In the global war on terrorism, most attention is reserved for
military actions in the Middle East. When Latin America is discussed
in this context, the focus and most of the funding goes to Colombia
and its war on narco-terrorist rebels.
Lost in the din is the notorious, untamed strip of land that straddles
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. This tri-border area is a haven
for pirates, thieves, weapon smugglers and—most dangerous
of all, perhaps—Islamic extremists who are believed to be
organizing and funding terrorist operations from the jungle.
Cooperative work between the United States and the three nations
responsible for policing the region tends to emphasize law enforcement.
The South American nations, with high-profile U.S. encouragement,
have created an international intelligence center located in the
tri-border area to combat the growing crime. Sources in the State
Department said that the United States would have no direct involvement
with the center’s operations, but that U.S. intelligence agencies
would be the “logical liaison” with the center.
A State Department official said that Brazil has taken the lead
on this initiative, and that the center’s focus will extend
beyond terrorist threats into all manner of crime in the area.
The U.S. military also is involved in monitoring the area, but
is constrained by a lack of infrastructure and the complexities
of international relations.
In the last five years, U.S. military bases have proliferated in
Latin America. Bases, euphemistically called cooperative security
locations, are leased from host nations to operate radar and counter
drug operations. However, there are no CSL facilities near the tri-border
region, which reflects the more active role the military has in
the South American drug war, as compared to dismantling terrorist
support networks.
Additional military coordination agreements are being signed, but
the U.S. military is partially frozen out of the tri-border region
because of U.S. law that bans many military-to-military relationships
with signers of a treaty establishing an international criminal
court.
Fearing the spectacle of U.S. commanders and troops facing trial
before such an institution, Congress passed the American Service
Members’ Protection Act. ASPA places restrictions on providing
military assistance to governments of countries that are parties
to the Rome Statute, which establishes the International Criminal
Court. Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay are all signers to the treaty.
“While the ASPA provides welcome support in our efforts to
provide safeguards for our service members…it has the unintended
consequence of restricting our access to, and interaction with,
many important partner nations,” said Army Gen. Bantz Craddock,
commander of the U.S. Southern Command, during testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee. “Of the 22 nations worldwide
affected by these sanctions, 11 of them are in Latin America,”
he said.
Nations designated “major non-NATO allies”, including
Argentina, have waivers to ASPA. That nation received $825,000 in
international military education and training (IMET) funds from
the United States in 2005, and $1.1 million has been requested for
2006. Also, Argentina is slated to receive $1 million in foreign
military financing funds for the acquisition of defense equipment,
services and training. The other two nations in the tri-border area
do not receive financial support.
The United States also allocated $250,000 for IMET program in Paraguay,
but those funds were frozen this year because of ASPA. For 2006,
$50,000 is requested; if granted it will be frozen again.
Brazil also has IMET funding allocated for 2006 for a request of
$50,000. That money will not be available because Brazil signed
the Rome Statute and is not considered a major non-NATO ally.
Despite Craddock’s complaints over the loss of IMET exchanges,
other military to military relationships are being pursued with
the tri-border countries. “There are some workarounds,”
said Air Force Master Sgt. Jose Ruiz, spokesman for Southern Command.
“Exercises would be one of them.”
Craddock told Congress the command conducted 16 joint exercises
in 2004 that involved more than 10,000 troops. This year Brazil
will host a multi-lateral peacekeeping exercise, called PKO South
2005. The goal of the exercise is to get Latin American nations
used to operating in a U.N.-style, multinational peacekeeping effort.
PKO 2005 will draw together many Latin American countries.
Other upcoming exercises include Fuerzas Commandos, a special operations
competition and training exercise in Chile during later this month
that features all three tri-border nations as scheduled participants.
Argentina also will participate in SOUTHCOM-sponsored Panamex, a
multi-national practice run at defending the Panama Canal against
maritime threats.
“Despite the effect ASPA had on IMET, we still do have military-to-military
relationships with nations in the area,” Ruiz emphasized.
Meetings between the U.S. armed forces and counterparts in Brazil
are long traditions. For example, bilateral staff talks between
the U.S. and the Brazilian military have been occurring for more
than 20 years. Responsibility for this meeting has shifted from
the Army’s training and doctrine command to the Army, itself,
in 2004.
These staff meetings focus on doctrine, training and materiel,
as well as on approaches to regional security. The most recent was
conducted in Texas during March. This meeting’s theme was
the “Operational Role and Doctrine of our Armies in the 21st
Century, as it relates to Combined Arms and Joint Operations.”
Also, the assistant secretaries of defense maintain regular contacts
with counterparts in foreign civilian defense ministries, via standing
military cooperation committees. These working groups have been
established with Argentina and Brazil.
Academic exchanges also are cultivated between national defense
universities, but as far as maintaining a steady presence on the
ground in the tri-border region, the effort pales in comparison
to the most troubled country in the region: Colombia.
Rebels there control large swatches of land and municipal governments,
generate huge sums from smuggling and enjoy a level of popular support
in and out of the country.
In response to Colombia’s request for help, President George
W. Bush widened U.S. military and intelligence agencies mandate
to help train Colombians to hunt and kill rebels.
The fight in the tri-border region is less obvious. The Muslim
population of Middle Eastern descent in the tri-border area has
been growing steadily, but little trouble was seen until bombings
struck Jewish cultural centers during the 1990s. Subsequent investigations
into those attacks pointed to cooperation between Islamic Hezbollah,
the Iranian secret service and members of local Muslim communities
in the planning of the bombings, but Argentine authorities stopped
short of producing legal evidence.
Now the region is eyed as a fault line in the global war on terrorism.
U.S. officials and international security experts often have stated
that Hezbollah, Hamas and Jemaah Islamiyah generate revenue through
drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forged
travel documents and even software piracy.
In March, William Pope, the State Department’s principal
deputy coordinator of counterterrorism, noted at a conference on
the Middle East terrorist connections in Latin America that several
suspects in the 1997 attack on tourists at the Luxor Temple in Egypt
fled to the tri-border region, and that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik
Mohammed is believed to have visited the tri-border area for several
weeks in 1995.
In 2002, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil formed the “3+1 Counterterrorism
Dialogue.” Cofer Black, then coordinator for counterterrorism
at the U.S. State Department, went to the region to participate
in the launch of that effort.
Craddock highlighted the domestic efforts of Paraguay and told
Congress that Southern Command “will work to increase information
sharing agreements and explore all possible options for security
cooperation in the future.”