As the Army began sketching its promised medium-weight
brigades at Fort Lewis, Wash., Army logistics leaders met with industry executives
to begin planning for the ammunition needs of the new units.
The new outfits-called brigade combat teams-are intended to overcome the problems
that the Army experienced during NATO's 1999 war with Yugoslavia. During that
brief conflict, the Army had trouble moving its heavy combat units, with their
70-ton M1A Abrams tanks, to the borders of Kosovo in time to be of use.
Embarrassed by that experience, the Army has set out to create combat forces
that are easier to deploy than its traditional heavy armor, but more lethal
and better protected than its lighter units.
Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, Army chief of staff, wants to develop the capability
to put a combat-ready brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division
on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions within 30 days.
Army officials said it might take a decade or longer for the service to fully
meet this goal. "The chief's vision is a real tough mark on the wall for
us to meet," Maj. Gen. Joseph R. Arbuckle, commander of the Army's Industrial
Operations Command, based in Rock Island, Ill., told industry representatives
at the Munitions Executive Summit, held last month in Tysons Corner, Va. The
conference was sponsored by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA).
As a first step, Shinseki ordered the rapid-fire conversion of two existing
brigades-one heavy and one light, in the Army's I Corps at Fort Lewis-into prototypical
units for the entire service, equipped with state-of-the-art, medium-weight
armored vehicles.
In January, at the Armor Center in Fort Knox, Ky., the Army tested 35 such
vehicles made by firms from the United States and six other countries-Canada,
France, Germany, Singapore, Switzerland and Turkey. Officials plan to decide
this summer which vehicles to buy, in order to have the first ones at Fort Lewis
before the end of this fiscal year.
The Army is looking for vehicles that are significantly lighter than the tanks,
fighting vehicles and artillery pieces that it currently uses. They also want
a uniform platform that meets all the new brigades' requirements, including
command and control, anti-tank and reconnaissance missions.
One option being considered is to reduce crew sizes-from four for the Abrams
and three for the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)-to two for the new platform, according
to Maj. Gen. John F. Michitsch, program executive officer for Ground Combat
and Support Systems (GCSS), headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. But that
won't save enough weight, Army officials said.
"The real key [to a lighter combat brigade] is going to be to lighten
up the logistics," said Arbuckle, "and that means primarily fuel and
ammunition."
The heaviest part of an armored unit is not the vehicles, Army officials said.
Rather, it is the fuel for the vehicles, followed by the ammunition, and then
the vehicles themselves.
Searching for a Weapon
The weapon to be mounted on the vehicle has not yet been determined, said Army
Maj. Gen. John S. Caldwell Jr., head of the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command
(TACOM), in Warren, Mich., adding: "We are encouraging the Army Material
Command to keep the requirements to a minimum, and see what industry can come
up with."
The 120mm main gun, mounted on the Abrams, is considered too large for the
middle-weight vehicle envisioned for the new brigades, officials said. Even
the 105mm, found on older models of the Abrams, "looks really huge on an
LAV (Light Armored Vehicle)," said Col. (P) William Lenaers, commander
of the Army's Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC).
Nevertheless, he concluded: "We need to have a 105 out there that can take
on and kill heavy tanks."
Certainly, to fight heavy tanks, the new vehicles will need more armament than
the 25mm chain gun or even the TOW anti-tank missiles currently on the LAVs
used by the Marines, Army officials agreed.
"Getting to the fight faster is OK," said Caldwell. "But when
you get there, you had better be able to fight and to kill the other guy ...
"Most of the discussion [about a new, more lethal armament system for
the new vehicles] has been about smart munitions," he said.
Smart munitions-also known as precision munitions-are attractive, Army officials
said, because they are far more accurate than conventional, or "dumb,"
ammunition.
"Precision munitions kill faster and deeper," said Col. Bernard E.
Ellis, project manager of the Army's Artillery Munitions Systems. Thus, he explained,
less ammunition is required to achieve the same effect, significantly lightening
the logistics load that a combat vehicle must carry into battle.
A major problem with precision munitions, however, is cost. In 1999, according
to Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the House subcommittee on military
procurement, the Army was $1.7 billion short of basic ammunition, and the Marine
Corps was $193 million short.
The shortage of precision munitions in the Army stockpile is particularly acute,
Arbuckle said. "There is currently no smart ammunition in the stockpile,"
he added. "And it ain't coming in too quickly, either."
Under current forecasts, Arbuckle said, smart ammunition would make up only
a small percentage of the stockpile through 2029. That has to change, he said.
"Our challenge," he told the summit, "is to efficiently and
effectively transition the [industrial] base from conventional to smart and
brilliant munitions. What counts from the warfighter's standpoint is that that
weapon has to be in the stockpile when the joint chiefs need it."
A major problem that the Army faces, officials agreed, is an unclear organizational
structure for its munitions programs. Said Arbuckle: "In my view, we have
a fragmented system for managing conventional munitions in the Army. Who's responsible
for all of this? Nobody-or all of us"
A Single Executive
To improve munitions management, a 1997 study by the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory recommended putting all ammunition programs under a single Army executive.
Instead, Congress-leery of creating another three or four-star military position-ordered
the heads of the three major elements of the system, the IOC, TACOM and GCSS,
to join together in a Triad executive council. The purpose of Triad, formed
in 1998, Arbuckle explained, is "to pursue the most comprehensive and cost-effective
approach to the life-cycle management of munitions for the Army."
Triad has helped, its leaders agree. "Communications have improved vastly,"
Arbuckle said. But disagreements continue.
"The meetings get pretty heated," said Caldwell. "A lot of energy
is expended ... I don't believe in leadership by committee."
Some officials in the Army and industry still would like to see the appointment
of a single executive for ammunition, responsible for making all final decisions.
But few believe that Congress is ready to approve such a change.
In fact, congressional staff members, requesting not to be identified, warned
industry executives not to expect much at all from Capitol Hill this election
year.
"This is going to be a tough year," said an advisor to the Senate
defense appropriations subcommittee. "There's not that great clamor out
there for defense spending."
Neither Congress nor the White House will be eager to openly break their 1997
agreement limiting federal spending, the staffer said, even though both sides
have ignored it when it suited them.
Even if defense does get additional funding, don't expect much of it to go
to ammunition, the Senate advisor warned, adding: "Ammunition is the first
to be funded, and it's the first to be stolen from."
If the Army does get its medium-weight vehicles mounted with 105mm cannon,
the staffer asked, "where are you going to get the ammunition for them?"
More Closures?
One way for the Army to save money for new munitions, several speakers said,
is to close additional government-owned ammunition plants, depots and arsenals,
known as the organic base. The Army established a large system of such factories
during World War II and the Cold War to ensure a reliable supply of conventional
weapons and ammunition.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, a number of these facilities-focused
on making old-fashioned, "dumb" munitions-have been declared obsolete
and either closed or converted to other purposes.
Some officials argued that all government-owned ammunition factories should
be closed.
"I think that the proper size of the organic base is zero-nothing,"
said Kenneth J. Oscar, deputy assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition,
logistics and technology. "I can see no argument for why we need an organic
base," he told industry executives. "There's nothing in our organic
base that I can't buy from you."
Several officials contended that the Federal Arsenal Act, enacted during World
War II, requires the Army to maintain the ability to produce the conventional
weapons and ammunition necessary for national defense, rather than rely entirely
upon private industry.
Oscar, however, argued that the Arsenal Act applies only to arsenals, and not
to depots or ammunition plants. "If we don't need them, we ought to get
rid of them," he said. Excess facilities, he said, are eating up funds
that could be used to buy "munitions that my son will need when he goes
to war-and that's criminal."
But Gen. John G. Coburn, commanding general of the Army Material Command, headquartered
in Alexandria, Va., cautioned that the Army "must maintain a core organic
capability." He explained: "I don't know that we need a large one,
but we need some."
Also, closing government-owned factories may not free up as much money as expected,
warned Larry Gulledge, civilian deputy commander of the IOC. When the command
closed the Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, it was hit with an $80 million environmental
cleanup bill, "which we didn't expect."
Jeffrey Bialos, deputy undersecretary of defense for international affairs,
took the opportunity to defend the Defense Department's globalization policy,
which encourages foreign companies to bid on Pentagon contracts and U.S. firms
to seek work with the militaries of other nations.
"One model is a Fortress America and a Fortress Europe, with separate,
closed markets," said Bialos. "From our standpoint, that's not desirable.
We prefer to see a competitive, trans-Atlantic market."
The increasing use of coalition forces with units from several countries, as
in Kosovo, Bosnia and East Timor, places greater emphasis on interoperability,
Bialos said. "We have to share the same weapons, ammunition and communications
systems."
With this in mind, the department is encouraging closer industrial linkages
with U.S. coalition partners. To make it easier for U.S. companies to do business
abroad, Bialos said, "export controls clearly need reform, and we're working
on that." But he added:
"It's a two-way street. If we expect U.S. companies to have greater access
abroad, we have to allow foreign companies to have more access here."
The department considers foreign sources on a case-by-case basis, Bialos said.
"It's complex; it's not easy, folks," he added. "There is a litany
of things that need to be done to ensure reciprocity for U.S. firms in Europe."