Less than a year away from a major milestone decision for the Army’s
Future Combat System, there are concerns that critical FCS technologies
will not have advanced enough to meet the ambitious deadlines. Some
believe that a decision at that time would be, at best, a guess.
In April 2003, the FCS is scheduled to move ahead with the so-called
Milestone B, a decision that will determine whether the Army will
proceed with a demonstration program. The uncertain maturity of
some technologies does not mean, however, that the program is not
technically feasible. Rather, innovative management of technical
risk is required.
There are six basic technologies that will need to mature in order
for the Army to field the FCS as currently planned: sensors, networking,
robotics, armor, munitions and hybrid power.
Relatively speaking, the most mature technologies are munitions,
armor, and hybrid power, which are products of the Industrial Revolution.
Although advances in these areas will occur, their capabilities
will increase at relatively slow and linear rate.
Sensors and robotics are growing out of the development of electronics
in the late industrial period and early computer age. Their capabilities
will grow exponentially. The least mature technology is networks.
Predicting when the sensor, robotics and network technology will
advance sufficiently to meet FCS requirements is at best an educated
guess and the primary difficulty in managing the risk inherent in
a high technology program.
Based on open literature sources, it is reasonable to say that
demonstrations needed to support a milestone B decision in 2003
for the six critical technologies could occur as early as 2004 or
as late as 2010. Estimates for when the technologies could be ready
for FCS low rate production varied from 2006 to 2015.
The FCS is designed to equip the Army’s Objective Force,
which would close the gap between light and heavy forces by replacing
them with medium-weight units, designed both to deploy quickly,
to fight a major conflict and to perform peace-enforcing missions.
This vision, however, is not easy to implement and relies heavily
upon technology. Thus, how technology is used and managed is critical
to its success.
To satisfy the requirements of the Objective Force, the FCS should
be lightweight, deployable, and maneuverable. To achieve this, the
FCS is intended not to be platform-centric but network-centric.
The FCS is a modular construct with its separate functions for fires,
transport and sensing distributed across platforms that are individually
smaller and lighter than either the 70-ton M1A1 Abrams or 35-ton
M2A3 Bradley.
The FCS consists of both manned and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs),
as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in a network-centric
system of systems. In addition, the FCS must be able to survive
a first-round engagement, it must be affordable and maximize commonality
as well as joint and international interoperability, and it should
include embedded training and human factors considerations in its
design.
A team of Boeing and SAIC was selected in March as lead systems
integrator, responsible for overseeing the integration and demonstration
of an FCS prototype.
Next April, the decision will be made to proceed toward system
development and demonstration (SDD). The SDD phase of the program
will extend until September 2006. The timetable calls for a decision
on low-rate initial production in fiscal year 2007 and full-rate
production in 2008 or 2009. Finally, a demonstration of initial
operating capabilities is expected in 2010 with subsequent iterative,
or block upgrades to full operational capability thereafter.
Following is a summary of the current state of the six critical
technologies in FCS.
Sensors
Electronic information is used both as an additional weapon in the
FCS arsenal and as an additional layer of protection. On the surface
are tactical sensors (chemical, acoustic, electro-optic, infrared,
electromagnetic, and magnetic). National assets alone are insufficient
to meet the intelligence, surveillance and targeting requirements.
High altitude electro-optic and electromagnetic sensors are relatively
mature and available to division-level commanders and above. However,
typical update rates are on the order of hours to a day and are
therefore most useful only for intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
To enable FCS capabilities with fast update rates, sensors and
sensor platforms need to be assets of brigade-level and lower commanders.
Commanders are currently able to detect and track targets using
unattended acoustic ground sensors and moving target indicator radars,
but reliable target identification requires imaging sensors mounted
on UAVs and UGVs. Simply mounting a visible or infrared camera on
a platform, however, does not solve the target identification problem.
Bandwidth constraints of the network do not allow for streaming
video from these sensors, nor would the flood of data help a commander
assess his or her threat situation.
Miniaturization of electronic technology and its integration with
photonic technology will be necessary to provide UAVs and UGVs with
on-board processing for data compression or information extraction.
In this way, the sensor provides a commander only what is required
under the low-power, low-bandwidth constraints of the network. A
demonstration of such technology under the Army’s Sensor Optoelectronic
Processing Scientific and Technology Objective (STO) is expected
in 2004, but its insertion into a systems demonstration is unlikely
before 2006.
Concurrently, the Sensors for the Objective Force STO, which addresses
the integration of sensors into a network, has been proposed as
an advanced technology demonstration. A demonstration of capabilities
would happen no sooner than 2005.
The utility of sensor data depends upon the speed with which it
can be relayed to and processed by other components in the FCS.
In one engagement in Desert Storm, sensor-to-shooter time was 80
minutes after an SA-2 surface-to-air missile site was detected as
a potential threat. Although in the recent military operations in
Afghanistan, sensor-to-shooter times were reduced to 20 minutes,
nominal times remained on the order of hours. Perhaps the greatest
challenge facing FCS is the development of a network to provide
high-speed command, control and communications.
Networking
FCS network capabilities go beyond those envisaged for the Army’s
current Battle Command System. The network must be capable of integrating
numerous remote ground and aerial sensors, maneuvering robotic systems,
and controlling and directing both direct fire and beyond-line-of-sight
weapon systems in a mobile environment. In addition, bandwidth management
and seamless internetworking of both horizontal and vertical communications
are required. The architecture and protocols for such a system are
presently undeveloped and are only just being addressed.
Anyone who has used a wireless modem or cell phone to connect to
the Internet is already aware of the problems facing the FCS. Consider
that Single Channel Ground and Air Radio System (SINCGARS), which
has a bandwidth of only 9.6 kilobits per second (Kbps), would take
23 minutes to transmit a single 1001(1650 pixel 8-bit JPEG image.
The Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), which transmits
at 14.4 Kbps, would still take more than 15 minutes.
Only a broadcast system, such as the Global Broadcast Service,
which transmits at 23 megabits per second (Mbps), is capable of
sending this image in under one second. The FCS is required to transmit
images and data from multiple sensors, which only exacerbates the
bandwidth problem. Although image compression and partial information
updates can reduce the bandwidth load, to maintain situation awareness
on the order of tens of minutes dictates a constant large stream
of imagery and data.
Further, the network must be insensitive to nodes dropping on and
off unexpectedly, which places an additional burden on network protocols.
In addition, the network must have a low probability of detection
and intercept and must provide assured communication that is linked
horizontally and vertically.
The Army Multifunctional On-the-Move Secure Adaptive Integrated
Communications (MOSAIC) program addresses some of these hurdles.
By 2004, it is expected to demonstrate a self-organized wireless
cluster consisting of 15 to 20 nodes. The network is expected to
have a 2-minute installation time and 5-minute recovery. Data transmission
is between 56 Kbps and 15 Mbps, dependent upon the range between
nodes, which at the extremes are from 100 kilometers (km) to 100
meters (m). However, a wireless network with the capacity for 100
Mbps transmission will not be ready until at least 2010.
Robotics
As part of the FCS concept, robotic vehicles serve several functions,
including as sensor platform, weapon platform, and network node.
UAVs are mature enough to serve as semi-autonomous sensors and weapons
platforms. Because of the complexity of ground navigation, UGVs
are not as far along.
Although the operational concept for FCS requires UGVs to sense
the battlefield and react on their own with minimal human interaction,
current technology can best be described as remote controlled or
tele-operated. Semiautonomous operation, suitable for sensing and
indirect fire functions, will not be available until 2010, and fully
autonomous systems (necessary for direct fire, battle damage assessment,
and reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisitions) will
not be available until 2015 or later.
The Army’s Robotic Follower technology demonstration aims
to create a robotic replacement of the Army mule. In off-road conditions,
the robotic follower chases 500 m behind a lead vehicle at 15 kph.
By 2005, separation is expected to increase to 750 m and speed to
65 kph.
Armor
Survivability in the conventional sense requires technologies in
both passive and active protection, as well as stealth. With regard
to passive protection, improvements in armor technology have led
to the development of ceramic- and composite-based lightweight armors
capable of surviving a first-round hit from a medium-caliber weapon
(smaller than 30 mm, as compared to a 125-mm round for the M1A1).
The technology to manufacture these armors for application to FCS
should be available by 2006.
In contrast to passive armor, which is designed to withstand a
hit from a round, active protection systems are designed to sense
the round and deflect or destroy it prior to penetration (using,
for example, ejecting armor plates to alter trajectory) or defeat
it in some manner after penetration. Deflection of shaped-charge
weapons and rocket-propelled grenades should be possible beyond
2006, but the deflection of larger munitions or kinetic-energy rounds
is not expected until beyond 2010 and perhaps not before 2015.
More advanced protection technologies, such as stealth, are also
not expected to mature until 2010. The development of smart armor,
which attempts to deflect a round once it has penetrated the first
layer of armor, and electromagnetic armor, which reshapes a penetrated
round, are also research areas that will require a decade or more
to bring to fruition.
Munitions
To enhance survivability, FCS fires will be distributed and robotic
and will rely heavily upon non-line-of-sight systems. Lethality
overmatch will be guaranteed through an integrated system of both
ground-based line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight systems, as well
as precision and loitering attack missiles.
A demonstration of ground-based systems is addressed in the Multi-role
Armament and Ammunition advanced technology demonstration. The ATD
focuses on developing an improved kinetic energy (KE) round by 2006.
In contrast to conventional munitions that rely upon explosives,
a KE round destroys a target through energy transfer. The intent
is to transfer sufficient energy to destroy a target by blasting
a penetrator rod traveling at hypervelocity speed (5,000 feet per
second) through heavy multi-plate or reactive armor.
The effectiveness of KE weapons has already been demonstrated by
the line-of-sight antitank (LOSAT) missile. LOSAT consists of two
2-pack launch pods mounted on a Humvee and uses a second-generation
infrared imager for target acquisition. By the end of fiscal year
2003, an operational company of 144 missiles will be delivered to
the XVIII Airborne Corps.
Improvements in KE missile technology are covered under the Direct
Fire Lethality ATD, which addresses the loss in accuracy due to
lateral acceleration and diminished performance against explosive
reactive armor. The goal is to increase a KE round’s probability-of-hit
and probability-of-kill at 3 km to better than 70 percent of the
current Abrams rates.
The primary hurdles to improved performance are not technologies,
but engineering and manufacturing. Technologies being pursued include
an advanced propellant, a radial thruster, a novel penetrator and
an electro-thermal-chemical igniter.
The improved KE missile will transition to the Armament and Ammunition
ATD in 2002. This ATD addresses issues related to the overall firing
systems. For example, current gun weight is 6,700 pounds (lbs),
which should be reduced to 2,900 lbs by 2006. Weight reduction to
3,500 lbs is acceptable. Further, the lightweight FCS platforms
need to withstand the recoil force of the weapons system, which
currently is 160,000 lbs. The goal of the ATD is to reduce this
to 85,000 lbs, with 100,000 lbs as an acceptable minimum.
Beyond-line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight weapon systems are currently
not as mature as line-of-sight systems. For that reason, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency initiated the Netfires program,
which seeks to develop a multi-missile package capable of engaging
targets between 25 and 50 km away, as well as a soft-launched loitering
attack missile capable of hitting targets between 40 and 100 km
away. The loitering attack missile can remain above a designated
area for up to one hour before engagement collecting data to improve
situation awareness. These technologies will not mature before 2006.
Hybrid Power
A hybrid system combines an energy storage system (for example,
flywheels or batteries), a power unit like a fuel cell, and a vehicle
propulsion system. Propulsion can come either entirely from an electric
motor alone, referred to as a series configuration, or in combination
with the engine in a parallel configuration. One attractive feature
of using hydrogen fuel cells for power generation is the production
of water as a by-product. Thus, in addition to reducing fuel consumption,
fuel cells reduce water requirements as well.
Hybrid-electric counterparts of both the Bradley and Humvee are
already under development. With regard to the FCS, the Advanced
Hybrid Electric Drive (AHED) program seeks to demonstrate a 13-ton,
8-wheeled vehicle using an 8-wheel drive. The independent wheel
drive, which uses a 150-horsepower (hp) permanent magnet motor,
allows a vehicle to turn in place like a tank by having one or more
wheels turn in different directions. The primary power source for
the AHED is a 500-hp diesel engine and a 114-kilowatt (kw) battery
pack. It has a 114-kw battery pack for supplemental power. Top speed
is expected to be 65 mph.
Many of the technologies associated with hybrid power remain research
topics. For example, hybrid propulsion of FCS ground vehicles requires
efficient electronic switching at high voltages and temperatures.
Increased efficiencies to the levels desired for the FCS require
a better understanding of surface interfaces and material defects
in wide band gap semiconductor materials, a fundamental research
issue that may not be resolved before the decade’s end.
Key Decisions Ahead
Given the state of the various technologies needed for FCS, the
Army should consider developing initial versions of FCS for low-intensity
conflicts and, as technologies mature, new versions for higher-intensity
combat.
Although the revolutionary capabilities envisioned for the FCS
demand some technologies that are still unproven, critical requirements
in survivability and lethality depend on more conventional technologies.
This bodes well for the demonstration of a prototype FCS between
2003 and 2006 with rudimentary capabilities in networked situation
awareness but more substantial capabilities in survivability and,
especially, line-of-sight fires.
A block I FCS entering low rate initial production in 2007 would
be capable of peace enforcing and low-end small-scale conflicts.
Robotics is a keystone technology for the FCS. The dependence upon
robotics is perhaps the key enabler to reducing overall FCS weight
and size.
Although present capabilities in UGV technology fall short of FCS
expectations (for example, a 15-kph follower as opposed to a 60-kph
fully autonomous vehicle), the development path is straightforward
and will be aided by natural advances in software and computing
technology. But the present deficiencies in UGV technology are offset
by the maturity of UAV technology and the approach to Netfires.
While reducing vehicle weight is important, it may be possible
to achieve the Army’s goal of deploying an FCS brigade in
96 hours using a mix of robotic and manned vehicles that does not
rely solely upon the C-130 aircraft. A wide range of other deployment
enablers exist that can meet the strategic timelines. For example,
the C-17 strategic airlifter is capable of moving combat vehicles
up to 70 tons. Hence, even if technology cannot achieve the 20-ton
objective, heavier variants can still be deployed.
The information requirements for detecting, tracking, and identifying
objects are immense. Sensor technology needs to be miniaturized
and needs to be smart (that is, provide on-sensor preprocessing
for detecting and tracking targets prior to transmission). Although
the technology for achieving this no longer lies in the realm of
research, this does not imply that solving the engineering problems
is a simple task. The infrastructure for developing and producing
it needs to be supported.
The performance of the MOSAIC ATD network will be critical in assessing
the level of situation awareness that is possible in the near term.
It should not be surprising that the most revolutionary technology,
network technology, has yet to be demonstrated. The challenges in
designing a secure network with mobile infrastructure are unique
to the military. However, commercial technology developed for networks
with fixed or portable infrastructure can be leveraged for military
needs, especially with regard to integrating applications that are
presently stove-piped.
Meanwhile, there are critics who claim that the FCS will lack an
adequate level of survivability, The FCS denies an opponent the
opportunity to fire by seeing first and shooting first. Also, the
likelihood that an opponent might hit a manned vehicle is reduced
using distributed, unmanned platforms on the battlefield. Critics
contend that by relying upon a mobile, light, and distributed force
structure, the Army is subjecting itself to far too many dangerous
situations where large-scale heavy forces will be required.
Lethal technologies and precision weaponry, while effective, may
still prove incapable of defending the lightweight platforms of
the FCS against a determined adversary. However, the argument for
FCS rests less on its individual combat power relative to a heavy
enemy force and more on its place within the Army’s contribution
to a joint services operation.
Nonetheless, to address concerns about survivability, the Army
has purposefully dedicated one modernized legacy corps, the III
Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, to retain a sufficient number of heavy
combat systems, such as the M1A2 Abrams tank with system enhancement
package, the Paladin self-propelled howitzer, the multiple-launched
rocket system, the Apache Attack Aviation system, and the M2A3 Bradley
fighting vehicle.
Even with one corps as an insurance policy, the question remains:
How vulnerable is FCS? With the possibility of near-peer competitors,
such as China, able to deploy several corps’ worth of combat
power, how survivable will the Objective Force plus one U.S. corps
be in terms of the future threat? Admittedly, additional study is
required to address survivability.
Current technology in munitions provides an effective line-of-sight
fire. FCS is dependent upon Netfires to ensure its capability for
beyond-line-of-sight fire. Although this can also be provided using
precision bombing, if a decision has been made to deploy ground
troops, one needs to assess the total logistics cost of deploying
Netfires as part of the FCS versus sending a manned bomber.
There are questions as to whether milestone decisions are being
made too soon. Besides the technology risks, there are other factors
to be considered. First, the chief of staff, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki,
may need to rely upon his successor to implement many of the changes
proposed, and there is concern that a successor may not stay the
course of Army transformation. Second, there is a competition for
dollars. The Army needs to upgrade its legacy equipment, so the
FCS procurement dollars may not be available in the out years. Third,
the political environment may not support a change in Army force
structure in 10 years.
Joseph N. Mait works at the Center for Technology and National
Security Policy at the National Defense University. Jon O. Grossman
is a senior researcher in military technology at Rand Corporation.
A version of this article was first published in the Defense Horizons
newsletter, of the National Defense University.
The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other U.S.
federal agency.