In a recent Government Accountability Office report, Congress was lauded for implementing an explosives screening requirement for all checked luggage following the 9/11 terrorists attacks.
But aviation security analysts say the measure has diverted funds, attention and resources from passenger and carry-on baggage screening checkpoints to the detriment of national security.
“We had an inconsistency between checked baggage and carry-on baggage. Either one was a threat of getting a bomb on a plane, and Congress, by mandating 100 percent screening of checked baggage, left this glaring inconsistency with carry-ons,” says Robert Poole, director of transportation studies at Reason Public Policy Institute, a nonprofit organization headquartered in Los Angeles.
That loophole was exposed flagrantly in August, when British authorities disclosed an alleged terrorist plot to bomb at least 10 airplanes as they flew to destinations in the United States.
The nation’s airports do not have any liquid explosives detection technology deployed to passenger screening checkpoints.
“We’re extremely weak on the liquids side. What has saved us in the past is that people have not wanted to do liquid explosives because they tend to be very volatile,” says Douglas R. Laird, president of Laird and Associates, Inc., an aviation security consulting firm.
The mastermind behind the 1994 Philippine Airlines bombing incident was caught when one of the liquid explosives being concocted for another bombing attempt caught fire in a Manila apartment. But liquid explosives have come to the forefront as weapons of choice for potential terrorists because ingredients are attainable at local stores.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks were not the result of checked baggage security procedures, but they did shed light on the lack of screening requirements. Until Congress mandated its 100 percent screening requirement, only 5 percent of checked bags were being screened for explosives.
“Congress should not be initiating these sorts of things. The Transportation Security Administration, with access to all the intelligence data and all their modeling capabilities, ought to be the one proposing what we need to do next and where we would get the most bang for the buck,” says Poole.
To meet Congress’ mandate for screening all checked baggage for explosives, TSA spent millions of dollars to procure and deploy explosive detection systems at the nation’s airports. While EDS systems have been deployed to the largest 85 airports in the country, explosives trace detection systems have been deployed to the rest of the airports.
“Trace is good, but trace should never be used as a primary screening device, because all it tells you is whether something is or isn’t there,” says Laird.
Trace technology searches for vapors or particles of explosives. The system requires security agents to handle luggage manually and swab them for testing. It’s a time-consuming and labor-intensive process, and that type of technology can be fooled, he says. EDS, on the other hand, gives a vivid picture of a bag’s contents down to minute detail, he says.
“The good news is, there’s EDS at airports that handle 85 percent of the people. But the bad news is, 15 percent of airports use trace,” he adds.
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