Roger Beaumont’s latest book, “Right Backed by Might:
The International Air Force Concept,” provides an in-depth
military and political history of the Western world as it relates
to the concepts of “international police force (IPF) and “international
air force” (IAF).
As an Air Force officer candidate and a student of Western European
politics and history, I found it a disappointing reading experience.
The idea of having standing multi-national military and policy
forces has been studied for decades, and it would have been interesting
to hear from Beaumont—who is a credible expert—about
why these forces have not materialized as many had hoped. But Beaumont
fails to offer his opinions on the matter.
Academics will find this book elementary, and those with only a
mild interest won’t get past the first few pages. But I would
strongly recommend it for someone writing a research paper—the
sources listed are numerous and mostly primary.
The true history buff, however, will be frustrated by the lack
of new insight or information. The novice will learn the chronological
order of events in modern military and political history, but not
much else. Beaumont presupposes the reader has a vast knowledge
of history and consequently glosses over the events that comprise
it. The result is that there is no real target audience for this
book.
“Right Backed By Might” attempts to provide an outline
of the history of the modern world as a backdrop to the story of
an international air force; the concept of an IAF comes up frequently,
but most often in the context of the League of Nations and the United
Nations. He mentions many failed attempts and designs for various
IAFs, but given the nature of air power—and its propensity
to change quickly—these precedents may or may not be useful.
He also fails to give sufficient attention to the way these concepts
have evolved in recent years.
The book moves very quickly, and does not go into any significant
depth, up until the events of the 1940s. The ‘40s, ‘50s,
and ‘60s are all carefully detailed. But after that, when
his thesis should be picking up speed, given the huge advances in
air power since the 1970s and the increase in global cooperation,
he slows down, merely glossing over the events of the 80s and 90s.
He makes no significant mention of any current plans for an international
air force, although several entities out there today seem suspiciously
akin to one.
The insufficient coverage of modern times stems from a lack of
appropriate organization. For instance, chapter three covers the
years 1919-1939. But the last chapter is subtitled “collective
security since World War II.” To devote the first four chapters
of the book to the time before World War II—and only one chapter
to the nearly 60 years since—is a vast oversight. Most of
the developments that have taken place in the realm of air power
have happened very recently. I would venture to say 95 percent have
occurred since World War II. To lump all that change together into
one final chapter seems at best inappropriate and at worst inane.
Another problem that I see is the implication that the IAF concept
has reached its heyday and since declined. He titles his chapter
on World War II, “In Fullest Bloom.” What is “in
bloom,” of course, are the concepts of an IAF and an IPF.
This seems suspect. While the idea of such entities were popular
at the time, the Western world certainly did not have the technology,
capabilities, or let alone the willingness to ever make it a reality.
Given the trend toward globalization, the actual possibility of
practical application and implementation is much nearer—and,
in some ways, has become a reality.
There are, nevertheless, some redeeming qualities in Beaumont’s
work. Among them is his peculiar turn of phrase, which makes this
book much more bearable for the reader. For instance, at various
points in the book, we are bringing home “the very large slab
of diplomatic bacon,” seeing folks “chained to the doghouse
of the Maginot Line,” drawing the “dull, stubby weapon
forged at Paris” and falling off of the “proverbial
wagon.” We see concepts likened to “keys on the faery
ring of fanciful nostrums ... which won’t fit ‘into
the lock of peace.” When Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia, the
European democracies “did not pick up the gauntlet hurled
into their faces,” and certain bombing raids were “increasingly
bigger beads on the lengthening string of the failure of large-scale
bombing operations.”
Again bearing the casual reader in mind, Beaumont uses his knowledge
of popular culture to his (and ultimately the reader’s) advantage.
He backs up each segment of history with various movie, book, or
song titles that reflect popular sentiment of the times, also citing
various opinion polls and surveys. This brings the point home that
not everything happened in a military or political bubble. The average
citizen was reacting to it and formed opinions—although whether
or not those opinions were heeded by the politicians and diplomats
of the day is another story.
On the same note, there are many useful and interesting quotes
throughout this book. This goes back to Beaumont’s extensive
use of primary sources. He keeps the quotes relatively short (there
was an appreciated lack of block quotes in this book) and always
relevant.
It’s also worth noting that the chapters carry a flower motif
throughout (with names such as “Blossoms on the Wind”
and “Blossoms Scattered and Faded”). Strange for a book
about politicians, the military, and airpower.
This book is a textbook in the strictest sense. At no point does
he draw any conclusions. Well—okay, 10 years of research and
he comes up with these: We need to look at precedent when we talk
about an IAF today, and the likening of the IAF concept to a civilian
police force is incorrect. The analogy actually should be to a fire-prevention
league or an emergency response team. This causes the reader (at
least this reader), upon finishing the book, to say incredulously,
“I rehashed every history class I’ve ever taken to learn
that the analogy is to the wrong civil service?” The answer
to that is a categorical yes.
The only other glimmer of a conclusion is in the last sentence
of the book. Many authors choose to end with a succinct and powerful
closing remark, whereas Beaumont clearly avoided that route. “What
is clear is that, like crime and disease, there is no prospect of
the problem going away, nor will the hazards of persisting in our
heedlessness and leaving our fate to the fall of metaphorical dice
in the form of ad hoc responses.” Where was his editor on
that one?
There is no doubt that Beaumont has incredible command of the knowledge
he confers on the reader. But he is no Stephen Ambrose; this will
not become a best-seller. As evidenced by the plain, academic cover
and the publisher’s write-up, it was not intended to be. However,
it will be checked out of the library. With a comprehensive index
nearly half the length of the book and a footnote virtually every
other sentence, it will be a great directory to further resources
and a wonderful place to begin research on related topics.
“Right Backed By Might: The International Air Force Concept,”
216 pages, published in February 2001 by Greenwood Publishing Group,
Westport, Conn. Price: $64.
Bethany Stott is a cadet at the U.S. Air Force Academy.