2/6/2012The Pentagon's weapon procurement woes are well known. They are mentioned in countless speeches and blue-ribbon studies, but never successfully tackled, said the Defense Department’s acting acquisitions chief Frank Kendall. “I keep giving the same speech and talking about the same things,” Kendall said Feb. 6 in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There’s a certain 'Groundhog Day' feel to this,” Kendall said. A combination of an entrenched culture, management incompetence and bad contractor performance has snowballed over the past decades into an avalanche of embarrassing program failures. Kendall said he has seen many attempts at acquisition reforms under various guises, but the problems that existed in the 1980s and 1990s continue to this day. “Sen. McCain was pretty much spot on,” said Kendall, citing the Dec. 15 Senate floor speech in which Senator John McCain, R-Ariz., called out the Pentagon for wasting billions of tax dollars on military boondoggles. What happens is that too many programs get started and “we find out later on that they were unaffordable,” said Kendall. “We have got to stop that.” Buying weapon systems has become a cliché for Einstein’s definition of insanity: Doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. “There’s an awful lot of ‘conventional wisdom’ in our business on what works and what doesn’t,” said Kendall. Contracting trends such as “concurrency” — the overlapping of development, testing and production — and fixed-priced buying are embraced and rejected in cycles, he said. In the past two decades, “We have been for-or-against concurrency four or five times, and for-or-against fixed price contracting four or five times,” he said. “We are now going through another cycle” where concurrency has fallen out of favor — with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as the cautionary tale — and fixed-price contracting is back in vogue even though it has resulted in several procurement failures in the past. The use of concurrency in the Joint Strike Fighter program has caused untold damage in time and money, Kendall said. “Putting the F-35 in production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice,” he said. “It should not have been done. But we did it.” The JSF management was self-deluded by optimistic predictions that digital simulations could replace actual flight tests. “Now we’re paying the price,” he said. “We’re finding problems in all three variants” of the F-35. Kendall has instructed the Pentagon’s procurement bureaucracy to question the conventional wisdom and to rely on actual data to make decisions. “The sign outside my door says, ‘In God We Trust, the rest must bring data,’” said Kendall. “We tend to retry things every 10 years or so because we don’t remember what happened the last time they were tried,” he said. “That is because we don’t have any data. … It takes data and in-depth analysis to understand what really works.” Kendall acknowledged that it will be difficult to turn things around unless managers are held accountable. Because programs extend over decades, “We make decisions and we don’t see the impact for years. … We’re not around to take credit or blame for what we did,” he said. Having hard data to hand down to successors would help, but common sense business practices also are needed, said Kendall. “Acquisition is not a science, there’s always some art in this.” A key contributor to the current procurement woes is a deficiency of skills in smart business practices within the Defense Department, he said. When military leaders sit down to chart their equipment investments, they often fail to abide by one of the standard rules of capital planning: Don’t commit to buying something if you don’t know you can afford it. The price-is-no-object approach worked over the past decade when military budgets were soaring, but will not be acceptable in the coming downturn, Kendall warned. If the portfolio being modernized is combat vehicles, for example, officials must decide how many they should replace and how many they should repair or upgrade. On that basis, said Kendall, “you derive a cost cap for the new program. It’s standard capital planning: Make investments we can afford.” When such a drill was conducted for the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle program, Kendall said, “It was a revelation to the G-8 [chief of resources] of the Army how much money he was going to have for other things.” That exercise led the Army to change its funding priorities and delay the start of the program. “That’s our problem,” said Kendall. “We start things we shouldn’t have started.” He also blamed current troubles on a convoluted bureaucratic method for deciding what weapons the Pentagon should by — known as Joint Capabilities Integration Development Process. “It’s too cumbersome,” and it’s not clear it produces any valuable outcomes, Kendall said. “We don’t want people setting pie-in-the-sky requirements.” 2/5/2012The Office of Naval Research made headlines last year when its engineers fired a projectile from an electromagnetic rail-gun with a muzzle velocity of Mach 7. But sci-fi projects increasingly are becoming luxuries for U.S. military laboratories, and pressure is growing on science shops such as ONR to deliver practical remedies to problems such as the rising cost of maintaining Navy ships. The Navy still wants its $1.5 billion science budget to deliver groundbreaking technology, but with Pentagon spending about to start dipping, researchers will see growing pressure to produce tangible payoffs. For the Navy, that means tackling everyday fleet annoyances such as ship corrosion and repairing aging components, said Rear Adm. Matthew L. Klunder, chief of naval research and director of test evaluation and technology requirements.
"This isn’t glitzy," he said in an interview. "It isn’t going to get you on the walk of fame in Hollywood." Under the rubric of "total ownership costs," ONR is investigating new materials that could help prevent corrosion across the Navy’s 286-ship fleet, which boosts repair costs by $7 billion a year. ONR created a new coating that has helped to trim maintenance expenses for some ships by 35 percent, and developed a non-skid material that is more resistant to heat and cracking, Klunder said. High-end science remains a goal, he said. "The leadership wants ONR to continue strong on ‘game changing’ technologies such as directed energy, autonomous unmanned systems, cyber and electronic warfare," Klunder added. "But by the same token, they want to ensure that we keep systems in the current fleet viable." The Pentagon’s budget proposal for 2013, which projects spending cuts for the first time in more than a decade, has the armed services planning for smaller forces that also are better equipped and trained. Klunder said the projected downsizing offers an opportunity to exploit technology. In the Navy’s undersea force, for instance, there might be fewer attack submarines as construction of new boats gets delayed. But the Navy could fill gaps left by submarine cutbacks with robotic surveillance mini-submarines. "You save money and increase capacity with unmanned underwater vehicle technology," said Klunder. "You’ll see more [UUV systems] in the water over the coming year." ONR promotes the use of digital simulations as substitutes for costly live training drills. In aviation units, for example, "When we train people, you’re burning fuel." With "immersive simulations," some of that expense can be avoided, he added. Marine Corps infantry units at Camp Pendleton, Calif., also are taking advantage of the new technology. " We put over 13,000 Marines through an immersive infantry trainer over last year alone." ONR designed a simulator for sailors who need to prepare for counter piracy missions. They can practice how to board a hostile ship and handle dicey hostage scenarios. Another way in which the military could save money is by adding new gizmos to existing aircraft so they can perform extra functions. ONR has asked contractors to submit bids for a sensor kit that could turn conventional helicopters into robotic cargo delivery vehicles. Under a five-year $98 million project, companies will be asked to design an "autonomous aerial cargo utility system" that could be used with any helicopter, said Mary (Missy) Cummings, project manager at ONR. Ground supply convoys in warzones are often targeted with buried bombs and rockets, so the military is looking for ways to increase aerial deliveries, Cummings said. An unpiloted helicopter, called K-MAX, already is being used by Marines in Afghanistan. But ONR’s technology is far more advanced, Cummings said. "K-MAX is elementary school and AACUS is college in terms of the kinds of technology advancements we are making." The AACUS system is a huge leap in artificial intelligence, she said. "It finds its own way through bad weather, through obstacles." Autonomy in military vehicles, she said, means that "we’re not just controlling toys, we’re doing complex missions." She believes that systems such as AACUS could save the military billions of dollars over time because it would not have to buy new aircraft. Cummings, who was a Navy fighter pilot for 10 years, flying F/A-18 Hornets and A-4 Skyhawks, is a pioneer in the design of accessible drone technology that anyone could operate from a smartphone or tablet computer. 2/2/2012When he commanded air combat forces in 2006, Gen. Ronald Keys cautioned the U.S. Air Force to break its addiction to expensive “Gucci” weapons. Air Force leaders are certainly heeding that advice as they brief congressional committees this week on details of the service’s 2013-2017 budget proposal. The major themes of the spending plan: The Air Force is emphasizing quality rather than quantity, many items that would be “nice to have” are not affordable, and modernization will be slowing down. “We made tough choices,” Air Force Secretary Michael B. Donley said Feb. 2 at a breakfast meeting hosted by the Air Force Association.
Donley outlined proposed cutbacks to the Air Force fleet, most of which had been unveiled last week by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as part of a belt-tightening plan to reduce Pentagon spending by $259 billion in the next five years. Donley offered a more pointed assessment of how the planned budget cuts are compelling the Air Force to scale back on dream high-tech weaponry and focus on the pragmatic. About 286 aircraft have been identified in the budget submission for elimination across the Air Force over the next five years. They include 123 fighters (102 A‐10s and 21 older F‐16s), 133 mobility aircraft (27 C‐5As, 65 C‐130s, 20 KC‐135s, and 21 C‐ 27s), and 30 intelligence-collection systems (18 Global Hawk RQ‐4 Block 30 unmanned aircraft, 11 RC‐26s, and one E‐8 damaged beyond repair). Planning for a smaller force, Donley said, means “our decisions favored multi‐role platforms over those with more narrowly focused capabilities.” The Air Force is slowing the pace and scope of modernization while protecting programs that it considers imperative if it has to fight a war in the foreseeable future, such as long-range bombers, cargo planes, surveillance drones, aerial refueling tankers and F-16 fighter jets. In addition to jettisoning old hardware, the Air Force also expects to remove nearly 10,000 airmen from the ranks, about half from the active-duty force and the rest from Reserves and Air National Guard. Donley defended the recommended cutbacks to the A-10 fleet, which has turned into a controversial issue with Army advocates who claim that this will lead to diminished capacity in the Air Force for air-support missions. Donley insisted that the Air Force remains “fully committed” to supporting ground forces with strike and transport aircraft. The centerpiece of a future higher-tech Air Force, the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, remains plagued by delays and is now projected to enter the fleet by the 2020s. “It’s way out there,” Donley said, although he stressed that that Air Force is not scaling back current plans to buy the aircraft. But for purposes of planning its five-year budget, the F-35A is not a big factor, he said. “It’s not anywhere in the next 10 years.” As a result, the Air Force is hedging its bets and upgrading 350 decades-old F-16 Fighting Falcon multi-role jets. Donley said this was a wise move in light of F-35 delays and the possibility that F-16s might be flying far longer than the Air Force originally forecast when it bought the F-35. “It makes sense to protect multirole F-16s,” Donley said. Several space programs, such as the Space‐Based Infrared and Advanced EHF satellites, and space launch vehicles, will continue to receive funding, Donley said. Cyberwarfare also is among the budget winners. The Air Force also plans to collaborate with the Navy to fund new radars, precision munitions, and other systems to support the Air‐Sea Battle concept that seeks to equip the U.S. military for large-scale wars in the Pacific region. “To continue funding these high priority investments, we made the hard choices to terminate or restructure programs with unaffordable cost growth or technical challenges such as the RQ‐4 Block 30, B‐2 Extremely High Frequency radio improvements, and the Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals,” Donley wrote in a white paper released yesterday. “We eliminated expensive programs with more affordable alternatives that still accomplish the mission, such as the C‐130 Avionics Modernization Program, the C‐27J program, and Defense Weather Satellite System. Likewise, we discontinued or deferred programs that are simply beyond our reach in the current fiscal environment, such as the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform, Light Mobility Aircraft, and Light Attack and Armed Reconnaissance aircraft.” The budget hit list contained many items that the Air Force did want, Donley told the AFA conference. “They are just not affordable.” 2/1/2012 A new policy paper released today by the U.K. Ministry of Defence stresses the British government’s commitment to keeping its armed forces well equipped despite a budget crunch that in recent years has eroded spending on military hardware.
But the paper’s major themes — tapping commercial companies for new technology, opening the market to foreign competitors that can provide better deals and improving U.K. buyers’ technical skills — underscore the government’s frustration with the rising costs of research and development of new weapon systems. Over the past several years, R&D has dropped from 2.6 percent to 1.2 percent of the MOD’s approximately $52 billion budget. The white paper outlines broad goals to provide high-quality equipment for the U.K. armed forces while minimizing wasteful spending. It also calls for a new relationship with industry. The MOD intends to invest more than $237 billion in military equipment over the next decade. Of note are the MOD’s industrial policy guidelines, such as how it should go about protecting key domestic suppliers that would be vulnerable if U.K. military spending shrinks or if they lost business to foreign competitions. The industrial policy dilemmas outlined in the white paper are not unlike those that currently are being weighed in Washington, D.C., where Pentagon suppliers are calling for the Defense Department to protect key sectors of the U.S. industrial base. U.K. defense budgets and military exports support around 155,000 skilled jobs, and another 145,000 indirectly employed in the supply chain. The British government’s position is that it will carefully assess the risk of losing a critical domestic supplier against the financial benefits of buying from a foreign vendor. “The circumstances in which we will need to do this will vary according to the capability concerned and the external situation,” the white paper says. “In some cases, the costs of potential protective measures may be prohibitive.” Some suppliers, the paper states, “may be fundamental to achieving and maintaining certain of our sovereignty requirements, so we may take action to protect those aspects of capability that they supply to us which are essential to our national security.” Once a particular sector of the industry or specific technology has been identified as essential to national security, the MOD will gauge the cost of keeping R&D shops and production lines in business. “We will then make a decision about whether this cost is affordable and demonstrates value-for-money.” For many of its future procurements, the U.K. plans to seek technology from the global market. “We may wish to take the economies of scale that become possible when working with another nation, as well as the opportunity to harmonize requirements, pool resources, share facilities and overhead costs, and benefit from longer production runs,” the paper says. “Working with another nation may allow us to maximize our capabilities, by sharing technologies and aspects of capability that would not otherwise be available to the U.K.” Working with foreign allies, the policy says, is “not detrimental to our national sovereignty provided that we retain the operational advantages and freedom of action that we judge to be essential.” The United States is cited as the U.K.’s “major bilateral acquisition partner.” British weapon buyers, meanwhile, have to become “intelligent customers,” the paper says. Being an intelligent customer is a catchphrase for government bureaucrats who grasp the intricacies of technology and are aware of the market trends. The MOD calls for a “lean, skilled work force in-house. Almost all technology development is driven by the consumer market. As a result, the paper says, “We need to draw on and leverage this investment, but to succeed we need to know what to buy, where it can be bought from, and where we need to focus our own investment in science and technology.” But the paper cautions that “success as an intelligent customer nevertheless presents its own challenges. … We must understand and assess the market place, what is potentially available, who the suppliers are, and what processes and standards are being used.” An intelligent customer has to “understand how to integrate commercial off-the-shelf products, designed for markets with a high degree of certainty, into evolving defense and security systems and equipment. We have, therefore, to be able to identify, understand, and evaluate the technical, financial, interoperability, and security risks involved in such integration.” 1/31/2012 Contrary to recent reports, the Navy’s decision to send a floating base to the Middle East has less to do with special operations than it does with other missions in the Persian Gulf, the service’s Fleet Forces commander said. Reports referred to the floating base, a resurrected amphibious assault ship that was in the final stages of decommissioning, as a “commando mothership” for special operators. But that will not be the focus of the USS Ponce, Adm. John Harvey told reporters in Washington Jan. 31. “It is not the primary mission,” he said. “It’s not going over there as an alternate command ship. It’s not going over there as a special operating forces Death Star Galactica coming through the Gulf.” The main purpose of what Harvey called the “afloat forward staging base interim” is to support mine sweeping operations and patrol combatant craft in the Persian Gulf, he said. He called it an interim solution because the Navy may turn to its Mobile Landing Platform ships to perform the floating base role. The forthcoming budget will have details on the quantity and purpose of the MLPs and when they will be built, Harvey said. But there is no end-date for the USS Ponce, he said. “And I’m not aware of a definitive start-date for the MLP so I think there’s considerable maneuver room here . . . We’ll see what the [2013] budget has in it and how many we get.” The requirement for the floating base was in place before he moved to Fleet Forces Command in July 2009, Harvey noted. It was conceived as a “lily pad” for heavy MH-53 helicopters, a mothership for mine countermeasures, he said. That doesn’t mean that special operators couldn’t use the ship. In a call for bids for the upgrade of the USS Ponce, construction and refurbishing details allow for increased security and communication capabilities. The timing of the request for proposals — just a few days after a special ops raid to rescue hostages in Somalia — also lent to the perception that the ship would be a floating base for commandos, Harvey said. “If you put a certain type of lock on the door, you can have a certain type of briefing in that space,” he said. “If you have this number of radios in a [communications] space instead of just this number of radios, then you have a little bit more capability.” He added: “There were some things that we can do that would make it amenable for some of these spaces to be used by special operating forces, but it is not a soft-support platform. There were just some choices we had to make that could give it some more capability.” Harvey said the goal is to have the USS Ponce ready to sail the first of June. 1/30/2012 The Obama administration’s strategy to reshape the post-war military is less than a month old, and already it is under fire from Washington insiders.
The new military playbook, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," is disconnected from reality and was built on hopeful and unproven assumptions, a panel of experts from Washington think tanks said last week. One of the sharpest rebukes of the strategy is the emphasis on shifting the military’s focus from large-scale ground combat to high-tech naval and air warfare in Asia-Pacific. “What in the strategic environment leads them to think that?” asked Stephanie Sanok, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The guidance to the Defense Department is that it should not expect to fight in the “environment in which we’ve been operating for the last years,” she said. That might be the administration’s desire, but it is inconsistent with what is going on in the world, Sanok said. In the words of senior military and civilian defense officials, among the biggest threats to the United States are ungoverned, “failed,” states where terrorist groups find safe havens, and countries where civil wars breed instability. “The United States has a strategic interest in maintaining stability in Africa, Asia and the Middle East,” she said. “The new planning scenario ignores the lessons learned over the past few years.” The strategy assumes that the United States will not engage in ground wars and must be prepared for high-end combat in the Pacific. “I’m not sure why they draw that conclusion,” Sanok said. Other analysts also have knocked the Pentagon’s sudden change in focus, considering that U.S. troops remain bogged down in a ground fight in Afghanistan. The Defense Department is becoming “obsessed with the high tech problem,” Frank Hoffman, a defense analyst at the National Defense University, said last month. Another line of attack against the strategy is that it assumes that other countries will take over global policing duties that the U.S. military has conducted for decades. Sanok said she does not believe any country has yet agreed to take on specific missions now performed by the United States and, if so, it is not clear what they are. European NATO members have been slashing defense spending. “Based on my experience, they [U.S. leaders] probably talked [to allied officials] for a couple of days and they call that ‘consultations,’” she said. “It remains to be seen what our partners can do.” The strategy mentions the use of “innovative partnerships,” which is code for relying on non-traditional allies such as Mali and Chad in Africa, and Indonesia in Asia, said Sanok. These nations have depended on the U.S. military to train and equip their own forces, so it is doubtful that they could step into any major role left unfilled by the United States. Even though these goals are stated in the new strategy, she added, “I don’t think those discussions have happened.” Critics also have blasted defense planners for insisting that budget cuts can be rolled back, if circumstances warrant it. “Reversibility” is the new trendy word, Sanok said, but nobody knows what it means exactly and how it would apply to specific budget decisions. “How do you un-retire something?” With less money, some procurement programs will have to be slowed down. But so far there is no policy that points to specific programs or manufacturing plants that would have to be protected in case they have to surge production in response to a crisis. “Some members [of Congress] worry that the Executive Branch does not understand the impact to the industrial base,” she said. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has said he wants to protect the industrial base. “I’m not sure what that means,” Sanok said. “What have they done to ensure that happens?” The Pentagon’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal, some details of which were presented last week, also has come under fire for making improbable assumptions. The plan, which cuts $259 billion in spending over the next five years, dodges the politically sensitive topic of rising personnel costs. Compensation and benefits make up one third of the Pentagon’s budget, but account for just one-ninth of the proposed reductions, said Todd Harrison, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. It is unrealistic to not expect that personnel costs — which have been on a steady climb for more than a decade —will put pressure on other areas of the budget. Panetta has recommended that the Defense Department create a special commission to deal with retirement benefit reforms, but no comparable debate has been initiated regarding pay and benefits for active-duty forces. Harrison also questioned Panetta’s assertion that $60 billion of the $259 billion in savings will come from “efficiencies.” “That’s very optimistic,” Harrison said. ”It’s incredibly risky to be banking on those savings before they’ve been achieved.” CSIS analyst David J. Berteau, also cast doubts on these savings projections. The efficiencies, for instance, include “better use of information technologies. “Ever since we created IT we have taken money out of the budget in anticipation of savings from better use of IT,” Berteau said. Other money savers, such as “streamlining staff” and reducing contract services, are vague and tough to quantify. Another popular catchphrase of efficiency experts, “better inventory management,” also is questionable, he said. “This has been a hallmark for decades. You take the money out and then you figure out how to be more efficient.”
In the federal government, the Defense Department is responsible for its own computer network security, and the Department of Homeland Security is charged with protecting just about everything else in U.S. controlled cyberspace. But in the event of a wide-scale cyber-attack in the United States, don’t call DHS, said one former government insider. “If we do ever have a cyberwar, it will be won or lost in the private sector,” said Jason Healey, director of the cyber statecraft initiative at the Atlantic Council. Healey served as the White House director of cyber infrastructure protection from 2003 to 2005. Most of the Internet is in the private sector’s hands, along with most of the expertise in combating cyber-attacks, suggested Healey, who also worked at the National Security Agency and was there at the founding of the Joint Task Force — Computer Network Defense, the Pentagon’s first joint cyber war-fighting unit. Healey made his comments at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. Jan. 30 during a panel discussion marking the release of a report, “Cyber-Security: The Vexed Question of Global Rules,” produced by McAfee and the Security Defense Agenda, a Brussels-based think tank. “Tick through in your heads. How many major incidents have we had that the solution has started at DHS? If you are under attack, who do you really want on your side? DHS, or McAfee or Microsoft, or AT&T?” he asked. The National Cyber Incident Response Plan names the DHS-run National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center as the lead agency for dealing with large-scale cyber-attacks. But Healey has little regard for this organization. The NCCIC is responsible for the production of a common operating picture for cyber and communications across the federal, state, and local government, intelligence and law enforcement communities and the private sector. It is operated within DHS’ office of cybersecurity and communications, a component of the National Protection and Programs Directorate, according to the DHS website. The Defense Department, Department of Justice, FBI, Secret Service and the National Security Agency are among the entities that are supposed to share information at the center. Healey and other panelists decried the lack of information sharing between federal agencies. And that goes for sharing information with the American people as well. Stewart Baker, a partner at the Steptoe & Johnson law firm, and former assistant secretary for policy at DHS, said for a decade the U.S. government was too secretive about the cyberthreat. So the public and the private sector are just now beginning to grasp the problem. Healey agreed. “If it weren’t for the press, the American people [and] American companies would not know about the threat,” he said. He recalled going to a conference last year where he was expected to brief senior leaders involved in national security on cyber-issues, but he didn’t have anything to show them in terms of official reports that could explain the situation. “There is no government document we could use. We used Vanity Fair articles to try and say, ‘here is what the threat is,’” “When it comes to the government, if you want to convince us of the threat, tell us, don’t leak it. Because right now we are kind of dependent on the press,” he said. At a separate event at the press club later in the day, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano touted the department’s cybersecruity accomplishments. At her annual address on the “state of America’s homeland security,” she said DHS is “deploying the latest tools across the federal government to protect critical systems while sharing timely and actionable security information with public and private sector partners to help them protect their own operations.”
Representatives from such industries as financial services, electric power industry and the telecommunications are working at DHS alongside its own cybersecurity experts to prevent, identify, and address cyber-incidents, she said.
“Beyond protecting the computer networks of the civilian side of our government, we are leading the effort to protect our nation’s critical information infrastructure — the systems and networks that support them, to name a few,” she added. DHS’ computer emergency readiness team responded to more than 100,000 incident reports, and released more than 5,000 actionable cybersecurity alerts to federal, state and private sector partners, she said.
1/27/2012 Improvised explosive devices were once used as a means to lure troops into firefights where insurgents could ambush them with small arms fire. Today, it’s the opposite, said the director of the Joint IED Defeat Organization. Small arms are used to lure troops to IED emplacements. “They are using small arms to lure us into IEDs when we are dismounted. They’re using small arms to set up an IED engagement when were mounted, and they’re using small arms to break … contact. It is all about the IED,” Lt. Gen. Michael D. Barbero, said at a Jan. 26 talk at the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. He quoted one combatant commander serving in Afghanistan: “It’s not a case of IEDs on the battlefield. IEDs are the battlefield.” “Before, these were complementary capabilities on the battlefield, which led to either a direct engagement or facilitated maneuver, or firepower, but this is the weapon. This is the fight,” Barbero said. Barbero’s comments came only hours before Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta delivered a “Defense Budget and Priorities” document outlining what capabilities the Pentagon would like to cut and what it would like to “protect." The details of the Pentagon's fiscal year 2013 budget request — including specific funding for JIEDDO — will be revealed Feb. 13. Meanwhile, roadside bombs continue to take their toll on U.S. forces. The proliferation of IEDs is fueled by the reality of inexpensive and easy to obtain components, such as circuit boards and ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer component that can be used as the explosives. “Their C4ISR model is crushing ours,” Barbero said of the insurgents’ command, control, computers, communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Compared to the counter-IED efforts of the U.S. military and federal bureaucracy, which is scattered over multiple departments and agencies, the networks that design, fund and emplace bombs are nimble, he said. “They are flatter, virtual, unencumbered,” he said. As for their use of the Internet to carry out operations, “It is relatively secure. It’s cheap, seamless.” They use social networking as a means for recruiting, sharing tactics, techniques and procedures, rehearsals and to transfer funds, he added. “You have to continue to invest in defeating the device. That is what drives down the casualties, but that is playing defense,” Barbero said, noting that he believed that the IED scourge is here to stay, and the tactic will continue to be used globally as a weapon of terror. There are some 500 IED incidents per month outside Iraq and Afghanistan, he said. JIEDDO has a three-pronged approach. One is defeating the device by detecting the bombs before they detonate, or by improving protection for troops and vehicles.
U.S. forces also had great success in Iraq by “attacking the network.” The third element is “training the force.” That is where he sees room for improvement. “I think our biggest gap is training. We are working it as hard as we can. But we have improved training. We are really focused on that,” he said. “At the end of the day, our best counter-IED capability is the soldier or Marine who knows how to use these [capabilities] — what looks right and what doesn’t,” he said.
1/26/2012 The budget hit list has been revealed. Defense industry should breathe a sigh of relief. There are no big-ticket program cancellations, although several weapon systems are being put temporarily on hold.
Ground forces are bearing the brunt of the cuts. The Pentagon wants to reduce the size of the Army and the Marine Corps by 100,000 troops by 2017. The top line reductions for the 2013-2018 period amount to $259 billion, which would put the Defense Department on a path to cut $487 billion over the next decade. But even with these reductions, the budget "still makes a $614 billion [$525 billion base budget and $89 billion war budget] investment in our nation's security," said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey at a Jan. 26 news conference. The budget, Dempsey insisted, "maintains our military's decisive edge and helps sustain America's global leadership." Ever since President Obama announced last April that the Pentagon would have to cut at least $400 billion in spending over the next decade, defense industry has been bracing for a bloodbath. Analysts and contractors had predicted that most of the cuts would come from weapons programs. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, also speaking at the news conference, noted that even after losing 100,000 troops, the Army and Marine Corps will still end up larger than they were before 9/11. The Army’s active-duty force will drop from 570,000 to 490,000, and the Marine Corps’ from 202,000 to 182,000. The reductions are in line with the Obama administration's new strategic guidance that calls for a shift from ground wars to high-tech conventional warfare and an increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Army, even before the new strategic guidance was completed, had been weighing tough hardware-or-people budget choices. Historically, the Army has been able to fund most of its high-priority procurement programs as long as personnel stays at less than 46 percent of the Army’s total budget, which was about $145 billion for fiscal year 2012. Equipment accounts — research, development and acquisitions — make up 20 to 25 percent of the Army’s budget. Army Maj. Gen. Anthony A. Cucolo III, director of force development, said in December that personnel costs now are consuming 48 percent of the Army’s budget. That sparked worries about the possibility of having to cancel or delay a large chunk of the Army’s procurement portfolio. The Army’s goal is to allocate 20-25 percent of its budget for equipment. Panetta's plan redirects part of the savings from personnel cuts to investments in weapons systems that would equip the military to expand its presence in Asia Pacific. The budget preserves the Air Force's current bomber fleet, and includes funds for a new bomber. It maintains 11 Navy aircraft carriers and 10 air wings. Ship construction programs will be delayed but funds are being requested to add new weaponry to existing submarines and surface ships. Among the budget decisions that might affect contractors the most are the slowdown of Joint Strike Fighter procurement, delay of the Army Ground Combat Vehicle, reduced purchases of a new cruise-missile defense airship and of a new missile that would replace the Hellfire, and the termination of one of the military’s four variants of the Global Hawk unmanned aircraft. Army helicopter modernization will be delayed by three to five years. A major satellite program, the Defense Weather Satellite, is getting the boot. The Pentagon also plans to cut back on purchases of commercial satellite imagery and terminate a Humvee upgrade program. Such slew of program cutbacks and delays, however, is not going to push industry over a cliff, analysts said. “Our military industrial complex will survive,” said Kevin Ryan, a retired Army officer and executive director at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “We are still spending a huge amount,” Ryan said. “Panetta [has made it clear] he will try to protect the military industrial base. … You won’t see [top tier contractors] Raytheon or Lockheed closing.” One reason why this round of budget cuts will not deliver as big a blow as had been expected, Ryan said, is that industry has been taking preemptive action over the past two years, since former Defense Secretary Robert Gates launched a series of “efficiency” efforts and program terminations. Companies already have been laying off employees and closing down facilities, said Ryan. “They already knew what was going to happen. They knew sales are going fall. They’re self cutting as opposed to reacting to fewer orders.” But the industry still will be in relatively good health, said Ryan. “After the budget cuts, as big as they are, we are left with a large military force, despite the ground force reductions.” Industry has been slashing costs more aggressively in anticipation of an age of austerity, said David Melcher, CEO of ITT Exelis. “We could see the writing on the wall,” Melcher told National Defense. “We anticipated the top line was going to come down.” For the past two years, ITT has gotten rid of excess overhead, he said. “We continue to do that,” he added. “If you’re not watching your cost, you bear the risk of being non-competitive.” Industry investors also have adjusted to the new budget outlook, Melcher said. “Defense stocks in the aggregate look about what they did in 1991” at the beginning of the post Cold War downturn,” he said. Melcher, like other aerospace and defense executives, is optimistic that the new Pentagon strategy that shifts focus from counterinsurgency land wars to high-end warfare in the Pacific will benefit companies that produce advanced technology. “We’re in the camp of companies that like the direction that DoD is going,” said Melcher. The likelihood is that defense industry will be able to weather the storm, noted Jason Gursky, an analyst at Citi Investment Research. “Broadly speaking, while we expect all defense companies to take some lumps as part of the DoD's savings process, we do not anticipate any franchise-threatening moves,” Gursky wrote. “In our view, aligning weapons procurement to a renewed focus on Asia and on operating in anti-access environments will leave the industrial base in a much healthier spot vs. the impact of the ‘90s procurement holiday.” Ground force supporters, meanwhile, worry that Panetta’s budget moves are shortsighted and are uncomfortably similar to former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s much criticized policies. “It’s very odd to me that everything that Secretary Rumsfeld tried to do — cutting people and increasing ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] technology, air and naval power — is being resurrected,” said retired Army Lt. Gen. James Dubik, senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. Panetta almost dusted off Rumsfeld’s plan and put a new label on it, Dubik said in an interview. “This drawdown is based on the false belief” that technology can make up for less manpower, he said. “This was a failed policy under Rumsfeld.” Dubik said it is “folly to ascertain Asia-Pacific as our future and make that the basis for how we structure our armed forces. … No administration can risk to have ground forces ill prepared for whatever happens.” The debate over whether the right programs are falling to the budget ax could become dramatically more heated if Congress doesn’t figure out a way to avoid the automatic cuts that the Budget Control Act requires the federal government to make by January 2013. For the Defense Department, that would amount to another $500 billion in cuts over the next decade. During a meeting with industry CEOs last week, Panetta said he is confident that the department and industry can live with a $487 billion cut, but said he still worries that Congress will fail to act, and that sequestration is a real possibility. ITT CEO Melcher, who attended the meeting, said that Panetta called on industry to help prevent sequestration. He asked industry to “help articulate to the Congress, to the media and others what the potential impacts of sequestration are,” said Melcher. “Industry is on Secretary Panetta’s side. We don’t want to see cuts above the current cuts.” Congress will be debating the Pentagon's budget proposal as it also deals with tax issues, an extension of the debt ceiling and, most likely, continuing resolutions to keep the government running. Only a budget resolution that finds another way to cut the deficit would avert sequestration. Panetta suggested that industry leaders should be talking to members of Congress who have genuine concern for national security, irrespective of politics. But even if sequestration does not happen, the Defense Department will still see historically high budgets for the foreseeable future. The administration is requesting $525 billion for its base budget in fiscal year 2013, compared to $531 billion in 2012. The five-year plan calls for a steady increase to $567 billion by 2017. The Pentagon also will ask for $88.4 billion for war costs, which are exempt from the Budget Control Act cuts. The war budget was $115 billion in 2012. “The proposal to roll back the DoD budget plan for 2013-2017 by $259 billion doesn't amount to much of a reduction from recent spending levels,” said Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives. “The difference between planned spending for the next five years and the last five will be about 4 percent in real terms.” William D. Hartung, defense analyst at the Center for International Policy, said the president’s plan is, at most, a “modest adjustment at a time when military budgets of recent years have been at the highest levels since World War II.” The real problem, he said, is that the Pentagon and the industry had “unrealistic plans that assumed that the Department of Defense budget would continue to increase indefinitely. Last year’s president’s budget proposal had envisioned defense spending growing to $622 billion by 2017, compared to the current plan that forecasts $567 billion for 2017. Hartung characterized these cuts as a “course correction” that is modest when compared with past builddowns, such as those after Korea and Vietnam or at the end of the Cold War.” “Eliminating one of four versions of the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle, slowing down the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, and delaying the start of a new ballistic missile submarine for two years are managerial decisions, not tough budget choices,” he said. “All three make sense if the goal is to buy time to improve cost and performance of key systems or capabilities, but they don't go far enough in assessing the need for those capabilities.” Panetta’s budget proposal continues the efficiency campaign started by his predecessor Robert Gates. He said management reforms are needed to ensure “more disciplined use of defense dollars.” Among the most controversial items on the efficiency list is the intent to request Congress to authorize a Base Realignment and Closure round. The rest includes a familiar litany of management reforms: improve contracting practices, better use of information technology, cutbacks in official travel, reductions in contract services, deferrals in military construction and cuts to civilian pay raises. Panetta said these reforms will result in $60 billion in savings over the next five years. The Army on Jan. 26 issued a call for bids for the next phase of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program.
The request for proposals comes on the same day that Defense Department officials revealed details about budget reductions and announced their decision to terminate the Humvee recapitalization program and shift those resources to JLTV.
“Both the Army and the U.S. Marine Corps have identified critical capability gaps in their respective light tactical vehicle fleets,” said Kevin M. Fahey, program executive officer for combat support and combat service support (PEO CS&CSS). “JLTV is the most cost-effective program to meet capability gaps for the light tactical vehicles with the most demanding missions.”
Industry executives had been gearing up for both JLTV and a Humvee recap program. But critics have been pointing out the overlap between the two efforts, as well as similarities with the all-terrain variant of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle. Some experts said that it would be unlikely that both JLTV and the Humvee recap program could survive the current budget situation.
Concerns about JLTV were raised after Army and Marine Corps officials seemed divided on the approach to the vehicle. The Army was pushing for more protection to guard against roadside bombs while the Marine Corps wanted a vehicle light enough to transport via helicopters and on the back of ships. During a technology development phase, officials said that all of the vehicle prototypes delivered by the contractors were overweight.
The teams during that phase – led by Lockheed Martin Corp., BAE Systems and an AM General-General Dynamics consortium called General Tactical Vehicles – have been tweaking their vehicle designs in anticipation of the RFP and the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the program. The focus, industry executives told National Defense, has been on weight and shaving costs. Initial estimates put a single vehicle at more than $300,000, a price the Marine Corps said it could not afford. The goal now is for each vehicle to cost between $230,000 and $270,000.
The new RFP calls for vehicles to have curb weights no greater than 14,000 pounds and says that they should be transportable by CH-47 and CH-53 helicopters.
The Army intends to award up to three contracts during the summer for the EMD phase. Each contract will call for 22 prototypes to be delivered. The service has reduced the allotted time that was anticipated for this next phase as part of an effort to refine the acquisition strategy and get the vehicles to troops sooner, officials said.
The service plans to award a single contract for production in 2015. Officials have said the Army would like to buy 20,000 vehicles and the Marine Corps as many as 5,500.
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