My comments this month are precipitated by President
Clinton's $110 billion proposed increase for the Defense Department during Fiscal
Years 2000-06.
If approved by Congress, this funding boost would represent the first long-term
sustained increase in defense spending in more than a decade. Further, the administration
says that the additional funding will help the Pentagon achieve its procurement
spending goal of $60 billion per year by Fiscal Year 2001.
Currently, procurement is running at about $45 billion per year. The chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry Shelton said "First, this budget
will fully fund our critical readiness requirements" and "second,
it will enable us to achieve the procurement goals spelled out in the Quadrennial
Defense Review."
But, before we get carried away with optimism about the prospect of more dollars
for force modernization, we should take a closer look. First, the audit trail:
The Joint Chiefs originally sought a $148 billion increase over the Fiscal
Years 2000-06 period. Then the chiefs and the secretary of defense negotiated
this level to $112 billion and Office of Management and Budget and the White
House agreed to $110 billion.
For Fiscal Year 2000, the Defense Department would receive $12 billion of this
increase-$2 billion for Bosnia, $2.5 billion for military pay raises and improved
retirement benefits, and $7.5 billion for a variety of other needs such as reliability
upgrades to aging equipment, spare parts, as well as modernization programs.
So the Pentagon ended up with 74 percent of the original Joint Chiefs' target
and, considering the volatility of budget drills, that's probably not so bad.
The bottom line is that we should also look at were the money comes from, because
there's more than meets the eye. First, 68 percent of the increase is for the
latter three years of the six-year period. Thus, only 32 percent or $40 billion
of the increase will apply to the serious near-term readiness problems facing
our forces today.
Perhaps more importantly, 60 percent of the $110 billion proposed increase-or
$66 billion-is to be generated from within the current defense budget projections.
These funds would stem from internal savings resulting from expected fuel price
decreases, projected lower inflation, and other efficiencies such as acquisition
reform (Haven't we spent that savings several times before?).
In the end, the much heralded $12 billion increase for the budget year 2000
only includes $4 billion that will be added to the defense top line.
The fact that much of the increase is forecast to be generated from within
the current budget is a direct consequence of the budget rules change in Fiscal
Year 2000, which removed the so-called firewalls for defense and domestic activities.
This means that one spending cap covers both activities and the arrangement
results in a so-called zero sum game-if defense is increased, domestic programs
must be reduced.
It is doubtful that defense can be a winner for very long under this scenario
because the American public generally is not ready to support increases in defense
spending at the expense of domestic priorities. Many of these citizens who do
not support higher military budgets take the competence of our forces for granted.
It's worth noting that anyone under the age of 40 probably does not remember
Vietnam.
Further, in an era when fewer and fewer policy makers have ever served in the
military, and when the political process is less attuned to matters of national
security, we probably should heave a sigh of relief that any increase at all
has been granted.
Meanwhile, at NDIA our goal now is to focus on the top priority item of the
association's Top 10 Policy Issues for 1999-to support increased defense modernization
budgets. Escalating from the current $45 billion annual procurement level to
the $60 billion target will take more than the $40 billion increase requested
for the first three years-especially if we are to sustain the pay raises and
other necessary quality-of-life improvements.
As the President said in his January 2 radio address, "when we give our
service men and women a mission, there is a principal we must keep in mind:
We should never ask them to do what they are not equipped to do, and we should
always equip them to do what we ask. The more we ask, the greater our responsibility
to give our troops the support and training and equipment they need."
We can only hope that the President and the Congress act on these good words.