Senators May Seek Life Science Lab Security Regulations
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By Stew Magnuson and Matthew Rusling
“The commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”
That is the opening paragraph of a Senate commissioned study, “World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism.”
And if this alarming scenario comes to pass, it is more likely than not to be a biological weapon, said the authors at a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing.
While the report delved into the possibility that terrorists would obtain a nuclear weapon and use it, biological weapons would be much easier for them to develop, said former Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., commission chairman.
Life science laboratories, and similar facilities are proliferating throughout the world. Security is lax at many of them — including the United States. Background checks for those working in the labs are spotty.
The nuclear industry recognized from its very beginnings that it was dealing with dangerous material and that safety and security had to be paramount. But that was not the case with bio-labs, which have never had a strong security culture, the report pointed out.
This lax security will soon converge with a global revolution in the life sciences where lab workers can synthesize strands of DNA, piece them together and assemble infectious viruses.
“The only way to rule out the harmful use of advances in biotechnology would be to stifle their beneficial applications as well — and that is not a realistic option,” Graham said in a prepared statement.
It’s unlikely that a terrorist will become a bio-weapons expert. It’s more likely that a bio-weapons expert might be recruited into a terrorist cell, the report said.
The case of Bruce Ivins, who was allegedly behind the anthrax cases and worked in a highly secure Army facility at Fort Detrick, Md., was mentioned several times by committee members.
The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Tokyo, was not mentioned, although it aggressively recruited followers with advanced science degrees into its ranks. It later used this expertise to manufacture biological weapons, which were not successfully deployed. However, its efforts to recruit chemical engineers and to make nerve gasses such as sarin did succeed.
Ranking member of the committee, Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, said U.S. bio-labs will probably be subjected to the same regulations that the chemical industry now must submit to after legislation passed requiring plants to draw up security assessments.
Currently, labs receiving federal funding are under “light” security regulations, but oversight is split up amongst the Centers for Disease Control and the Department of Agriculture. There are turf battles over who is overseeing what labs, noted the report.
“And if you don’t get federal funds, you’re not regulated at all,” said former Sen. Jim Talent, R-Mo., vice-chairman of the commission.