Despite the geographic and —sometimes perceived—philosophical
distance between the operating fleet and those inside the Beltway,
the Navy’s ongoing efforts inside the Pentagon and in the
fleet are indeed moving in the same direction.
The most important issues for both the fleet and Navy Pentagon
are the employment of forces and their contribution to joint war
fighting.
During the past decade, successive strategy and force assessments
have sought to balance ends with means and to identify a “rightsized”
U.S. military. This year, the second Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) will attempt to refine U.S. defense strategy and determine
the force structure needed to execute that strategy. The central
question is which capabilities are needed to defend America’s
global security interests.
Each of the services possesses unique and complementary attributes.
Future projection of U.S. combat power overseas—where many
of our security interests lie—will therefore be a joint endeavor.
Since the end of the Cold War, many of the forces that were based
overseas have returned to the United States. This suggests that
the future joint force must be more mobile and expeditionary to
overcome the “tyranny of distance,” particularly in
the Asian theater.
The Army and the Air Force have begun “transforming”
their force structures and/or organizations to do just that.
A rapidly deployable joint force must be capable of moving quickly
to the fight. To accomplish that, it needs immediate and sustained
access to any region of the world where U.S. security interests
are threatened.
Access is critical to U.S. operations against a potential foe.
All else flows from the initial success of maintaining the access
required for the follow-on fighting forces.
In the coming decades, we expect that this access may be challenged
by nations that seek to expand their regional influence in ways
that compete with the interests of the United States. One possible
area of emphasis for the forces of these regional competitors would
be on anti-access or area-denial capabilities, employing asymmetric
means to deny access to regions of U.S. interest. Land-based cruise
missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, land and sea mines and
conventionally powered submarines typify the scope of these military
threats. Other potential threats are ballistic missiles, weapons
of mass destruction and information warfare.
The QDR analysis should identify those capabilities that overcome
those challenges and create the requisite conditions for the timely
projection of joint combat power.
It is helpful to consider the question of why naval forces are
deployed overseas in peacetime, and how improved capabilities will
expand the capacity of those forward-deployed forces to assure access.
The United States is a maritime nation with global interests. The
oceans are the “great commons” that connect us to the
world. And in an era of globalization, information and communications
technologies inextricably link our interests and economic prosperity
to the freedom of these “commons.”
Maritime transport alone accounts for more than 99 percent of the
volume and 80 percent of the value of all intercontinental trade.
U.S. exports directly support 11.5 million U.S. jobs and have fueled
one-third of total economic growth since 1993. Nearly three quarters
of those exports travel by sea.
Global information networks have become the catalysts for “just
in time” supply chains, or those “heel-to-toe”
economic relationships that allow merchandise to move more efficiently,
without the overhead costs of warehouses and storage facilities.
It is maritime transportation, however, that makes “just-in-time”
work. Ships at sea have replaced the warehouse ashore.
Forward deployed naval forces, additionally, can be employed from
within a region, without restrictions, even as we might begin to
deploy other assets. From that timely response, the United States
gains tactical surprise.
Denying sanctuary to a potential adversary means not permitting
the littorals to be either a barrier, or a maritime area that we
cede to an enemy. The credibility of that response shapes regions
of interest, deterring potential foes and reassuring allies and
friends.
Naval forces have responded to 144 contingencies during the last
decade, including 11 combat operations. Every Navy carrier battle
group to deploy since 1998 has engaged in combat as part of Operation
Allied Force in Southeastern Europe and/or operations in Southwest
Asia. For example, during Operation Desert Fox in December of 1998,
rotationally deployed naval forces struck 85 targets over four nights
of combat. These same naval forces required no reconstitution and
subsequently continued their routine six-month deployments in other
theaters of operation. Because of the desire for tactical surprise,
the National Command Authority directed that only naval tactical
aviation and weapons from Navy ships be employed on the first night.
Improvements to sensors and networks, combined with better weapons,
make today’s naval forces significantly more capable than
their counterparts of only a decade ago.
While the other services are “transforming” to become
lighter and more expeditionary, the Navy is continuing an evolution
from platform-centric to network-centric operations, with an emphasis
on effects-based warfare. This transformation is about changes in
force capability—not necessarily force structure. That means
leveraging the mobility of naval platforms, reducing their signature
and distributing unit level offensive and defensive capabilities
throughout the force.
The Navy’s continued evolution to a network-centric force,
arming the war-fighter with both better knowledge of the battle
space and the weapons to use that knowledge to act quickly and decisively,
is central to its ability to provide sustained assured access for
joint power projection.
Although much of the joint force’s manpower will arrive by
air, the majority (usually 90 percent) of the force for joint operations
must deploy by sea. Maintaining freedom of the seas is therefore
key, not only to the success of the Navy’s operations at sea
and the introduction of the joint force, but also to sustaining
the lines of communication to ground-based forces once the battle
is joined.
From a practical standpoint, this entails making improvements to
individual sensor systems and increasing the number of “nodes
on the network.” By introducing more sensors into the environment,
networking that sensor data, then displaying the information to
the operator in a user-friendly fashion, greater speed of command
becomes possible.
A broad range of these initiatives is both in progress and programmed
within the Navy’s current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
For example, outfitting the F/A-18E/F fighter-attack aircraft with
the Airborne Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)—a phased
array radar—will allow that aircraft to see farther and more
precisely while using less energy. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles
(UUVs, or miniaturized submarines) will be deployed from submarines
to precisely map the ocean bottom, finding and neutralizing mines
without putting manned platforms at risk. They will covertly provide
hydrographic surveys to support amphibious operations, and transmit
this information back to the network in real time. Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) will provide a vantage point over land that cannot
be achieved by ship-borne sensors and that may be hazardous for
manned aircraft.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) will allow platforms to
share sensor information about the air picture to engage targets
beyond the “sight” of onboard sensors. Similarly, the
Naval Fires Control System (NFCS) will contribute to our effort
in the ground war, providing for a shared ground picture and integrated
“calls for fire”—allowing ships to provide artillery
from the sea by displaying the land battle to the afloat commander
in real time.
The principles of network-centric warfare involve applying that
knowledge of the battle space to engagements with smart, precise
weapons with extended reach.
Extended-range guided munitions will provide high volume, GPS-guided
fire for precision effects. The miniaturization of air-dropped weapons,
such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition, will allow the carrier
air wing to attack more targets in a single sortie.
Today’s carrier air wing can strike more than four times
as many daily aim-points as its Desert Storm counterpart, and currently
programmed capabilities will result in almost a seven-fold increase
by 2008. At the same time, the Navy has distributed strike capability
throughout the force, from 14 carriers in 1982 to 144 strike platforms
today.
Precision, long-range gunfire from surface platforms will provide
high-volume fire support to ground troops maneuvering ashore. Together,
this family of offensive capabilities will provide deep-land attack
for interdiction of shore-based systems while providing “artillery
from the sea” to support lighter ground forces until they
are firmly established ashore.
In this decade, the Navy also will deploy advanced defensive capabilities.
The Navy Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) will protect
key ports, airfields and amphibious lodgments. Projecting defense
from the sea against theater ballistic missiles—which may
be armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—provides defenses
for ground forces flowing into theater until they become established
ashore.
TBMD-capable ships can play a critical role in combined operations
with coalition partners, defending friendly units as well as key
sites ashore.
Navy TBMD platforms provide a protective “umbrella”
for the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) and the Brigade Combat
Team. They will contribute to the success of Air Force and Army
transformation efforts, because they will need less of the critical,
initial airlift to deploy defensive systems.
There are times when there is no substitute for ground-based troops.
The Navy-Marine Corps team provides mobile, flexible combat power—operating
from the seas—making the Marines another “battery of
the fleet.”
With improved capabilities to provide troops in the field with
real-time, fully automated “calls for fire” from high-volume,
precision gunfire platforms, the Navy will enable ground units to
arrive and maneuver without their own organic heavy artillery.
Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn is the deputy chief of naval operations
for naval warfare requirements and programs (N7).