Critics of U.S. missile defense programs wonder why the threat of a missile
attack is greater today then it was throughout the Cold War, when the Soviet
Union built a massive and strategic arsenal. Why didn't we need ballistic missile
defense systems then, as much or more so than we do today?
In the days when school children practiced hiding under desks and people built
backyard bomb shelters, there was no practical way to defend against a nuclear
attack. Nonetheless, while utterly ruthless, the Soviet leadership recognized,
as did U.S. leaders, that a nuclear war was a no-win situation.
A major nuclear exchange would wipe out civilization. Leaders on both sides
also realized that the use of small tactical nukes would lead to escalation.
Consequently, both sides tacitly accepted the deterrence concept of Massive
Assured Destruction (MAD).
Nevertheless, both sides recognized the advantage of coming up with defensive
systems that would provide a one-sided advantage-the capability to strike the
opponent, while remaining immune to his attack. Starting with Nike Hercules,
the United States built systems such as Safeguard, which could destroy incoming
warheads. Those systems subsequently were destroyed.
The Soviets also deployed two sites of an anti-ballistic missile system decades
ago. These interceptors were small nuclear warheads. But again, both sides realized
that the detonation of thousands of nuclear warheads within the atmosphere,
or just above it, would cause irreparable damage.
Both sides also realized that any defensive system would still have "leakage,"
meaning that some warheads would get through. The answer was to increase the
numbers of offensive systems. So, both the Soviets and the Americans expanded
and perfected their ballistic missile forces. The result was that the probability
of total destruction of our planet increased to essentially 100 percent. Ironically,
the more the technology evolved for defensive systems, the larger the offensive
forces became-and the more necessary the deterrent effect of MAD.
Work on defensive systems technology continued and was accelerated in this
country under the Strategic Defense Initiative program (SDI), popularly known
as Star Wars. The Soviet Union also accelerated its efforts. Some credit the
costs of those efforts with hastening the economic collapse of the Soviet Union.
In the United States, nuclear warheads on interceptors were disallowed. Critics
of SDI claimed that such a system was not only too costly, but technically infeasible.
And they were correct. The U.S. interceptors were not agile enough, the sensors
were neither sensitive enough nor had the needed resolution. The computers were
too slow, and the software was too cumbersome.
So the U.S. government initiated new technology approaches. Since then, progress
has been made in the form of lighter materials, smaller and more efficient thrusters,
more sensitive and capable sensors, faster microprocessors and computers, and
associated memories, streamlined software algorithms.
All these technologies combined helped to make hit-to-kill feasible. Thus ended
the need for nuclear or even for large conventional warheads. Paradoxically, since the end of the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear attack
on the United States seems to have increased. There are a number of reasons for this:
- Control over the now-Russian offensive arsenal is less secure and the possibility
of a renegade group launching one or several long-range missiles is much greater
because there is less discipline and control than during the Cold War.
- The need for money in a Russian economy that cannot afford to pay its scientists,
technicians, and personnel-coupled with the looser controls-increases the probability
of surreptitious export of technology and missile and warhead materiel to rogue
nations.
- But the main reason is the rogue nations' growing access to technology and materiel.
While today's Russian leaders could be expected to act in a logical, rational
way, there are leaders of rogue nations who can and do act, by American standards,
irrationally. They are fanatics, zealots, for whom the future of their societies
or of the world is of no consequence.
Consider the actions of the North Korean government, which shows no concern
as children starve, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the "Blooming
of the Flowers" upheavals in China, the ongoing massacres in sub-Sahara
Africa and the emergence of terrorist groups around the world. There are people
who would not hesitate to launch a missile carrying a warhead of mass destruction
against New York or Los Angeles.
However, as the United States works to develop and deploy ballistic missile
defense systems-capable of intercepting and destroying a small number of such
warheads-technology aimed at making those warheads less vulnerable is ongoing.
Russia claimed recently that it is developing warheads capable of quick reaction
maneuvering to evade U.S. interceptors. It is likely that better decoys and
countermeasures will be developed in the future-incorporating appropriately
tailored corner-cube radar reflectors, equivalent masses, devices radiating
the proper spectral infrared emissions, as well as large quantities of elements,
such as chaff, to confuse and overload the U.S. system's discrimination sensors
and algorithms.
Drawing lessons from the past, McDonnell Aircraft-under contract to the Air
Force in the 1960s-demonstrated a lift-to-drag (L/D) ratio of 4.0 maneuverable
lifting reentry vehicle (MLRV). At the same time, General Electric demonstrated
a maneuverable reentry vehicle with an L/D of over 2.0. The MLRV had a footprint
thousands of miles long and more than a thousand miles wide. However, the Air
Force discontinued maneuvering reentry vehicle work because it was not needed.
Ballistic reentry was much less complex and less expensive. But the resurrection
of this technology would complicate the role of any ballistic missile defense
system.
While rogue nations would probably not be able to develop such sophisticated
capability by themselves, they might with help from Russia or China. Those two
countries, which are not the United States' best friends, might furnish it to
them directly or under the table.
But we need to work hard and smart to evolve the technology capable of defeating
possible future capabilities. The good news is that the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization is working on a technology plan that will encompass ballistic missile
defense programs performed by the government, in most cases in concert with
the private sector. The bad news is that both government and private sector
research and development funding is declining.
Morton T. Eldridge is a consultant at Guest Associates Inc., a Huntsville,
Ala.-based firm specializing in business development and engineering services.