It is the year 2018. A provincial governor attempts to secede from
Indonesia, establish an independent Islamic state and take control
of the Strait of Malacca, a vital sea lane for world shipping. A
U.S. aircraft carrier group and a Marine Expeditionary Unit, already
in the region, are dispatched to help put down the rebellion. Another
MEU and a second carrier group are six days away.
Their assignment—in cooperation with Indonesian and international
coalition forces—is to seize the provincial capital, Pekanbaru,
and the key port, Dumai. The job is complicated by the fact that
nearby Singapore and Malaysia, fearing retribution by the Indonesian
rebels, are refusing to allow the United States and its allies to
use their military bases.
That was the scenario for the 10th annual war game sponsored jointly
by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the National
Defense Industrial Association. About 75 players—both Marines
and members of the association—participated in the exercise,
which was conducted recently at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory,
in Quantico, Va.. A reporter from National Defense Magazine observed
the proceedings.
The purpose of the game was to permit defense-industry representatives
to test the Corps’ latest expeditionary warfare concepts,
note shortcomings and suggest possible improvements, explained Frank
Jordan, director of the laboratory’s war-gaming division.
Like all such games, it was played without real military forces
or even computer simulations. Instead, four groups of players—known
as “cells”—decided how to deploy imaginary forces
to meet a specific, hypothetical crisis.
The forces in play were considered to have the weapons, equipment,
support and capabilities that they currently have or are planned
to have at the time set in the game, Jordan said.
MEUs are standard Marine outfits of about 2,200 men and women each.
A MEU consists of a reinforced battalion of fully-equipped ground-combat
troops, a mixed squadron of rotorcraft and vertical-takeoff fighters,
and a support element.
By 2018, the MEUs should have several pieces of weaponry and equipment
that are now in the planning or experimental stages, said game director
Bill Simpson. These include the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle,
Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, lightweight
155 mm howitzer, Expeditionary Fire Support System and possibly
the Marine Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles.
The first assignment for the war game’s players is to figure
out which troops and equipment the MEUs would be able to take aboard
the cramped ships. “We’re getting bigger equipment,”
said Lt. Col. Thomas Anderson, “but we can’t take it
all with us.”
Limited Deck Space
The MV-22s, in particular, are significantly larger than the helicopters
that they are scheduled to replace, noted Max Gianelloni, from Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems.
“This game severely limits us for deck space,” he complained.
Another problem is where to store all of the different kinds of
ammunition required for a MEU, said Wisniewski. Developing one munition
that can be fired by a number of weapons systems makes a lot of
sense, he said.
“If I can take one type of ammunition with me, and not five,
my logistics problem is fixed,” he proclaimed.
The question quickly became what could be left behind. Paul D.
Wisniewski, from the Northrop Grumman Corporation wondered: “Does
a MEU need a force reconnaissance element? In a joint operation,
those functions are likely to be performed by special-operations
forces, and a Marine force recon unit won’t be utilized.”
Marine Lt. Col. Phillip Ridderhof disagreed. “You can never
get enough recon,” he said. “You never want to depend
on somebody else.”
In the end, the cell decided to have the MEU’s force recon
unit perform a liaison function with special operations.
In order to seize the capital and port with minimum casualties,
speed may be more important than firepower, the cell decided. Therefore,
members opted to trade 70-ton M1 Abrams tanks for additional AAAVs
and an EFSS battery. The armored AAAV can carry troops across ocean
or land at speeds up to 30 mph. The EFSS fires 120 mm mortar rounds
every 12 to 20 seconds and is transported on the MV-22.
The Marine Expeditionary Family of Fighting Vehicles, however,
did not make the cut. With a combat weight of 14 tons, the experimental
MEFFV is lightweight, and it is expected to come in a number of
variants, including a fire-support version with a 120 mm Dragon
Fire rifled mortar and an antitank model designed to defeat heavy
armor at long ranges. The problem, cell members agreed, is that
the MEFFV isn’t scheduled to be deployed until 2020—two
years after the time of the war game.
Still, Kenneth Woechan, of Litton Fasteam, argued that the MEU
should have its own dedicated fire support. “You don’t
want somebody else shooting your BBs,” he said.
Reed T. Bolick, of Cypress International, agreed. “I think
we’ll need the full triad of fire support—mortars; 155
mm lightweight, towed howitzers, and naval fire support” he
said. “That gives you a whole spectrum that you can call if
you need it.”
Another capability needed for this mission, cell members said,
was mine clearing. “In every war game I’ve ever been
in, they say we’re missing the mine-clearing capability,”
said Ridderhof. The first death at Camp Rhino in Afghanistan was
a mine casualty, he noted.
Also, Ridderhof said, the port of Dumai is situated on a narrow
inlet of the Strait of Malacca, which would be an ideal place to
lay sea mines. The carrier group and the amphibious ready group—the
ships transporting the Marines—must be able to protect themselves
against that threat, he said.
Clearing Mines
In addition, he said, the MEU itself must have increased “shallow-water,
anti-mine capability” to protect its troops as they go ashore.
The LCACs—the air-cushioned land craft that transport Marines
from ship to shore—can’t operate until their path has
been cleared of mines, Woechan said.
To help with that chore, the cell agreed to reinforce the MEU’s
platoon of combat engineers, whose job includes mine clearance.
They also concurred, however, that the Navy needs to do much more
to improve its countermine capability.
In addition, the cell wrestled with the issue of combining the
two MEUs into one Marine Expeditionary Brigade that could fight
as a single coordinated unit. Players worried that the two MEUs
could not supply enough headquarters personnel to provide a full
command-and-control function for a brigade.
“If you’re going to stand up a MEB staff, you need
training,” said Larry Barnes, from Titan Systems Corporation.
“Training is a big issue. You should have a standby MEB staff.”
“My only concern is that I don’t think the MEB has
enough assets to control the action,” said Ridderhof. Facing
immediate combat, he noted, the two MEUs could not spare enough
personnel to provide a full staff for the MEB. “The MEB would
have enough assets to coordinate, but not control the MEUs.”
The cell agreed to have the MEB coordinate operations of the two
MEUs, with one taking the port while the other focused on the provincial
capital.
Coordination of air assets would be particularly important, Wisniewski
noted. After one MEU airlifted its troops to hit the capital, he
asked, “why not pool assets from both MEUs to move troops
in from the sea” to take the port?
For a single MEU to take either city unaided would be difficult,
the cell agreed. They noted that the rebels had a total of six brigades
at their disposal, including one in the capital and another in the
port.
For the two MEUs to link up also would be tough, Bolick noted,
since the capital and port are connected only by one 80-mile highway
with six bridges. “It’s an automatic kill zone,”
he said.
Wisniewski pointed out, however, that the Marines weren’t
expected to do all the fighting. Although the Indonesian national
army had no forces in position to respond quickly, it eventually
is expected to commit units. Also, Australia has committed an army
brigade to the operation. In addition, the U.S. Army has a division,
including three brigade combat teams, on the way.
“We’re enablers,” said Wisniewski. “Let
the Army, the Australians and the Indonesians do the heavy fighting.
Our job is to kick down the door for them.”
Wisniewski proposed that one MEU conduct an amphibious landing
at the port, surround it and prepare for an assault by a combined
coalition force. The coalitions forces could be brought in by C-130
and C-17 air transports and the high-speed catamarans that U.S.
services currently are trying out, he said. Meanwhile, the other
MEU would capture the capital’s airport, use it to fly in
reinforcements and encircle the city.
Rebels inside the city would be unable to receive supplies or reinforcements,
nor would they be able to offer aid to their colleagues in the port,
Wisniewski said.
Andrew Kondracki, from the Office of Naval Research, raised an
important question: “How long do we have to wait until the
Army arrives—96 hours?”
While they wait, the Marines will have considerable air support.
One carrier, with scores of combat aircraft, is nearby, and another
is only days away. In addition, the MEB can call upon U.S.-based
long-range bombers—B-52s, B-1s and B-2s—to pummel enemy
targets with precision-guided munitions.
In this scenario, the Marines can get additional support from a
next-generation Maritime Positioning Force, which the war game assumes
will be in place by 2018. As proposed, the Maritime Positioning
Force (Future) includes supply ships big enough to serve as complete
bases for U.S. forces to launch military strikes, eliminating the
need for nearby airfields, ports and staging areas.
The new ships—unlike today’s logistics vessels—would
have flight decks long enough for strategic air transports, as well
as MV-22s and Joint Strike Fighters, and ramps for AAAVs and LCACs,
enabling them to keep MEUs supplied almost indefinitely.
The question, however, is whether the Navy will be able to build
this new class of ships, said Brig. Gen. William D. Catto, commanding
general of the Warfighting Laboratory. “The Navy right now
is broke,” he told participants in the war game. It can’t
afford all of the ships that it wants, he said.
Also, Catto said, the Navy is leery about expeditionary warfare.
It doesn’t want to operate close to shore, he said. “The
Navy thinks the littorals are a thousand miles out. That ain’t
the littorals.”
Within the next five years, he said, the Navy and Marines need
to put together a plan to improve cooperation. “We’re
going to drag them into the 21st century.”