3/12/2010An alarming increase in roadside bomb attacks in Afghanistan has prompted a review of contracting practices at the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
The problem with current contracting methods at JIEDDO is that they slow down the deployment of new counter-IED technology, said the agency’s director, Army Lt. Gen. Michael L. Oates.
Shortly after taking over the reins at JIEDDO earlier this year, Oates ordered a comprehensive review of the agency’s contracting operations, he told reporters last week during a bloggers’ roundtable. The review was conducted by a team of government contracting experts who had never been associated with JIEDDO, Oates said. He specifically asked for outside critics because he wanted the evaluation to be unbiased.
Oates already received a report from the review team and soon expects to launch contracting reforms. The most significant one would be to boost in-house expertise, said Oates. The goal will be to make the technology-buying process “speedier and more effective,” he said.
“Speed in contracting is key,” said Oates. The traditional process is intrinsically slow because it emphasizes due diligence and oversight. But JIEDDO cannot afford lengthy procurement cycles at a time when U.S. troops are being killed and maimed on a daily basis. While IED attacks have dropped off in Iraq, in Afghanistan they have doubled during the past year, said Oates.
The Pentagon requested nearly $3.5 billion for JIEDDO in fiscal year 2011. That is a considerable jump from its 2010 budget of $2.3 billion.
The review team was made up of “government personnel with great resumes,” Oates said. “They’ve given us some great advice.” Oates’ predecessor, Lt. Gen. Thomas Metz, said in a December farewell speech that JIEDDO’s mission is being impaired in many ways by its contracting practices. “I leave General Oates with some challenges that I have failed to solve. A very important one has to do with contracting,” said Metz. “Since 9/11, I have seen this war from seven flag-officer positions. I have seen billions of our nation’s treasure expended, often not in ways that provide the biggest bang for the buck or even for the fight we are currently in.
"JIEDDO’s establishment was a mandate to bring us to the reality of the enemy we currently face," Metz said. "JIEDDO has embraced a transparent set of analytically driven processes to make sure we properly manage the funds allocated to us. But if we add more and more layers of bureaucracy, and thus time, to get things done we relinquish the initiative to the enemy.”
The Defense Department could “significantly help JIEDDO with its mission by bringing a contracting capability inside the organization thus streamlining the processes while being prudent with our citizens’ money," Metz said.
Oates, meanwhile, is facing more immediate troubles: How to expedite the deployment of sensors and other ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems to Afghanistan to help troops catch insurgents as they’re burying bombs. The explosive devices that U.S. troops fear the most there are fertilizer bombs that are easy to build and to conceal along unimproved dirt roads. The Pentagon’s IED detectors that were successfully used in Iraq don’t work in Afghanistan because they were designed to identify metals. Non-metallic IEDs are a huge problem, said Oates. The only way to defeat them is to catch insurgents in the act of burying them, which requires a huge presence of aerial sensors. “Persistent ISR” is today’s best defense against IEDs, he said.
As if combating IEDs weren’t hard enough, Oates also must contend with the transportation bottlenecks that are hindering the deployment of ISR systems. The military’s transportation system is overtaxed, so JIEDDO’s equipment must compete with “other tonnage and personnel that has to be moved into Afghanistan to support the surge,” said Oates. The infrastructure in Afghanistan -- with limited ports of entry and lines of communication -- is making life difficult for JIEDDO. “We face quite a bit of a transportation challenge,” Oates said.
Additional reporting on JIEDDO can be found in the April issue of National Defense.
3/11/2010Pentagon officials disclosed last week that the F-35 joint strike fighter program so far has exceeded its original cost estimates by more than 50 percent.
These revelations come as no surprise considering the history of this program. The Government Accountability Office concluded that F-35 estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended two-and-a-half years compared to the program baseline approved in 2007.
The price per aircraft projected at $69 million in 2001 is now up to $112 million, according to GAO. The Pentagon plans to acquire 2,443 jets for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Foreign nations also are expected to buy the aircraft.
Predictably, Pentagon officials were grilled today on Capitol Hill. The Defense Department acquisition team assured lawmakers that there is no need to panic, that problems are under control and that it will be smooth sailing from now on. But will it?
Cost overrun bombshells such as the F-35 are exactly what acquisition reforms over the past two decades were supposed to prevent. Last year, another major piece of legislation, the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, dumped even more strictures and oversight into the process. Obviously this latest round of reforms would have come too late to affect the course of the F-35.
But even the Pentagon’s own acquisition experts are skeptical about the ability of WSARA or other reform initiatives to avert massive overruns in future programs.
WSARA harps on the need to estimate costs accurately early in the development phase, and to come up with “independent” cost calculations before a program even gets off the drawing board. That would allow the Pentagon to reject low-ball bids from contractors who under-price systems to beat their competitors. In hindsight, if the Pentagon had accurately estimated F-35 costs when the program was conceived in the mid-1990s, would it have done things any differently?
It appears that until Defense Secretary Robert Gates took over at the Pentagon, nobody had seriously calculated the cost of F-35, nor had the program been funded to fully cover it.
“For the first time the program has been funded to the independent cost estimates for production,” said Matthew J. Schaffer, deputy director for conventional forces, cost assessments and program evaluation at the office of the secretary of defense. “This emphasizes the secretary’s interest that we implement these reforms,” he said last week at a Precision Strike Association conference in Arlington, Va.
The principles that underpin the WSARA legislation -- stable requirements, funding independent cost estimates, securing favorable contract terms, injecting mature technology -- are all commendable, said Schaffer. But they are not new. “We tried the same things in the past,” he said. The only difference now is that “We have decision makers who are willing to make decisions based on these principles.”
But Schaffer cautioned that these early cost estimates are easier said than done.
Members of the Pentagon’s new CAPE organization (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) gathered for three days in Williamsburg, Va., in February, to discuss the impact of WSARA. The burning question there was “How are we going to estimate costs that early in the procurement cycle?” Schaffer said.
Predicting accurately how much a system will cost early in its design phase -- years before it’s actually produced -- is a daunting prospect, he suggested. “There won’t be the usual details that are used for a detailed cost estimate,” he said. “It is going to be much more ambiguous. How do we go about doing it?”
These are difficult questions, Schaffer said. Early cost appraisals will have to consider whether the technology is mature, if there are alternatives, or if an “evolutionary” approach is warranted, rather than trying to bite off too much technology all at once. Schaffer conceded that with large and complex programs such as the F-35, the Pentagon will have to take some risks. “In some cases, we’ll have to take a large bite,” he said. “In F-35 there is no evolutionary approach. I can’t have half the stealth. Some things are predetermined.”
Other acquisition experts agree that forecasting costs so early in a program (before Milestone A) may be a taller order than what Congress envisioned.
Pentagon analysts have at their disposal mountains of technical, performance and cost data to make somewhat credible estimates, but information and research alone are not enough, wrote Martha A. Roper, senior operations research analyst for the office of the deputy assistant secretary of the Army for cost and economics.
What is needed is an “analysis culture with the policy, procedure and willingness to develop and/or accept cost estimates that are less precise than those developed at Milestone B or Milestone C,” Roper argued in an article published in the January 2010 issue of the Defense Acquisition Review Journal. Without a “large-scale, department-wide culture change within and around the analysis community,” early cost estimating will be tough to accomplish.
Privately, industry experts blame the Pentagon’s procurement woes (it’s not just the F-35) on a shortage of skilled buyers and competent managers overseeing major programs. Regulatory schemes such as WSARA also could use more “teeth” to enforce discipline, some industry insiders contend. “If they enforced Nunn-McCurdy and canceled programs, that would send a message,” one insider said.
Another acquisition expert who offered his views on the condition of anonymity said the problem is the excessive complexity that usually leads to Pentagon buyers chasing rainbows. The technical specs often are so intricate that they create major blind spots for the government, particularly in trying to predict costs, this expert noted. “With high technology systems, the difficulty of accurately estimating production costs is extreme for systems that have not yet undergone a preliminary design review.” Unless the Defense Department starts enforcing cost estimates -- and budgeting accordingly -- in the nascent R&D phase of a program, “defense acquisitions will continue to enter their Milestone B process effectively blind-folded with respect to long-term costs,” he added. “The more complicated and software-intensive we make our weapons systems, the harder it is to predict both their performance and their cost.”
The Army has asked for $1 billion to proceed with development of the technologies that survived the Army’s canceled Future Combat Systems program, but all of them fell short of performance goals during a major test last year.
Now dubbed the Early Infantry Brigade Increment 1, some of its components performed “well below” what was expected in a limited user test, said J. Michael Gilmore, director of test and evaluation at the office of the secretary of defense, during a House hearing.
“All of the systems have notable performance deficiencies,” Gilmore said before the House Armed Services air and land forces subcommittee. A second limited user test is scheduled for this fall. Gilmore said it would be “very challenging” to correct the shortcomings in the systems before that time.
“The demonstrated operational reliability for each of these systems falls significantly below the user threshold requirements,” Gilmore said.
Subcommittee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., repeatedly interrupted witnesses and asked why the Army would ask for an additional $600 million in the fiscal year 2011 budget request on top of the $400 million allocated this year if the technologies were not ready to go into production.
Gilmore said that, as a test and evaluation official, it was not his place to comment. However, he estimated that the fixes may take up to two years.
Some of these technologies include a Class I unmanned aerial vehicle, a small ground robot, a non-line-of-sight launch system, unattended ground sensors and a network integration kit to send and receive data from these systems.
The FCS vehicle program was canceled last year, which left a handful of legacy technologies that were believed to be in advanced state of development. All were intended for small dismounted units, and had been touted for years by the Army as the first in a wave of "spin outs" that would reach soldiers in the field quickly and make a faster impact on operations.
The desire to salvage some of the investments already made -- and Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ goal to quickly speed needed technologies into the current fight -- may have influenced the budget request.
Lt. Gen. William N. Phillips, deputy chief of staff of the Army, G-8, said getting the technology fielded as quickly as possible comes at the direction of OSD. “Each item may not be as mature as the other items,” he said.
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Ashton Carter approved low-initial production lots of increment one. This, “despite having acknowledged that the systems and networks were immature, unreliable and not performing as required,” said Michael Sullivan, director of acquisition and outsourcing at the Government Accountability Office. “It’s too early and too risky,” to proceed with increment one, he said.
“You do have to take some risk, I do recognize that,” Smith said. “We want to get this stuff in the field in order for our troops to have what they need.” But he questioned why the Army needs $600 million when there are no products available to buy. Sullivan predicted that the Army may end up lowering the performance bar. “These requirements may go down on all this before this is all done,” he said.
Look for additional coverage of Army modernization programs in the May issue of National Defense Magazine. 3/10/2010A House Armed Services Committee panel on defense acquisition reform that was created a year ago is now ready to put forth its recommendations, with the intent of converting its proposals into law.
The seven-member panel is now seeking comments and critiques from the defense industry before it publishes the final version of the report.
Rep. Robert Andrews, D-N.J., who chairs the panel, said he would like contractors to submit comments by March 20. A draft version of the HASC report can be downloaded here.
The group will sign off on the final report by the end of the month, and the full committee will review it during the April-May timeframe, Andrews said. The draft report contains an ambitious agenda: It wants to fix the underlying causes of failures in the defense acquisition process and recommend how to fix them.
The 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act targeted cost overruns and other problems in the procurement of major systems. Andrews said his panel is focusing on the "systemic weaknesses" in the procurement system that are not necessarily scandalous but need to be changed so the Pentagon can get better return on the money it spends.
One particular area of interest is the acquisition of information technology services and products. The procurement system treats IT as if it were water or ammunition, Andrews said. That has to change. It can take a decade to acquire an information network, for example. By the time the technology is fielded, it is five generations too old.
One of the recommendations in the report that is drawing criticism is the creation of new "performance metrics" to gauge whether a program is achieving cost and schedule goals. Current organizations within the office of the defense secretary would be assigned the responsibility of implementing those metrics. Andrews will recommend that the HASC permanent subcommittee for investigations and oversight periodically review those metrics and assess whether they’re working as intended.
Several defense officials and contractors have warned that these measures would add more confusion to the process, and that it would be better to enforce the rules that already are in the law, instead of piling on new ones.
Once the report is finalized and the HASC approves it, the next step will be to decide if it will be part of the 2010 defense authorization bill or whether it should be included in separate legislation.
3/8/2010The Pentagon’s new industrial policy guidelines call for the Defense Department to tap the commercial sector and niche small businesses for new technologies.
“Although innovations unique to national security often occur within the 'pure-play' defense industrial base, the vast majority of innovative and revolutionary components, systems, and approaches that enable and sustain our technological advantage reside in the commercial marketplace, in small defense companies, or in America’s universities,” said the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
The QDR calls for establishing “requirements and pursuing specific programs that take full advantage of the entire spectrum of the industrial base at our disposal: defense firms, purely commercial firms, and the increasingly important sector of those innovative and technologically advanced firms and institutions that fall somewhere in between.”
Those “in between” companies offer many of the niche products and services that the Pentagon needs to counter the enemy’s rapidly changing tactics and technologies. At an AFCEA industry conference in February, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright, USMC, lamented that current conflicts “have a duty cycle of about 30 days.” The Pentagon’s lethargic procurement cycle cannot keep up. "That's part of the frustration that you'll hear day in and day out both from myself and the Secretary of Defense [Robert Gates] as we try and move this department to a footing and a risk calculus that is commensurate with the war that we're actually in, not the war we'd like to be in,” Cartwright said.
But it is not clear how the Pentagon plans to go about changing the status quo. Small businesses and commercial firms typically have been skeptical of the Pentagon’s rhetoric because the procurement system remains stacked against those “in between” firms cited in the QDR.
“The reality is that the procurement process cannot be changed so dramatically as expressed in the QDR ... The utility and innovation of this unique sector of the defense industry must be better understood and incorporated in the short-term strategy,” said Muriel Jérôme O’Keeffe, president of JTG inc., a small woman-owned company based in Vienna, Va., that specializes in multilingual services and cultural analysis for intelligence and homeland security agencies.
There are potentially hundreds of firms fall in the “in between” category, but as a rule these companies are not able to score defense contracts unless they are subcontractors to the large primes, said O’Keeffe in a recent interview. “If you’re providing a niche service or product, it’s hard for small businesses to get contracts,” she said. “We depend on large companies for our survival.”
If the Defense Department is serious about recruiting agile small companies, it needs to change its business model so that it compensates contractors for performance, not for labor hours, O’Keeffe said. The government would get more bang for the buck if contracts were awarded for a specific product or service, to be delivered as soon as possible, as opposed to the government agreeing to pay for labor hours regardless of what is accomplished during those hours, she said.
But changing contracting methods so that the government pays for deliverables, instead of labor hours is not likely to happen overnight, she said. “It is going to be a big shift.” Government officials talk about their desire for better contractor performance but are not taking action to incentivize suppliers to produce faster. In areas such as information technology, companies sell labor hours, which is very different from selling a finished product, said O’Keeffe.
“At the moment, the procurement process doesn’t reward agility,” she added. “For certain high-tech products, the government should look at a different way of procuring the service.”
Another problem for small IT or analysis firms is that many of the niche services they offer have been bundled into larger intelligence or logistics contracts, so the Defense Department may not be able to draw on their talents unless it hires the prime contractor to do the work.
“After 9/11, anything dealing with cultural and language shifted into larger procurements and that expertise is now with large companies that provide larger services,” said O’Keeffe. That may not be the best deal for the government.
Information technology consultant Anand Datla offered similar observations in a recent article in National Defense. He said government contracts that pay for labor hours instead of performance are stifling innovation and hindering progress in areas such as cybersecurity. “The traditional acquisition economy is not giving the government the best value for taxpayer dollars,” he said.
3/3/2010Earthquake warning systems, detecting explosives in mass transit systems and helping communities recover from biological attacks are just a few of the priorities the Department of Homeland Security’s science and technology directorate will take on under its new leader, Tara Jeanne O’Toole.
O’Toole, who was sworn in four months ago, told the House Homeland Security subcommittee on emerging threats, cybersecurity and science and technology, that bio-terrorism remains one of the nation’s greatest threats.
The directorate’s chemical and bioterrorism division has emerged as a nexus in the federal government on such threats. “The bio program needs to stay extremely robust,” she responded when asked about maintaining the division’s budget.
There needs to be more planning and analysis on what to do in the aftermath of such an attack, she testified. O’Toole previously served as the director of the Center for Biosecurity in Pittsburgh.
Representatives in opening statements noted that the directorate has not had a strong record of fielding new technologies. “In spite of investing in hundreds of research projects, most technologies are never fielded,” said subcommittee Chairwoman Yvette D. Clarke, D-N.Y.
O’Toole responded that one of her top priorities will be to work with DHS agencies to strengthen their ability to write clear and concise requirement documents, which is a skill that is lacking in the department.
The directorate will also team with the Transportation Security Administration’s laboratory in Atlantic City to expand beyond its traditional mission focusing on airline security, to produce technologies than can screen for explosives in mass transit systems. Another partnership with the Department of Energy’s national laboratories will seek to solve an age-old problem of predicting earthquakes, according to her written testimony.
3/2/2010The U.S. Air Force is now training more pilots to fly unmanned aircraft than traditional aircraft. The service’s UAV fleet has swelled by 300 percent over the past two years, and the expansion continues.
Meanwhile, observers wonder if this transformation is just a temporary blip or a permanent shift in the capabilities and priorities of the Air Force.
The answer is simple: There is no going back to the old days, said Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley.
The transfer of personnel, weapons acquisition dollars, training assets and other resources from conventional to unmanned aircraft is “being institutionalized and will stay with us for years to come,” Donley said this morning at a breakfast with reporters in Washington, D.C.
The demand for ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) is gargantuan, and shows no signs of slowing down any time soon, he said. The Air Force has committed resources to this mission for the long term, Donley noted. “The appetite for situational awareness 24/7, 365 days a year has been established … That is not changing,” said Donley.
The situation is not likely to be much different when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end, he suggested. Commanders are going to expect ISR support regardless of where they fight. It is possible, though, that specific requirements for certain types of unmanned aircraft or other ISR system will evolve over time. “We have to assess remotely piloted aircraft requirements more generally, as a global requirement,” said Donley. “That will shape the future of the force.”
As Stew Magnuson reported this month in National Defense, the Air Force sees a world in 15 to 20 years where all its aircraft have an unmanned element. The current fleet of ISR and strike UAVs -- the Predator and Reaper -- are considered second-generation unmanned aerial vehicles. The Air Force is already looking at what comes next. It sees a time when every mission the service conducts has an unmanned variant, said Col. Eric S. Mathewson, director of the unmanned aerial systems task force at Air Force headquarters.
The third-generation drone the Air Force envisions will do airlift, resupply, electronic attack, strike and aerial refueling. The new drone could be an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform one day, and an aerial refueler the next. Or instead of fuel, it could have supplies placed in its hold and be flown to remote bases.
2/26/2010FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla. -- An Army unmanned aerial vehicle roadmap expected to be released in April will call for more manned-unmanned teaming of aviation assets, said Col. Christopher Carlile, director of the Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence.
Remotely piloted aircraft have their shortcomings, as do manned aviation platforms such as helicopters. Both have their strengths as well, he said.
Experiments have shown that when they were put together in operations they "went off the scale exponentially in terms of capability," he said at the Association of the U.S. Army winter symposium.
The Army roadmap will look at short-, mid- and long-terms plans for aerial drones until the year 2035. Carlile gave a sneak peak of some of its findings. Arming UAVs may not be a priority, he suggested. It may be more effective to leverage all the investments the service has made in armed manned systems. "You shouldn't get wrapped up on weapons on UAS," he added.
Currently, 99 percent of Army UAS are used for surveillance. However, the vision is for the drones to take on more missions such as communications relay, attack and cargo supply. "The transition from manned to unmanned systems must continue to be based on improving war fighter capabilities and not a love affair with technology," according to Carlile's slide presentation. FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla. -- The Army's new ground combat vehicle is not simply a recycled version of the canceled Future Combat Systems common chassis, said Gen. Peter Chiarelli, vice chief of staff of the Army.
Speaking to the Association of the U.S. Army winter symposium only hours after the request for proposals for the service's next combat vehicle was released, Chiarelli said that the service is looking for "full spectrum versatility."
"This is a vehicle that takes into account the lessons of eight years of war. It is not just FCS warmed over," he said. The GCV will replace the planned family of vehicles that was canceled when the FCS program fell under the budget ax last year.
One of the lessons learned is the need for protection. For example, it would have armored protection that could be changed over time based on the situations that soldiers find themselves in, he said. The FCS vehicles were conceived before the military went to war and encountered roadside bombs. "It will have a number of force protection packages that could be put on that vehicle that will allow it to, in fact, change over time," he said.
Commanders can make a choice on what level of protection they need based on the situations they encounter. "We're looking for full spectrum versatility in this vehicle," he said. That includes active protection systems which send out projectiles to protect the vehicles from such threats as rocket propelled grenades, he said. "Active protection is the future. This will be a vehicle with a growth potential that will allow it to add active protection measures as they become available," he said.
Chiarelli said the Army will initially select three proposals to enter a technology and development phase. "What we are really hoping for is three solid proposals to enter into that [technology and development] phase," he said. If the Army only receives two good proposals, it will proceed with two, he said.
Those contracts will be awarded in September, and that phase will continue for 27 months until December 2012, he said. Two contractors will be downselected for competitive prototyping in January 2013. The final winner of the contract will be selected in March 2016, with the first vehicles being delivered in the fourth quarter of 2018, he said. "We think this will be an amazing vehicle that will really launch the United States Army into this century," he said. 2/25/2010FORT LAUDERDALE, Fla. -- Army Lt. Gen. Michael Oates, director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, said he wished that the Taliban were held accountable for slaughtering Afghan civilians who detonate roadside bombs.
The most prominent IED used in the country is the pressure plate explosive, which relies on a person or a vehicle to step or drive over it to detonate the device. These deadly bombs are "victim activated," he said. They are killing Afghan civilians, yet the media almost never report these deaths, he lamented at an Association of the U.S. Army winter symposium press conference.
When the U.S. military accidentally kills Afghan civilians, it makes headlines all over the world. "But something that doesn't get a lot of airplay quite frankly is that the enemy kills a lot more civilians than us...When the Taliban puts these things out in the roadways, they put a lot of civilians at risk. ... That's too bad," he said.
"The reality is that they kill a lot of civilians and they get a pass," he said. "We need to give the Taliban the credit they deserve," he said.
Meanwhile, detecting and defeating the pressure plate devices has proven to be a tough challenge for his organization. There is very little metal in the detonators and the explosive material is mostly common fertilizer. He mentioned that there are some new detection devices in the pipeline, but he did not elaborate.
Oates told the conference in an earlier speech that JIEDDO has not gotten a large return on investment for the money it has spent on bomb detection technologies. The money it has spent on training, on the other hand, has been more successful.
In an interview with National Defense later, he said JIEDDO needs to do a better job communicating to industry and academia more clearly what technologies it needs.
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