Coast Guard 

Commandant: Coast Guard Suffering Under Strain of Tight Budgets 

2,011 

By Eric Beidel 

The Coast Guard’s new commandant has a familiar message for industry, Congress and the president of the United States.

It is the same message carried by previous commandants and one that comes second nature to Adm. Robert J. Papp Jr., the leader of the most cash-strapped branch of the military.

“We have kicked the can down the road for too many years,” he told National Defense. “We’re suffering significant degradation in our ability to respond to the needs of this country in the nation’s waters.”

Put simply, the service has a lot of old ships and boats and nowhere near the money required to replace them. It also has a growing number of missions and, some congressmen have said, not nearly enough of the personnel needed to carry them out. Many insiders, like former Coast Guard official Stephen Flynn, believe that a once flattering more-with-less mantra has grown tired and brought the force to the “the breaking point.” Papp does not go quite that far, but he knows the odds are stacked against him in the effort to bring the Coast Guard fully into the 21st Century.

It will require healthy doses of perseverance, persuasion and finger crossing, he said.

“Why should the American people, through their Congress, invest in the Coast Guard? I think it’s because it’s very important that we provide safety, security and stewardship for our nation’s waters,” said Papp, who was promoted to the helm after Adm. Thad Allen’s retirement in May.

“If not us, who else is going to do it?”

No other organization has the authorities to carry out such a broad range of missions, including maritime safety, search and rescue, environmental protection, drug and migrant interdiction, ice operations and general defense activities in conjunction with the Navy. It responds to natural disasters, cleans up oil spills and seizes nearly 500,000 pounds of cocaine and marijuana from drug smugglers each year. Yet its resources for executing these missions are dwindling.

The president’s $10 billion fiscal 2011 proposal for the Coast Guard calls for the reduction of 1,100 military personnel and the decommissioning of four high-endurance cutters and one medium-endurance cutter.

There also has been talk of White House budget officials slashing a program that would replace some of the service’s older ships. The Coast Guard has been conducting market research for the Offshore Patrol Cutter, which may be in jeopardy before any acquisition efforts begin.

Therein lies what Papp considers his ultimate struggle — the delicate balancing act of deciding how much of an annual $10 billion budget goes to the operation of the service and how much is spent on acquisition. It is the difference between treading water and moving forward, he said.

The Coast Guard has tried different approaches to update and replace its aging equipment over the years. Officials scrapped a much-maligned joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman in 2007 and brought the project in house. The initiative, called Deepwater, is a collection of more than a dozen acquisition programs aimed at modernizing ships and aircraft. Among other things, it calls for 91 new cutters, 124 small boats and 247 modernized airplanes, helicopters and drones. These platforms will replace assets that are growing increasingly expensive to operate and technologically obsolete.

Deepwater has been marred by delays, cost overruns and criticism from politicians and watchdog organizations. Doubts have been raised about whether the service has the personnel to handle such an undertaking. The Coast Guard has 950 military and civilian employees working in its acquisition directorate. However, it has struggled to find qualified candidates and still has many unfilled positions.

The Deepwater program once was estimated to cost $17 billion and be completed by 2018. Last spring, the service’s acquisition chief told Congress that the initiative is now figured to cost $27.4 billion and last until 2027. Those numbers could change again soon, as new cost estimates and another timeline are in the works. Before his retirement, Allen all but predicted that the program’s cost would increase yet again.

The flagship of the program is the National Security Cutter, which is replacing the more than 40-year-old high-endurance cutter fleet.

The service in November awarded a $480 million contract to Northrop Grumman to build the fourth National Security Cutter. Northrop built the first two already in operation, and is nearing completion on the third. Each ship is taking about four years from contract award to delivery.

Smaller ships are just as old as the high-endurance cutters. The 210-foot medium-endurance fleet also averages more than 40 years, three decades older than the Navy’s high-endurance ships. The Coast Guard’s newest offshore assets are 270-foot medium-endurance cutters, all more than 20 years old.

“At the rate we’re replacing ships, they’ll be in their 40s by the time we get around to them,” Papp said. “The young Americans who step forward to serve their country deserve better than that. They need reliable modern equipment to carry out dangerous missions at sea. We need to focus on that.”

Relief efforts after the devastating earthquake a year ago in Haiti revealed some of the problems with these old ships. Twelve of the 19 deployed required emergency maintenance, and two had to be recalled for dry-dock repairs. Helicopters that would have been used for rescues were called upon to fly in spare parts for the cutters.

Ships are just part of the story.

The Coast Guard also must replace its 110-foot patrol boats, all of which are “falling apart,” the admiral said. To compensate, the service has begun building a fast-response cutter, 12 of which are on budget. Ultimately, there will be 58 in what Papp said will be a “game-changing” fleet.

The Coast Guard, though, continues to throw money at old equipment. This stopgap is holding things together, but it will not last forever, Papp said. The budget is not that forgiving.

After fixed costs, the Coast Guard has about $6 billion to spend each year on day-to-day operations and about $1.4 billion for acquisitions. A new National Security Cutter eats up nearly half the acquisition funds. The Center for American Progress in a report this past summer suggested adding $5 billion to the president’s proposal for the Coast Guard. The service needs that much more just to keep up with its aging fleet, the report said.

“If the Coast Guard’s budget is authorized and appropriated as proposed, its total budget next fiscal year will be lower than that of next year’s total purchase of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters by the Department of Defense — next generation aircraft that are not needed in Iraq or Afghanistan,” the report’s authors wrote.

Many domestic security priorities, like boats used to patrol inland rivers and lakes, stay on the backburner. These boats are as old as the high-endurance cutters. Papp admits that the Coast Guard is “not doing so well” with the inland fleet or with crumbling infrastructure ashore.

The Coast Guard still uses buildings employed by the Life Saving Service in the 1800s. Some of its lighthouses date back to the 1700s. It has a $2 billion backlog when it comes to repairing piers, bulkheads, stations and barracks, Papp said.

The president has recommended $865 million to upgrade ships and boats in fiscal 2011, $101 million for aircraft and $155 million for other recapitalization efforts, including improvements at shore sites.

In some places, though, the Coast Guard still has no infrastructure.

Scientists say that warmer temperatures are causing the polar ice cap to shrink, which will open up Arctic waters to shipping traffic and oil exploration. The Coast Guard is being asked to take on increased responsibility in the region with no new money and little to no assets.

“I have zero resources up in the Arctic right now,” Papp said. “Anything that we place up there we take away from other locations in the Coast Guard.”

The Government Accountability Office recently issued a report in which it noted that global climate uncertainties coupled with the Coast Guard’s limited infrastructure would present challenges for Arctic missions. GAO officials visited Alaska and interviewed federal, state and local representatives as part of the study. It found that many were in the dark when it came to the Coast Guard’s plans for the Arctic.

“Some state and local officials believed that the agency had already determined its plan for Arctic operations but had not shared it, and one state official reported that his office and others may be willing to invest in infrastructure that could benefit the Coast Guard if and when they know the agency’s plans,” the GAO report said.

The service has been testing its assets in the Arctic, where an emphasis will be placed on the ability of small response boats to operate in shallow waters. The Coast Guard also will need to refurbish its three icebreakers, Papp said. The two heaviest are sidelined, and a smaller one is used primarily for scientific research.

The Coast Guard has been working on the outreach efforts, too. This past summer it launched Operation Arctic Crossroads, an effort that took personnel to far-reaching villages in northern Alaska. The service is using the opportunity to visit with residents and determine its operational capabilities in the northern locales.

“The Arctic is going to be a big challenge for us,” Papp said. “We have to do more than think about it. We’ve been thinking about it for a couple of years. We need to act.”

It took Canadian authorities a couple of days to reach a cruise ship and oil tanker that ran aground in separate incidents this past summer on their side of the Northwest Passage. “And I would say that the Canadians are actually better prepared at this point to respond to activities in the Arctic than we are,” Papp said.

The Coast Guard’s unfinished work extends to its people. Papp’s predecessor Adm. Thad Allen had begun to reorganize disparate groups and safety offices into regional sectors. There still are groups that have not been assigned. Papp also decided against plans to use just one operational leader in the field. He will continue to employ commanders for both the Atlantic and Pacific areas.

“I did not come in here with any plans for doing a massive reorganization of the Coast Guard or inflicting any more change and churn on the people of the Coast Guard,” Papp said. “I want to finish these projects, and that will allow us to focus on making sure we are delivering the best possible mission service to the American people.”

Completing projects is difficult when funding continues to wane. Former Coast Guard leaders have been outspoken about the lack of support on Capitol Hill. Some have suggested a civilian leader for the service, like the secretaries of the Army, Air Force and Navy. Others say that the commandant should be a voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Papp does not sound any alarms or offer radical ideas. During a November interview with National Defense, he used the same tone of voice to describe potential terrorist tactics on the open sea as he did while explaining how the Coast Guard had neither the money nor the wherewithal to field an unmanned aerial vehicle on its own.

Papp listed four priorities upon taking the commandant post, one of which was to strengthen partnerships. The service will need to do just that to accomplish its goals, including obtaining a surveillance drone for the maritime environment, he said. In the meantime, the admiral will continue to tell the story to anyone willing to listen of a force spread thin and in dire need of attention.

“We’re all hopeful that the economy will improve and changes occur where we get increased emphasis on the security operations of our country in the maritime environment,” Papp said. “We’ll just continue to press on making the case for the need to recapitalize and keep our Coast Guard strong.”

Reader Comments

Re: Commandant: Coast Guard Suffering Under Strain of Tight Budgets

To the readers who commented on this story, please accept our apologies for the delay in publishing your comments. It was an unintentional glitch.

Sandra Erwin on 01/04/2011 at 15:25

Re: Commandant: Coast Guard Suffering Under Strain of Tight Budgets

as a former coastie I agree that the the guard should be getting alot more cash for thier fleet. I've done a little research on the polar ice breaking situation. the polar star and sea are in horrendous condition and someone needs to pony up soon or we wont have an antartic capability. why isnt the national science foundation coming up with bucks? they use the polar breakers breakers most.

eric bigelow on 12/16/2010 at 15:40

Re: Commandant: Coast Guard Suffering Under Strain of Tight Budgets

“Why should the American people, through their Congress, invest in the Coast Guard? I think it’s because it’s very important that we provide safety, security and stewardship for our nation’s waters,” said Papp, who was promoted to the helm after Adm. Thad Allen’s retirement in May.

“If not us, who else is going to do it?”

Unbelievable. Yes there is a budget shortfall. And yes the Coast Guard needs a lot of money to get back on track. However - if the Commandant was so concerned about the budget he would help us secure $96-$180M for the 123s. All we asked for was 3 one page declarations all of which the legal office said were accurate and at least one of the declarations would be coming from a volunteer.

This cry for help on the Commandant's part is disingenuous and hypocritical. If he truly wanted to help the Coast Guard secure every nickel it could to improve he would be doing everything within his authority to get that money. But apparently a couple of more hours work to help us get the 123 refund back is over some kind of BS line? Admiral Papp put the politics, BS and your own pride, ego and frustrations with me aside. Let's get that money back, hold those contractors accountable and put that money to good use.

Michael DeKort on 12/16/2010 at 09:26

Re: Commandant: Coast Guard Suffering Under Strain of Tight Budgets

As the Father of a Sr Chief in the CG, I think it is disgraceful how our politicians can allow this to happen. The CG is our shores defense, our safe shipping lanes in our rivers and lakes, our rescue service for our fishing fleets and on and on. We need to have a more vocal group out there to help the CG get the $$$$$'s needed.

Jim Klynman on 12/15/2010 at 12:52

Re: Commandant: Coast Guard Suffering Under Strain of Tight Budgets

“Why should the American people, through their Congress, invest in the Coast Guard? I think it’s because it’s very important that we provide safety, security and stewardship for our nation’s waters,” said Papp, who was promoted to the helm after Adm. Thad Allen’s retirement in May.

“If not us, who else is going to do it?”

Unbelievable. Yes there is a budget shortfall. And yes the Coast Guard needs a lot of money to get back on track. However - if the Commandant was so concerned about the budget he would help us secure $96-$180M for the 123s. All we asked for was 3 one page declarations all of which the legal office said were accurate and at least one of the declarations would be coming from a volunteer.

This cry for help on the Commandant's part is disingenuous and hypocritical. If he truly wanted to help the Coast Guard secure every nickel it could to improve he would be doing everything within his authority to get that money. But apparently a couple of more hours work to help us get the 123 refund back is over some kind of BS line? Admiral Papp put the politics, BS and your own pride, ego and frustrations with me aside. Let's get that money back, hold those contractors accountable and put that money to good use.

The Commandant and his legal staff are obstructing our lawsuit on their behalf. The False Claims Act suit to recover $96M-$180M for the 123s

Coast Guard’s inexplicable obstruction of our legal efforts – a case which is asserted for the (majority) benefit of 1) the US and 2) a much more modest participation by me and my attorneys.

On Northrop Grumman’s 4th attempt to dismiss my “hull claims,” just days before trial and while we were discussing settlement, the judge entered an Order which stopped the settlement process. The Court believed that allegations of qui tam violations regarding the HM&E (hull structure and design defects) were based upon public disclosures by media and testimony at the April 18, 2007, Congressional Hearing of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and that I had no previous awareness of those problems. But,my claims were not based upon public disclosures, so we filed a motion for the Court to reconsider the dismissal. Moreover, the Court had already denied the Northrop Grumman/ICGS motion on three previous occasions stating I may have know about some of the 123s buckling status from the public/press but there was no evidence I learned about the fraud from public sources.

NG apparently changed the judge’s mind by presenting evidence out of context. For example, they only partially quoting my deposition text so that it looked like I connected most or the key parts at my hearing on 4/18/2007, while the full quote reveals that I qualified my statements by pointing to the preparation and lead up to the hearing which were not public disclosures. At that hearing Rep Cummings stated this case should be referred to the DOJ and that the CG should get all of its money back. In addition to this I had misunderstood some questions at my deposition and provided answers that were not want I would want them to be if I had fully understood the question – this also helped NG confuse the Court. Lastly in 2009 I had provided a declaration where, in addition to writing a confusing key paragraph, I made some recollection errors, because of the passing of time [6 years], and I had been unaware at the time that there were two separate shaft issues that caused shaft misalignment. So the judge took what he saw and made a ruling. (We responded under great stress, as the Court also only gave us 2 days, rather than the normal 21 days, to respond to a motion for summary judgment).

Now why did we want the Coast Guard’s help? We had filed a response to NG’s motion which disclosed my full deposition text. But we also needed to confirm that I learned the key fraud links from USCG personnel well before the 4/18/2007 Congressional Hearing. So we simply needed brief declarations from former CG employees Anthony D’Armiento and Tom Hickman to confirm my pre-hearing knowledge of the buckling hulls and design flaws known to the USCG after its investigations. We have obtained, fortunately, one declaration from the Congressional Committee’s former Lead Investigator, which is mentioned in the article. The investigator completely confirms and supports our position on my knowledge of the hull and shaft issues well prior to the Congressional Hearing, which I helped him organize. I was actually the person who provided Mr. Foushee the name and contact data for the investigations lead hull witness, Mr. Scott Sampson. Mr. Foushee’s Declaration should, standing alone, make clear to the Court its erroneous ruling. As it is always best to gather as much supporting evidence as possible, we also reached out to Mr. D’Armiento and Mr. Hickman, Coast Guard personnel at the relevant timeframe, for additional clarifying declarations.

Tom Hickman, a former WPB-110 XO and CG marine engineer who worked on the Deepwater program volunteered, if the CG would consent, to give us his declaration revealing communications with me about the hull buckling and design defects. Mr. Hickman actually referred to the contractor’s improper performance in the strongest possible terms. These statements in the fall of 2006 helped me support my fraud claims. I actually located the individual, called him to confer and passed his contact data to the CG. Within a short amount of time the agency currently employing him cleared him to help, so long as the CG consented, since the declaration related to a timeframe when the Mr. Hickman was working for the CG. Curiously, although I had no problem locating or talking to the witness, the CG reported that they were having problems locating him. Plleeasse!

Well the CG played “communications excuses” for a couple of weeks, losing critical procedural days. All the while, we clearly explained how and where Mr. D’Armiento could be contacted. In addition we provided sample declaration text for the CG and/or Mr. D’Armiento to edit in order to speed the process along, and we did edit the declaration per the CG’s comments. We knew that the Court could rule at any time, and we wanted the Court to have the proper evidence before it. After weeks or promising assistance, as the procedural deadlines continued to run, the Coast Guard issued a letter saying they were not going to help. (I then sought assistance from the current and former Commandants and received no response.) The Coast Guard’s key (frivolous) reasons for their dramatic change of course is repeated in the article. One of the points was that they did not have enough time. Well they had over three weeks. The reason we did not send them the Touhy agreement earlier was that Mr. D’Armiento was working for the DCMA at the time, and we wanted to make sure we followed the appropriate process. We specifically asked the CG to help by telling us how it wanted to process to proceed. They did, and we followed their requests. For reasons unknown, they strung us along, feigning cooperation, with no actual intention of providing any of the declarations. They misled us and Senator Cantwell’s office by telling both of us they were trying to assist us in the process. The matter could have been completely resolved by the CG in a matter of days, not weeks. The witnesses had already confirmed the facts that we needed them to confirm. We provided the draft declarations. All they had to do was “markup” or accept the drafts.

False guarantees issues were discovered weeks after the formal discovery cutoff.

In the summer, weeks after the formal discovery cutoff, we were finally allowed [by the defendants] to take the oral depositions of the Corporate Representatives of Northrop Grumman We learned that the contractors had misled the CG at the time (September 28, 2001) that they submitted to the CG their formal proposal for the construction phase of the IDS contract. The contractors in the contractual documents represented that guarantees of ICGS’ performance had been 1) executed and 2) delivered to the CG. But the guarantees were never executed or delivered to the CG. The contractors’ documents also confirmed that the award of the IDS Phase 2 contract was conditioned on the contractors providing the guarantees to the CG. Everyone knew that without the guarantees being provided to the CG, ICGS would not be awarded the Deepwater Phase 2 contact. Nonetheless, no guarantees were ever executed and delivered to the CG, and the contractors knew that fact. So, reality is that the CG awarded a prime contract to ICGS, a new and unestablished entity with grossly insufficient capitalization ($400,000) for a multi-billion dollar contract. As I write, the CG has demanded (2007) the repayment by ICGS of the $96.1 million that was wasted on eight completely unseaworthy 123s, now destined to become “scrap” according to the CG witnesses. So, how effective or good are the promised, but non-existent, guarantees, since ICGS hasn’t repaid a “thin dime?” If a real guarantee had been in place, the CG could have demanded the contractors’ performance of their guarantees. But there is nothing in place. Even worse for the U.S., ICGS, according to the contractors’ official witnesses, couldn’t pay a mere $10 million judgment, because it only has about $6 million. The U.S. is screwed unless our claims are allowed to proceed on the hull issues and the false statements about the guarantees. The CG has no money back, and it has 8 crappy 123s that it can’t even give away because of the dangers of operating the 123s. It’s just awful, and I and my lawyers are the ones spending the money and time, making huge investments, to get the money back for the United States

The internal contract documents show that the Coast Guard was assured that ICGS was a Joint Venture of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, another representation that was, apparently false, since the contractors denied the Joint Venture in Court—no denial in their contract proposal or in the contract documents, not on the ICGS website, not in media releases—just in the Court. So, we are also trying to straighten out that issue.

We included the guarantee and joint venture claims in the parties’ pretrial order, but we also requested that we be allowed to amend the complaint as a result of some comments by the Court during a pretrial conference. We have additionally requested some assistance from the Coast Guard to help them overcome the non-existent guarantees and the denial by the contractors of the Joint Venture which is prominently proclaimed on the contract documents and ICGS website.

Go ahead, Google “Joint Venture and ICGS and Lockheed and Northrop,” and you decide whether the contractors represented that they were a Joint Venture as they claimed to the CG, or not a Joint Venture as they told our Judge. Yes, it is amazing. Even so, the CG has little interest in cooperating with us in order to recover the huge losses to the U.S. taxpayers.

Does the U.S. have deficit problems and shortage of taxpayer money for virtually every federal program, anyone? Can the U.S. afford to waste the money [$96.1 million or more] that the CG wasted on the eight crappy 123s that are unseaworthy? Can we really afford to the have the Coast Guard “turn its head” in order to accommodate the contractors; no doubt, a relationship far too friendly given the virtual refusal to hold the contractors accountable? And, why is the CG obstructing our very expensive efforts to help them? Go figure… Well, it’s impossible to rationalize all of the bad decisions that the CG has made during our legal process. If they aren’t going to make the contractors pay back the money, when are they going to demand that the contractors fix the 8 pieces of crap floating in the CG’s Baltimore yard?

Do you need more examples of the Coast Guard putting up completely inappropriate road blocks? The Coast Guard produced late in the discovery period large and corrupted, in material part, a critical document that was one of the most important documents in the case. That document had been possessed by all of the Defendants for years and could and should have been produced much earlier. We literally spent many hundreds of thousands of dollars and wasted critical time doing work that the CG had already done and compiled. After we pointed out we had found the document and how critical it was the Coast Guard tried to suppress it; they “clawed it back,” until we badgered them to withdraw their suppression of the document in the last week of discovery.

Lastly, for the trial, the key CG witness who had confirmed in his Declaration that the CG was misled by the contractors on the hull structure issues was properly subpoenaed. Yet, immediately before trial we learned that the CG, who knew he was the “key witness” on the major issues had assigned him immediately before trial to a patrol boat in the Pacific. The boat where the witness was transported was in parts unknown, according to the CG, and it had no communications ability to enable even a telephonic testimonial presentation. Yes, at the last minute, the key CG witness jerked away from the legal process, designed to recover the CG losses of almost $100 million, to the Pacific to parts literally unknown, and he was shockingly unavailable for trial. The Court was highly concerned and commented from the bench that if we could find precedent for his Court to Order the CG to produce, immediately, the witness in Dallas, he would take whatever action was necessary

Screw up, screw up, screw up. When will government ever be held accountable for this kind of misbehavior? Only Congress controls the purse strings, and if Congress won’t intervene to persuade the CG to cooperate with the process, a good outcome will be difficult—not impossible, but much more difficult than necessary.

The Coast Guard has helped us only when mandated by law and subpoenas or when doing so was not critical to us. And even when forced to help, like providing documentary discovery, they fought us that as demonstrated by using the “clawback” to suppress the availability of one of the most important pieces of evidence in the case. Incredible as it may sound, all of the contractors had possessed the same document for years!

Why would the Coast Guard do this? Difficult to justify, so it is difficult to speculate. However, let’s acknowledge that it doesn’t like my whistleblowing, nor me, personally, as their representatives have candidly stated. Second, I believe they are being politically pressured by “others.” You can speculate about who is influencing the wave of poor decisions that we have suffered. Third– they have no interest in the public being reminded of their past failings and now finding out about the fraudulent guarantees. Imagine the concerns of Congress, the IG and the press if they known that the whole contract was awarded on the basis of a false statement regarding the execution and delivery of [CG] mandated guarantees, never executed or delivered as represented.

In addition to the pathetic 123s debacle, this also means that at least the first 3 NSC’s are covered by a false, non-existent guarantee – and depending on the contract mechanism – maybe all of the rest of the NSCs. The Coast Guard just announced that it awarded the 4th NSC to NG in a contract outside of Deepwater. Was there a competition? Is that boat guaranteed? How do you offer and award a contract to a company who has treated the Coast Guard the way ICGS et al have done so far? The 123 debacle is open with no money returned for the hulls, and the CG was duped into signing the entire Phase 2 IDS contract when there was no executed and delivered guarantee as expressly represented by the contractors. In addition to the qui tam violations, is there is a FAR issue here? Senator Cantwell’s staff wonders, too.

I find it very unfortunate that the Coast Guard would be behaving this petty, vindictive and short sighted because of their animosity towards me and towards transparent governance. The CG knows that our case is their best shot at getting recovery of the refund for the boats losses and other losses arising from the contractors’ fraudulent inducement of the IDS contract. My attorneys have already committed millions of dollars in services and expenses in order to help the U.S./Cost Guard secure their refund.

The taxpayers shouldn’t continue to be plagued with the $96.1+ million in absolute waste. Who else speaks for the taxpayers? Taxpayers are going through enough hell. The government is reportedly considering more taxes, while the CG gives a basic [$96.1 million or more] free pass to non-performing contractors in our case. Given these hard times – with universal federal deficits as far as the eye can see, reported Coast Guard, budget shortages and this being a post 9/11 world, isn’t it right to do everything they can to help us help the taxpayers get a decent recovery? We requested only cooperation (attitude check) and a review and revision, if needed, of a couple one or two page documents/declarations– not any real work at all. Hours, not days. Hours, not weeks.

We are hopeful that the Court has enough evidence before it to come to the right decision, but it won’t be due to any assistance from the CG. We will pursue the right outcome, as we have pursued everything else in this case. Take the CG’s excuses with a grain of salt and check the record if you want to be sure that YOU are not misled.

Michael DeKort on 12/14/2010 at 19:27

Submit Your Reader's Comment Below
*Name
 
*eMail
 
The content of this field is kept private and will not be shown publicly.
*Comments
 
 
Refresh
Please enter the text displayed in the image.
The picture contains 6 characters.
*Characters
  
*Legal Notice

NDIA is not responsible for screening, policing, editing, or monitoring your or another user's postings and encourages all of its users to use reasonable discretion and caution in evaluating or reviewing any posting. Moreover, and except as provided below with respect to NDIA's right and ability to delete or remove a posting (or any part thereof), NDIA does not endorse, oppose, or edit any opinion or information provided by you or another user and does not make any representation with respect to, nor does it endorse the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement, or other material displayed, uploaded, or distributed by you or any other user. Nevertheless, NDIA reserves the right to delete or take other action with respect to postings (or parts thereof) that NDIA believes in good faith violate this Legal Notice and/or are potentially harmful or unlawful. If you violate this Legal Notice, NDIA may, in its sole discretion, delete the unacceptable content from your posting, remove or delete the posting in its entirety, issue you a warning, and/or terminate your use of the NDIA site. Moreover, it is a policy of NDIA to take appropriate actions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and other applicable intellectual property laws. If you become aware of postings that violate these rules regarding acceptable behavior or content, you may contact NDIA at 703.522.1820.

 
 
  Bookmark and Share