U.S. policies to prevent nuclear proliferation are based on the assumption that hostile states would hand over bomb-making materials to terrorist groups. But that conventional wisdom should be challenged, said a panel of experts at a Cato Institute panel discussion this week.
Another way to look at this issue is to consider the strategic circumstances of prospective proliferators, said Matthew Kroenig, an assistant professor of government at Georgetown University and author of a new book, "Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons."
Kroenig argues that a nation that gives away nuclear know-how has sound strategic reasons for doing so. One key motive would be to assist another nation with which it shares a common enemy. The problem for Washington policy makers is what happens when that common enemy happens to be the United States. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than weak states, he noted, as weaker states that possess nuclear weapons constrain the conventional military freedom of action of powerful nations.
“A state that is less vulnerable to super power pressure, [and] doesn’t depend on a super power for its core security needs will be more likely to participate in these transactions,” Kroenig said. “For the past few years we have been banging our heads against the wall trying to figure out why it is so hard to get Russian and Chinese cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue,” Kroenig said. There is a belief that these countries will come around when their leaders realize that a nuclear Iran would pose a security threat. “I would argue that the answer is more fundamental. These countries are simply less threatened by Iran acquiring nuclear weapons than we are.”
Nuclear weapons are coveted because they work well as a deterrent. A panelist referred to a recent quote from Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton, Strategic Command commander, who said that throughout the 65-year history of nuclear weapons, no nuclear power has been conquered or even put at risk of conquest.
As far as terrorist groups are concerned, they are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons from failed states, Kroenig, and other panelists, said. They could, for example, seize bomb-making materials from a collapsing state, buy them from a “rogue actor,” or hire individuals with the knowledge to build a weapon. “I think one of the things we see here is that countries are very careful to provide nuclear assistance only in situations where it wouldn’t provide a direct threat to themselves. But when you are providing nuclear assistance to terrorists, there aren’t really any guarantees that it wouldn’t threaten you,” Kroenig said.
“It is more likely that a country like Pakistan would collapse and [terrorists] could seize a weapon, rather than building it on their own,” Kroenig said. “I think the obstacles to acquiring a weapon, acquiring the material, hiring people with expertise, simply doing it themselves are pretty high. So, my principal concern would be a state collapse and seizure of a weapon.”
Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said a complete workable bomb would likely come from Pakistan. However, there are about 30 countries that have at least one bomb’s worth of fissile material with varying degrees of security and varying degrees of protection. “All of this is a risk, and it should be the single highest priority for the United States today is to do everything in its power to secure it,” Zenko said.
—Reporting by Ashleigh Fugate