An effort to protect commercial aircraft against shoulder-fired
missiles will face a critical moment in January, when Congress is
scheduled to vote on whether to continue funding development of
the system. President George W. Bush’s 2006 budget proposed
a $49 million increase in funding for the project, raising the total
to $110 million.
The
controversial program has traveled a long road, according to its
director, James Tuttle, in the Department of Homeland Security Office
of Systems Engineering and Development.
The initial response to a 2003 request for proposals generated
110 white papers, ranging from the possible to the absurd. One advocated
shooting Roman Candle fireworks from planes; another called for
a net to snare onrushing missiles.
“Don’t laugh,” he told attendees at a recent
conference hosted by DHS, referring to the net scheme. “The
Defense Department actually tested that.”
Three teams were selected to move on: Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems
and United Airlines were awarded $2 million each to develop a countermeasure
system to defend commercial aircraft against shoulder-fired missiles.
The UA idea—using flares, infrared and oxidizing countermeasures—was
cut in favor of other methods that spoof oncoming threats with lasers.
The BAE system takes an internal-mounting approach, building the
tracking and laser targeting components into the aircraft. Grumman’s
proposal advocates installing pods onto aircraft that can be removed
and reinstalled as the need dictates. Both companies currently are
installing prototypes—BAE in a Boeing 707 and Grumman in a
Boeing MD-11.
If Congress approves, the second phase of the contract will feature
construction and testing of systems. Tests will involve firing real
missiles and judging the two finalists’ abilities to deter
them from striking their targets, Tuttle said.
Another major hurdle involves maintenance. Military anti-missile
systems get checked after 300 to 1,000 flight hours, while commercial
systems would get an inspection after 3,000 to 5,000 flight hours,
he noted.
The false-positive rate for a system on a commercial airliner also
would have to be much less than on a military aircraft. The analysis
would be done by ground controllers, who would be alerted instantly
to any missile incident and fed relevant data.
DHS shares responsibility for testing the systems with the Federal
Aviation Administration, with DHS evaluating performance and the
FAA checking airworthiness, Tuttle said.
Resistance to the program has been strong since its inception.
Naysayers come from every direction, including Capitol Hill, aerospace
pundits and segments of the airline industry itself. “Airlines
are struggling, to say the least. The last thing they want to do
is take on one extra cent,” he said. “They’ve
been reluctant. We’ve received pushback, especially from the
unions.”
Additional problems are presented by federal technology-export
laws. Under U.S. law, exports of unique, sensitive systems are controlled
tightly.
“As soon as the wheels leave the ground on an international
flight, we are exporting technology to other countries,” Tuttle
said. “Anti-tamper technology is one area we need help with.”
DHS also is focusing on new ways to reduce aircraft signatures
and to land damaged airplanes safely. One promising project is the
Propulsion Control for Aircraft Recovery, a joint effort with NASA
to design software to compensate for damages to hydraulics. Tuttle
said that an aircraft could fly without flaps solely by using thrust
for control, if the correct programming could take the new conditions
into account.
DHS has aviation concerns well beyond surface-to-air missiles,
Tuttle said, even though the missile program gets most of the press
and congressional attention. Other threats include high-caliber
rifle shots at low-flying planes, increasingly powerful commercial
lasers that can blind pilots and a slew of sabotage methods that
will necessitate integrating next-generation explosive and biological-
agent-detection systems into airplanes, Tuttle said.
Additional worries that will generate future government contracts
from the research community involve information security, chiefly
the protection of navigation and communication infrastructure from
dangerous sabotage.
“Commercial airplanes were not designed with security in
mind,” he noted. “The only thing they were worried about
was bird strikes to the engines.”