Marines fighting in Iraq have concluded that, in order to defeat
insurgents, the urban tactics learned in the United States require
a substantial makeover.
“The most effective training in this environment is for the
squad leader to sit down with his squad and talk,” wrote a
group of Marines in a report titled “Lessons Learned: Infantry
Squad Tactics in Military Operations in Urban Terrain During Operation
Phantom Fury in Fallujah, Iraq.”
The Marines belong to a scout-sniper platoon from the 3rd Battalion,
5th Marine Regiment.
The report, written by a sergeant, a corporal and two lance corporals,
offers, in bits and pieces, a glimpse of the insurgency that Marines
encountered in Fallujah in November 2004, when they fought Operation
Phantom Fury.
These Marines quickly discovered that tactics that they had learned
before going to Iraq—such as house clearing, breaching and
fire support—required considerable overhaul.
“Traditionally, the top-down assault is taught as being the
most ideal method for clearing a structure … Realistically,
this may not be the best option for the infantry squad,” the
report said.
Starting with the top floors may surprise the enemy and allow a
Marine squad to cut off escape routes more easily than going in
through the ground floor. But it also makes it tough for a squad
to pull out of the building.
“Momentum must not be lost,” warned the Marine snipers.
“Marines have been left behind in houses because the momentum
was lost.”
Breaching tactics also were adapted to the environment, the squad
members explained. “An important principle in breaching that
was learned is that the Marine making entry is never the breacher
… The breacher should always fall in the back of the stack
and never go in first.
“Marines have died because they followed their own breach,”
said the report. The Marines also asserted that speed is the most
significant factor in breaching a building. “If one method
of breaching is not working, then the breacher must quickly transition
to a different type. Standing in front of a door and beating it
with a sledgehammer for 10 minutes is unacceptable.”
In situations when immediate fire support was needed, tanks always
won over aircraft, the report said. Snipers praised the support
their regiment received from tanks and from infantry teams that
were armed with .50-caliber machine guns and Mark 19 grenade launchers.
“Fixed-wing close air support is an enormous weapon that
has great effects on the ground. The major problem with it is the
amount of time it takes to get bombs on target,” said the
report. “It took entirely too long for bombs to be dropped
when Marines were in contact. The minimum safe distance of the ordnance
was too great in order for even the block to be isolated, and that
allowed the enemy to escape countless times.”
Attack helicopter support was “extremely timely, but the
effects on target were not extraordinary. The Hellfire missiles
that were used did not bring down entire structures, but they did
do some damage.”
Another lesson for the squad was the importance of staying together.
Often overworked and under pressure to hurry, some squad leaders
split their units in two. “They did this to move faster through
the houses because they were tasked with clearing a lane that may
have contained up to 50 or 60 houses,” the report said.
But this leaves the Marines vulnerable. “Commanders should
not put stress on the squad leaders to clear at a speed that would
force the squad leaders to split their squad,” the Marine
snipers warned. “Tactical patience must be exercised at every
level.”
The Marines concluded that they were facing an impressively shrewd
enemy. “Overall, the enemy has adapted their tactics and techniques
in order to maximize their strong points and hit Marines when they
are the most vulnerable,” report said. “This is common
sense, but it must be said … In military operations in urban
terrain, it only takes a miniscule amount of intelligence in order
to create massive amounts of casualties.”
While Iraqi insurgents became skilled at using improvised explosive
devices, the Marines were no slouches either when it came to rigging
explosives. The report described four types of IEDs that the Marines
used in Fallujah:
• A homemade fuel-air device, called “House Guest,”
consisting of propane tanks detonated by C-4 explosive. Placed in
a central hallway, it was used to bring down an entire house. To
work, the propane tanks must be full.
• A 1/8 stick of C-4 used for breaching interior and exterior
doors. The Marines, who dubbed it “Eight Ball,” liked
it because it blasted open a path without using up too much explosive.
• A 60 mm or 81 mm white phosphorous mortar round, wrapped
three times with detonation cord and a 1/4 or 1/2 stick of C-4.
It was used to burn insurgents out of houses.
• Old-fashioned Molotov cocktails were made from one part
liquid laundry detergent, two parts gasoline. They also were used
to burn insurgents out of houses.
Offering advice to other Marines preparing to fight in Iraq, the
3/5 snipers stressed the importance of learning basic urban-combat
techniques, such as covering danger areas, prepping rooms with grenades,
operating in pairs and moving stealthily through ground covered
with broken glass.
They also emphasized the value of “initiative-based tactics,”
such as covering immediate danger areas, eliminating threats, protecting
buddies and being prepared to adapt. “There are no mistakes
when clearing a structure in combat, only actions that result in
situations—situations that Marines must adapt to, improvise
and overcome in a matter of seconds.”
The information in the report, the Marines said, “was learned
through the blood of the infantry squads in 3/5.”
The Marines classified their opponents as either guerrillas—who
want to fight another day—or martyrs, whose aim is to kill
as many Americans as possible before they die. Though both groups
use similar tactics, a major difference was that the martyrs fought
from fortified positions while the guerrillas did not. On the other
hand, guerrillas always have an escape plan while the martyrs do
not.
“The egress routes the guerrillas use are preplanned and
well-rehearsed. They move in groups and withdraw perpendicular to
Marines’ forward line of troops,” the report said. “Their
movement is through windows of houses, down back alleys, and from
roof to roof (only when obscured from Marine over-watch positions).
The routes minimize exposure in the streets.”
Another bit of wisdom from the 3/5 snipers is to keep the enemy
guessing. “Vary the method of entry into the structure; lead
by fire then don’t; assault top-down then bottom-up; don’t
use the same entry point every time; throw a fragmentation grenade
on the middle roof then assault bottom-up. Avoid patterning by all
means.”