the most part, ground forces are sent to war without the tools to prevail in the tactical battlefield, Scales says. Compared to the overwhelming superiority that the United States has in naval and air warfare, when it comes to ground combat, the American military “hasn’t come as far as it should,” says Scales. “It doesn’t dominate in the tactical fight.”
The ability of low-tech irregular enemies such as al-Qaida or the Taliban to kill Americans and put the United States on the defensive proves that there is a “cosmic incongruence” in the nation’s military strategy, says Scales.
In Afghanistan, small units have been hugely vulnerable to enemy ambushes and roadside bombs because commanders don’t have the necessary intelligence and often fight blind, Scales contends. Despite deployments of thousands of unmanned spy aircraft, units lack information, or even adequate means to communicate with other units that are not within the reach of human hearing. In Afghanistan, the Army operates 512 autonomous outposts, run by small units. More than half of U.S. combat deaths occur while trying to find the enemy, Scales says. Almost all combat deaths take place within a mile of the enemy, and within 400 meters of the road.
Years of combat have shown that the soldiers and marines who are the most likely to die are the “least trained and equipped for this dangerous calling,” Scales says.
Scales blames these deficiencies on a Beltway culture that is fixated on big-ticket weapons, on “picking a fight with China” and on hypothetical wars in space and cyberspace. Washington policy makers dodge meaningful discussions about the tactical aspects of war on the ground because close-contact combat is “dirty, horrific and bloody,” says Scales. “People just don’t want to talk about that.”
Turning a blind eye to this issue, from a national security perspective, is self-destructive considering that the biggest U.S. strategic vulnerability is the fact that enemies know they can win just by killing Americans, regardless of what else they might achieve. “It should come as no surprise that all our enemies, from low to high tech, have as an imperative to kill Americans, not as a means to an end but as an end in itself,” he says. “So why don’t we do a better job of lessening our strategic vulnerability?”
The reason is that the topic is too uncomfortable for politicians and policy makers, says Scales. Earlier this year, Scales sat on a congressionally mandate panel that was created to critique the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. The panel, chaired by former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and former Defense Secretary William Perry, was made up of “delightful people,” said Scales. But during hours of expert testimony and chattering, “I don’t believe the topic of ground combat ever came up,” says Scales. “It was all about big-ticket adversaries. … They love to talk about war in space and cyberspace … dominating the ‘commons’ … and building high-precision strike weapons.” These sessions became forums for the "geeks in cyberwarfare to pretend they are warriors and for the people in the State Department to pretend they are warriors,” says Scales. “These wonderful neat things inside the Beltway tend to trump the bloody and uncomfortable aspects" of the wars U.S. troops are now fighting, he says. “There are so few people in positions of authority who have had experience with that sort of thing.”
Scales cautions that neither political party is particularly to blame for this. “This incongruity spans every administration since Truman. … When a war is over we say we will never every fight this type of war again. And do we do? We do again, and again and again.”
Small units fighting irregular wars not only need to be better prepared from a “cognitive” perspective but also should be bolstered by a weapons-acquisition system that supports their needs, says Scales. “The current acquisition system is optimized to develop technology that’s centered around big-ticket systems that take decades" to reach fruition. By contrast, the enemy rolls out countermeasures in months or weeks. The upshot is that “we are embarrassed on the battlefield,” says Scales. The Defense Department’s scientific communities have never made small units a strategic priority in research and development. Scales specifically pointed his finger at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. “The greatest disappointment is DARPA,” he says. “It doesn’t appear that the reality of the tactical battlefield has worked its way into the scientific and technological development entities. … We still view the preparation of small units as an industrial process of mass production.”
The Pentagon also spends billions of dollars on instrumented training ranges and digital simulators, he adds. “But small unit leaders still have to gain proficiency the old fashioned way: in combat, by shedding the blood of their soldiers.”
The military bureaucracies brag that they incorporate “lessons learned” from the wars into their future planning. But that’s not enough, says Scales. “That’s reacting to the enemy’s actions instead of anticipating them.”
Fixing shortfalls in U.S. ground forces cannot be achieved individually by the Army or the Marine Corps, he says. “It will take a national effort. … I’d like to see the nation commit the resources to take dominance on the ground to the level that is found in sea and air warfare. … I’d like to see the science and technology leaders treat this as a problem.”
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