While most NATO members have skilled special operations units, the alliance so far has not forged them into a cohesive multinational force. Such a commando formation would be better qualified — particularly in counterterrorism scenarios — to respond to contingencies, avow military experts.
“A strong case can be made for creating a NATO SOF force,” suggests a study published recently by the National Defense University.
“What NATO does best — enhancing and melding multilateral capabilities for combined action — it has not done with regard to SOF,” write David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith.
Gompert is a senior fellow at Rand Corp., and a former ranking advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Smith, a retired rear admiral, is a former deputy commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command and one-time commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command.
“Much could be gained through sharing of know-how and best practices, and interoperability could be forged through SOF exchanges, training and exercises,” the study says.
The value of a NATO SOF force is obvious in light of the ongoing campaign against al Qaeda terrorist groups. In its 2006 quadrennial defense review, the Pentagon noted the heightened importance of SOF for combating the global jihad and other irregular threats.
Most NATO allies possess SOF capabilities in one form or another. Some allies also have high-performance commando and elite paramilitary forces that are not assigned to their defense ministries.
Within Spain’s Guardia Civil, for example, are some of the world’s finest counterterrorism forces — reflecting Spain’s long struggle with Basque separatists, who use terror tactics.
Several allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland, have SOF-type forces in significant numbers that are capable of a wide range of missions. Quantitatively, the combined SOF capabilities of NATO allies are roughly half those of U.S. SOF. This represents a significant capacity for global efforts, provided the forces can be organized to work and fight together against common threats such as al Qaeda, notes the NDU study.
However, the SOF of NATO members, including the United States, are not organized to collaborate for the purpose of improving capabilities, increasing preparedness or operating jointly.
NATO has on occasion requested U.S. and allied SOF for specific contingencies, such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo. Some useful but minor U.S.-allied bilateral SOF cooperation in Europe is currently sponsored by the U.S. European Command.
But other than allied special operations units embedded in the NATO response force, NATO has no SOF capability, nor has the alliance made it a priority to expand, improve and fit together member SOF capabilities, according to the report. “If history since the end of the Cold War is a guide, most future contingencies in which NATO may elect to act with force as an alliance will require SOF.”
This argues for making U.S. and allied SOF assets readily available, not as disparate and disjointed ad hoc national contributions, but as a coherent combined force, Gompert and Smith write.
“Though excellent, U.S. SOF are not superior in every mission or skill set. Representatives of this force would be the first to admit how impressed they are when exposed to their allied counterparts — from British tropical commandos to Norwegian arctic rangers to French undersea divers,” they relate.
Collaboration with NATO forces would better enable U.S. SOF to examine alterative approaches, innovations and niche capabilities. It also might permit specialization. U.S. forces would know where certain allied capabilities exist that they need not duplicate. In particular, SOF can expand their linguistic skills, the study says.
NATO SOF also would enhance the ability of U.S. commandos to operate in cultural settings known better to allies. “Deep cultural awareness and access can be essential in operations and in developing indigenous antiterrorism forces. This would apply anywhere in Europe, but also in parts of Africa and the Middle East, thus covering the three regions of main concern to NATO.”
Certainly in Europe, and arguably in much of Africa and the Middle East, combined U.S. allied SOF action is politically more acceptable and supportable than U.S. only action, the authors assert.
A NATO force notionally would have an “inner core” of 500 troops. It would consist of deployable command, control, communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance personnel and gear; assault units and support capabilities such as lift and logistics.
Counterterrorism goes beyond SOF dropping from helicopters by ropes at night into terrorist camps or storming occupied buildings. SOF must be able to function clandestinely for extended periods — collecting intelligence, strengthening local forces and apprehending killers.
Thus, NATO SOF could be active, rather than standing by for rare use, says the report. National units would rotate into the inner core every three months. That may seem like a short time, but longer periods might burden unit and personnel planning.
“For strategic, political and operational reasons, the United States should participate substantially but not overbearingly,” the study recommends. The total number of U.S personnel assigned to NATO SOF at any given time would be about 100.
An integrated NATO special operations force, however, would be up against serious constraints, the authors acknowledge. These forces are treated as scarce — high-demand, low-intensity, in Pentagon jargon — national assets with sensitive methods and means, unique abilities and critical missions.
“This raises concerns about any initiative that could place SOF under other than strictly national control, reduce SOF availability for unilateral use and share SOF how-how with any but the closest allies,” says the study.
Because of the tempo and danger involved in special operations, sharing tactical intelligence among units is crucial. In combined operations with allies, tactical commanders will want to share such intelligence across national boundaries.
When information is shared, the risks of compromise increase, the report says. But this consideration should not interfere with the creation or use of NATO SOF.
“Any ally who is trusted enough to participate in critical and sensitive special missions is surely to be trusted with information that bears on mission success. Allied special forces are hardly likely to imperil themselves by mishandling intelligence,” Gompert and Smith believe.
Moreover, tactical information in a fast-moving special operation is fleeting, thus, it is not easily exploited by the enemy. Tactical SOF commanders are in the best position to decide whether the operational risks of sharing information outweigh the benefits. SOF units typically generate their own intelligence and are able to judge the risks.
The larger NATO alliance would provide the SOF core with organizational and logistical infrastructure. “While the United States has substantial infrastructure for its own SOF, many allies do not, at least not for large or simultaneous demands,” the study says. While each participating country would cover the expense of its rotating team, NATO should use common funds to pay for support, which would be modest because these forces require comparatively little infrastructure.
Gompert and Smith make the case that the United States should initiate discussions with NATO regarding this plan. Even if two or three nations (United States, United Kingdom and Germany) began developing plans, others may join in time.
“A good test of the value of this initiative is whether it would worry al Qaeda. It should,” the authors contend. “Terrorists in Afghanistan have witnessed first hand what U.S. and allied special forces can do. To them, the prospect of a high-performance NATO counterterrorism force, able to operate anywhere with speed, agility and lethality, displaying Western-democratic resolve and unity, would be highly unwelcome.”