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More Lift Needed, Avers U.S. Transportation Chief 

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by Harold Kennedy 

U.S. Air Force strategic airlifters are prepared to conduct “any level of operations” necessary for the next phase of the war on terrorism, according to Air Force Gen. John W. Handy, commander in chief of the U.S. Transportation Command and commander of the Air Mobility Command. In the long run, however, more aircraft will be required, he told National Defense.

The Transportation Command is responsible for strategic air, land and sea transportation of all U.S. military services throughout the world. Headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Ill., it includes the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command and the Army’s Military Traffic management Command. In military parlance, Handy is “dual-hatted;” he heads both the Transportation Command and the AMC.

During the war in Afghanistan, the airlifters have been able to pace themselves, Handy said, so that he does not see a need to pause for reconstitution. “I would characterize that as not a high level or serious concern, because we, in fact, have not had to defer major maintenance as we’ve gone through this entire process,” he said. “To the greatest extent possible, we’ve been able to get aircraft back to home station and [give] appropriate maintenance.”

Thus far in the war, Handy said, the airlifters have performed “extraordinarily well,” in transporting personnel, equipment and supplies. “All of the feedback that we’ve hand from the other CINCs (war-fighting commanders) has been glowing,” he said.

Because Afghanistan is a landlocked country, almost everything that the war fighters initially needed went in “almost exclusively” by air, he said. During the first six months of the war, U.S. transports:

During that same period, tankers flew 1,500 refueling missions to help U.S.-based aircraft reach their destinations in Central Asia.

The heavy lifting, he noted, was done by the Air Force’s newest transports, the massive C-17 Globemaster IIIs, which flew 47 percent of all airlift missions into the theater. The C-5B Galaxies—which are bigger, but more than three decades old—accounted for 29 percent of missions into the region. Once in-theater, C-5 cargo was transferred to C-17s and C-130s, which could land on the short, austere runways of Afghanistan.

Allies—including British, Belgian, Canadian, Dutch, French, Norwegians and Spanish—also flew air-transport missions, using C-130s primarily, Handy said. The British, he noted, have leased four C-17s.

Commercial air cargo, including Soviet-designed An-124 Condors, conducted 8 percent of the flights, he said. The An-124s, even larger than U.S. C-5s, are operated now by Russian and Ukrainian companies, Handy pointed out.

Just a few years ago, the United States never would have considered using Soviet assets, Handy acknowledged, but he added: “The world has changed. The Soviet Union is dead, and now we even have contacts with businesses in former Soviet republics.”

The United States sought allied and commercial contributions, because it does not have the airlift and refueling capability that it needs, Handy said. “It’s a fact that we have shortfalls both in airlift and refueling,” he said. “That’s an honest fact.”

This spring, Handy said, the Air Force presented members of Congress with a so-called Global Mobility Roadmap, outlining the service’s air mobility needs and how it proposes to meet them.

Minimum Requirements
Right now, the United States does not have enough airlift to meet the minimum requirements set in a recent study of the Defense Department’s transportation system, called Mobility Requirements Study 2005, he noted.

That study estimated that, by 2005, the armed services will need a minimum of 54.5 million ton miles in strategic airlift per day from the active and reserve components of the AMC and commercial airliners in the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet. Today’s capability is less than 46 million ton miles per day, Handy said. “The shortfall is dramatic,” he said.

To fill the gap, he said, the AMC needs more C-17s and modernized C-5s, C-130s and tankers. This year, Congress approved procurement of 60 additional C-17s, which will bring the total number to 180. But that won’t be enough, Handy said. “We need at least 222 C-17s to meet the minimum requirements of MRS-05,” he said. The additional C-17s are needed to replace the venerable C-141 Starlifter, which is scheduled for retirement in the fall of 2006.

“The C-17 is remarkable in its capability,” Handy said. With a length of 174 feet, it can carry up to 170,900 pounds of cargo, including a 70-ton M-1 Abrams tank. It can airdrop 102 paratroops and equipment. With in-flight refueling, it can reach almost any spot on the globe, he noted.

Despite its bulk, Handy said, the C-17 can take off and land at small, unimproved airfields, with runways as short as 3,000 feet and only 90 feet wide. Even on such narrow runways, the C-17 can turn around, using its three-point star turn and backing capability, “just like driving a car,” he explained.

“It can get into just about any strip where a C-130 can land,” said Handy. In Afghanistan, for example, C-17s conducted nighttime, combat dirt landings, using night-vision goggles, to deliver reinforcements and cargo to the Marines at Camp Rhino.

The United States also needs to modernize its existing fleet of 126 C-5s, Handy said. “The C-5s have been incredible work horses, bringing in huge amounts of cargo and passengers,” he told a group of Washington defense writers.

Because the C-5 can handle 270,000 pounds of cargo—nearly 100,000 more than the C-17—it has been used to move “large numbers of assets” from the continental United States to the war zone, Handy said. Because they require a hardened runway at least 4,900 feet long, he said, C-5s are flown to midway points, primarily in Germany, Spain and Diego Garcia, where cargo and personnel are transferred to C-17s and flown into the theater.

The C-5s, however, are aging. The first ones—the 76 C-5As—are more than 30 years old and beginning to encounter problems with systems obsolescence, corrosion and reliability. In 1998, maintenance inspections found severe cracks in the horizontal stabilizer tie boxes of six out of seven C-5As inspected.

To fix such problems, the Air Force has embarked upon a two-phase program. In 1999, it awarded a $454 million contract—for an avionics modernization program—to the C-5’s manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, of Marietta, Ga. Under the terms of the contract, Lockheed will update the flight-control, communications and navigation systems and instrument displays.

Then, in 2001, the Air Force gave Lockheed a $1.1 billion contract to begin the system development phase of the C-5 reliability enhancement and reengining program, or RERP.

During the RERP, Lockheed will upgrade the C-5s with modern, commercial engines and systems and structural adjustments intended to make the aircraft viable until at least 2040. During the initial, seven-year phase of the RERP, Lockheed will develop its modernization strategy and demonstrate it on four C-5 aircraft. If the Air Force likes the results, it can award a modernization contract for the entire C-5 fleet.

The Air Force also is updating its four-decade-old C-130s, Handy explained. In 2001, the service selected the Boeing Company, of St. Louis, Mo., to perform a $4 billion avionics modernization for approximately 500 C-130s.

All of the 1950s-era analog instruments with round dials will be replaced with standard, flat-panel, digital displays. A new heads-up display will allow pilots to gather information while looking outside the cockpit.

Other upgrades include modern multi-function radar, new communications systems, a flight-management system and a single air-data computer to replace the current three variants. In addition, new instruments will be made compatible with night-vision goggles.

Installation is scheduled to begin in 2004 and continue through 2014, according to Boeing spokesman Paul Guse.

Air Force KC-135 Stratotankers and KC-10A Extenders struggled to meet the in-flight refueling needs of U.S. and coalition aircraft, especially during the early days of the Afghan war, Handy said. They got help from British and Turkish refuelers, he noted.

The Air Force has 540 KC-135s, which date back to 1957, and 59 KC-10s, which were introduced in 1981. In 1998, the service signed contracts worth $2.5 billion for their manufacturer, Boeing, to take over depot-level maintenance for both aircraft. The majority of the work is being performed at the Boeing Aerospace Support Center in San Antonio, Texas.

Currently, the Air Force is negotiating with Boeing to lease up to 100 Boeing 767 aircraft for 10 years and convert them into tankers as the first step in replacing the entire KC-135 fleet. This move—estimated to cost $26 billion—would save the Air Force an estimated $3 billion in reduced operating and maintenance costs over the next few years, according to U.S. Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan., in whose state the work would be performed.

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., however, cited studies by the White House Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office finding that the Air Force lease proposal would be too expensive. The OMB study declared that leasing would cost nearly 10 times the cost of upgrading the current fleet of KC-135s. The CBO report said that leasing would be “significantly more expensive” than a direct purchase of the 767s.

In another complication, Airbus—the European aircraft manufacturer—also is seeking to compete for the deal.

No matter which manufacturer is selected, Handy argued, leasing the 767s, rather than buying them, could be an attractive way of holding down up-front costs. “Let me ask you a question,” he proposed to reporters. “Why do you lease? Because you don’t have the money to buy a Mercedes or a Dodge. Your up-front money costs are dramatic. Leasing is a way to spread out this cost over a period of time. That is why people lease today.”

Thus far, however, McCain seems to be winning the debate. In May, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved his proposal—an amendment to the 2003 Defense Authorization Bill—that the Air Force be required to obtain specific congressional authorization and appropriation of funds before entering into any lease for B-767s.

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