The Gates Doctrine — based on the principle that the wars we are in are the ones we must win — is shaking up the status quo in the weapons-buying business.
Expensive, “exquisite” weapons that take decades to design and build are being spurned in favor of no-nonsense equipment that troops need today to fight insurgencies and various other forms of low-intensity conflict.
The icons of the Gates Doctrine are well known: mine-resistant armored trucks, unmanned spy aircraft, helicopters.
But there are still other irregular-combat weapon needs that are not talked about much. A recent Pentagon-funded study reveals that one of the biggest difficulties that U.S. troops face in current conflicts is that they lack nonlethal alternative weapons that they can use in situations when they need to take forceful action without harming civilians. The study, written by a group of researchers from the Rand Corp., describes this as a “void between lethality and inaction” that often results in no-win situations.
“American generals like to say that the purpose of U.S. forces is to fight and win the nation’s wars. But they and the rest of us know that nowadays it is not that simple,” says the 169-page report: “Underkill: Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations Amid Populations.”
U.S. commanders have been frustrated by the political damage that comes from killing, injuring, or terrifying civilians. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Gaza, armed militants hide in dense populations, challenging — practically daring — U.S., coalition, or Israeli forces to attack. “Enemy propagandists have a field day when counterinsurgency forces kill or injure innocent people,” the study says.
U.S. officials have concluded that the United States cannot afford to take the attitude that civilian casualties are unfortunate but unavoidable.
Rand examined what “nonlethal capabilities” might be useful for today’s wars. These weapons are standard in law-enforcement missions but have not been widely used by the military. “We all have unpleasant images of tear gas, firehoses, batons and rubber bullets,” Rand says. Such crude nonlethal weapons are inadequate for today’s military missions, notes the study. “The possibility of injuries being captured on film, in cell-phone snapshots, or on satellite TV places a premium on capabilities that are less easily depicted as cruel or brutal.”
The Defense Department has been developing nonlethal weapons for decades, but the technology has not lived up to its promise. The disappointment is evidenced by the relatively small (by Pentagon standards) $50 million annual budget for nonlethal weapons.
Among the complaints: Flash-bang munitions have limited range and may be frightening to innocent bystanders. Electric-shock Tasers are useful only at short range against small numbers of individuals, are not scalable and can cause pain. Tear-gas may alienate otherwise sympathetic individuals. Rubber bullets produce pain, if not injury and sometimes death, and cannot be adjusted according to the situation.
Rand’s suggested solution is a suite of nonlethal technologies that would include directed sound, directed light, lasers, cell-phone communication and video observation.
Lasers make functional nonlethal weapons because they can be scaled — from low-energy to high-energy to ultrashort pulses. They are portable and do not require physical projectiles, violent contact or inhalation.
For directed-energy devices to become more useful, they should beam data into cell-phone warning networks, Rand researchers say. If friendly authorities have access to cell-phone switches, a commander could request that all cell phones in a given neighborhood be called to transmit simple text or audio messages. Similar techniques could be used with video technologies. Vehicle-mounted or fixed cameras and video recordings could aid in refuting unfounded rumors and propaganda, and collecting intelligence about suspected insurgents. Live video also could help forces manage escalation or de-escalation.
This suite of technologies is within reach and does not require extensive development, the authors contend. More research would be needed in high-intensity sound that is precise at long ranges and can cause discomfort, disorientation or incapacitation. Efforts also should focus on software that permits selective and instantaneous cell-phone messaging to users in a particular area.
The study recommends that the Pentagon double its current budget for nonlethal technologies. But it cautions against turning this into a traditional acquisition program, which would take years to compete and implement.
Small-unit commanders, particularly, will benefit from nonlethal systems. But they also will need to learn how to employ the weapons and how to make life-or-death decisions under pressure.
The portfolio of so-called irregular missions is growing faster than the Defense Department can satisfy equipment and training needs, the study notes. U.S. forces find themselves doing more police-style work. They free hostages, isolate terrorists, board suspicious or pirated ships.
This equipment gap gives Secretary Gates an opportunity to put the weapons-buying bureaucracy to work on behalf of the fighting force.